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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS: 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCY DECISIONS 
 
The attitudinal model of judicial behavior dominates judicial politics scholarship, 
including studies of federal courts and agencies. Extant research finds limited support for 
legal constraints as determinants of judge behavior when agency decisions are under 
review. Attitudinal scholars suggest judges substitute their policy preferences in place of 
agency preferences. Contrarily, the legal model suggests judges defer to agencies because 
of procedures and doctrine rooted in the rule of law. 
 
This study tests hypotheses predicting whether federal agency review decisions in 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals during 1982-2002 are a function of judges‘ attitudes, namely 
ideology, or a function of legal constraints, including agency adherence to legally 
prescribed procedures and agency passing standard-of-review muster. Using logistic 
regression, I examine the impact of legal and ideological variables on the outcome of 
judges‘ reviews of agency decisions. 
 
Results support several hypotheses. Agency adherence to procedural standards, 
such as those outlined in the Administrative Procedures Act, increases the likelihood that 
a review panel will defer to the agency. If review panels and judges answer standard-of-
review questions favorably toward agencies, review panels and judges are more likely to 
support agencies in final case outcomes. Individual judge votes to support agencies are 
influenced by the ideology of other judges on the review panel: if the ideology of the 
review panel is in agreement with the agency position, individual judges are more likely 
to support agencies in final case outcomes. Finally, a judge is more likely to dissent when 
he/she is in ideological (dis)agreement with the agency position. 
 
In sum, results suggest that judges‘ regard for law and regard for their judge 
colleagues informs decisionmaking. Judges often defer to federal administrative agencies, 
even when their personal policy preferences are not found to be significantly associated 
with decisions. Judges‘ ideological preferences appear to be less important in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals than previous scholarship indicates, but ideology may influence 
judges‘ decisions through the ideological composition of the review panel and in dissent 
 
 
behavior. The implication is that the legal model of judicial behavior may be more 
prominent than the attitudinal model in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.  
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This is a study of judicial behavior in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. At its core, the 
study attempts to test whether decisionmaking is a function of judges‘ personal attitudes 
toward a particular policy or a function of deference to law. Using a sample of cases that 
are appealed to these courts from federal administrative agencies, this study finds that law 
is a strong determinant of judicial behavior. Judges‘ attitudes affect the outcome of their 
decisions only in limited circumstances. 
These findings are important for two primary reasons—one substantive and one 
methodological. Substantively, these findings suggest that a significant portion of the 
third branch of government may be less political than has been portrayed by some 
judicial scholars in political science. That the judicial branch defers to the executive 
branch as prescribed by the legislative branch holds particular import not only for 
policymakers, but also for students of democratic institutions concerned with how well 
fragmented power structures actually work. The current study suggests that 
decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals is more a function of law, deference and 
collegiality than it is a function of judges enacting their political preferences. This is a 
further suggestion that at least a portion of the judicial branch appears to stay within the 
confines of what is considered ‗judicial‘ within the United States‘ fragmented power 
structure. This is to say that if judges encroach into legislative and executive functions 
(i.e., political policymaking and administration), it does not appear that this 
encroachment is pervasive, continuous, or systematic when judges review agency 
decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. 
Beyond shifting the emphasis toward law and away from political ideology in 
judicial decisionmaking, these findings are important because they incorporate the 
theoretical frameworks from both political science and legal scholars. Legal scholars 
have not fully embraced political science‘s findings for a number of reasons, one of 
which is that much of the political science research uses overly broad and reductive 
variables in conjunction with complex statistical tools. The result, legal scholars and 
judges argue, is a body of empirical scholarship that overemphasizes judges‘ political 
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orientations as predictors of judicial behavior and under-emphasizes elements of law that 
are either not measured or are inappropriately measured. Similarly, political science 
scholars have been reluctant to accept as true the findings of legal scholars who 
emphasize law and legal doctrine as primary determinants of judicial behavior. 
It is not a new idea to suggest that the underlying cause of disagreement between 
these disciplines is because political scientists do not understand the nuances of law and 
legal scholars do not understand the nuances of econometrics. Indeed, entire conferences 
and symposia have been dedicated to resolving these concerns. Here, I take care not to 
suggest that political scientists lack the wherewithal to understand legal concepts nor to 
suggest that legal scholars lack the capacity to understand econometrics. In fact, the 
growing body of cross-pollinated scholarship suggests otherwise. I do, however, note that 
the substantive findings of the present study are rooted in an attempt to heed calls from 
both political science and legal scholars to incorporate the methods of both disciplines 
into studies of judicial behavior. Accordingly, I have tried to address in this empirical 
political science study some of the concerns of legal scholars by incorporating more 
nuanced measures of law, legal doctrine, and political ideology. I have also tried to 
incorporate legal concepts and language from actual cases, legal journals, and law 
reviews. 
I am a student of political science. Hence, this study is a doctoral dissertation that 
requires me to document all of my assumptions and to explain in detail my methods. I am 
also a student of law, which means that this study is informed by rudimentary 
understandings of law and legal doctrine. It would be arrogant and naïve to suggest that 
because I am a student of both political science and law that I can single handedly bridge 
the gaps between the two disciplines that have existed for over half of a century, all 
within my first major research study. It may be fair, however, to say that surveying the 
legal scholarship alongside the political science scholarship gives me, and hopefully 
readers of this study, a better understanding of the complexities and misgivings of 
measuring judicial behavior than if I had surveyed only the political science literature. I 
suspect that this was the intent of the myriad scholars calling for interdisciplinary studies 
to judicial behavior. This study relies heavily on quantitative research methods of 
political science, but it is informed by and verified by qualitative research methods from 
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the legal discipline. I will leave it to the reader to decide whether I am successful in this 
approach and whether this approach yielded substantively different and defensible 
results. 
As previously noted, the substantive results of the present study provide empirical 
support for law as an important informant of judicial behavior when agency decisions are 
under review. This study also suggests that the relationship between judges‘ political 
ideologies and their decisions to support agencies is not as evident in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals as it may be in the U.S. Supreme Court. Finally, this study suggests that 
collegiality among judges, who typically review cases in panels of three on the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, may temper judges‘ desires or abilities to substitute their preferences 
in place of agencies‘ preferences. 
In Chapter Two, I examine theories of judicial behavior and focus on the 
competing attitudinal and legal models. The attitudinal model dominates the political 
science literature and asserts that judges decide cases based on their attitudes, most often 
measured by judges‘ political ideologies. The legal model suggests that judges decide 
cases based on law and legal principles rooted in constitutionalism. 
Few scholars have reconciled the attitudinal and legal models, primarily because 
of measurement issues, but also because judicial behavior scholars focus on the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Much of the attitudinal research shows that the Supreme Court is a 
political entity, quite often dismissing law and legal doctrine as real constraints on 
justices‘ behavior. At best, some judicial behavior scholars suggest that while judges do 
vote according to their personal attitudes, the law may temper their ability to do so. 
Scholars heretofore have not sufficiently operationalized and subsequently measured the 
impact of the law on judges‘ votes and decisions. Further, few scholars have examined 
the attitudinal and legal models in courts other than the Supreme Court. 
This study focuses on the U.S. Courts of Appeals and gives special attention to 
the D.C. Circuit. The courts of appeals are a particularly good place to examine judicial 
behavior, not only because they serve as the courts of first-level appeals for a vast 
number of litigants, but also because they essentially function as the courts of last resort 
for an overwhelming majority of legal conflicts in the federal system. Less than one 
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percent of cases heard in the U.S. Courts of Appeals go on to be reviewed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
In Chapter Two, I argue the case for why judicial review of agency actions is a 
particularly good focus for a judicial behavior study. There is a considerable body of law 
that requires federal courts to defer to federal agency decisions in certain contexts. These 
laws stand in sharp contrast to attitudinalist assertions that judges substitute their 
ideologically-based preferences in place of agencies‘ preferences. Therefore, judicial 
review of agency actions necessarily pits the legal model against the attitudinal model. 
In Chapter Three, I use past studies of court-agency relations to form several 
hypotheses about judicial behavior in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. These hypotheses are 
concerned with federal agency success in court as a function of judges‘ ideological 
agreement with agencies and also as a function of judges‘ legally-prescribed deference to 
agencies. I hypothesize that behavior in the D.C. Circuit may be different from other 
circuits because of the disproportionately large number of administrative agency appeals 
that this circuit hears compared to other circuits. 
Reconciling the legal and attitudinal models of judicial behavior has been 
discussed and examined rather extensively in the political science literature, but these 
studies generally fail to adequately conceptualize and measure elements of the legal 
model. Scholars have been much more successful at specifying attitudinal models using 
judge ideology as an indicator of judge preferences; few scholars have been able to 
specify quantitative models that capture legal and attitudinal variables in the same model.   
In Chapter Four, I focus on building a model of judicial behavior. Here, I 
operationalize a number of legal variables based on legally-prescribed court deference to 
agencies, namely a number of standards of review that judges address when agency 
decisions are under review. Generally, these standards of review require judges not to set 
aside agency actions in favor of the courts‘ preferences. According to the legal model, 
agency decisions should remain intact so long as agencies: 1) provide substantial 
evidence to support their decisions, 2) do not abuse discretion, 3) do not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously, and/or 4) provide reasonable interpretations of statutes. I also examine 
several procedural questions pertinent to agency decisions, and specifically examine the 
relationship between agency adherence to prescribed procedures and judges‘ support for 
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agencies in final case decisions. I conclude Chapter Four by specifying several logistic 
regression models to test the hypotheses. 
Using data from the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database, I test hypotheses in 
Chapter Five using these logistic regression models. I examine a sample of published 
cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals reviewing federal administrative agency actions 
during the period 1982-2002. Results of the hypothesis testing strongly suggest that 
courts extend considerable deference to agencies where ideology yields to law in a great 
number of circumstances. This deference not only predicts behavior in the courts, but 
also helps explain why 90% of the agency-review decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
are unanimous and why agencies receive support in about two-thirds of appearances 
before these courts. Further, the results show that review panels and judges in the D.C. 
Circuit are generally no more or less political or deferential than their counterparts in 
other circuits. 
While this study provides considerable support for the legal model and suggests 
that behavior in the courts of appeals is less political than past scholarship suggests, 
ideology does manifest in limited circumstances. Further analysis of the outputs of 
logistic regressions in Chapter Six suggest that the ideological composition of a review 
panel sometimes affects the behavior of individual judges and that judges‘ decisions to 
dissent may be a function of their ideological (dis)agreement with agencies. 
The results of this study move the political science and legal disciplines closer to 
understanding more fully judicial behavior in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Judges have 
often described in their opinions and academic commentaries the struggle of the courts to 
find balance between an almost obsequious deference to administrative agencies and an 
invasive, intense scrutiny of their actions. Striking a balance between these extremes and 
maintaining the integrity of a review function that is substantively meaningful is not only 
the concern of judges, but also the concern of Congress, the President, and citizens, the 
latter of which are intimately affected by these decisions. This study suggests that courts 
and judges do reasonably well finding this balance. Judges defer to agencies 
considerably, but only where agency decisions rest within the confines of reasonableness 
and consistency. 
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In Chapter Seven, I discuss the ramifications of law and politics in a 
comprehensive model of judicial behavior. A complete model of judicial behavior should 
not be defined by what judges ought to do; rather, what they actually do. However, to 
ignore normativity in these models is to discount structural and professional norms that 
may also constrain judicial behavior. 
As do many studies in political science, this study probably raises more questions 
than it answers. I include in Chapter Seven a discussion of the limitations of this research, 
and I use the results of this research to frame areas for future inquiry. Neither the 
attitudinal model nor the legal model completely describe or predict judicial behavior in 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals. While this study brings law back into the study of judicial 
behavior and finds limited support for the role of politics in judging in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, future researchers must continue to bridge the theoretical and empirical divides 
between political science scholarship and legal scholarship. Doing so requires more 
extensive conceptualization and measurement of legal concepts, as well as finding new 
ways to measure and evaluate judges‘ normative philosophies of judging in practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Jerry D. Thomas 2010 
7 
 
CHAPTER 2: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 
 
 
Court scholars, especially those trained in the political science discipline, have 
been greatly concerned over the past sixty years with how judges behave and why they 
behave as they do. Scholars as early as C. Herman Pritchett (1948) speculated on law and 
politics as informants of judicial behavior and developed a framework for political 
science scholars to conceptualize and operationalize elements of law and politics as 
determinants of court and judge decisionmaking. As Martin Shapiro noted in 1964, 
political scientists approached judicial decisionmaking with an eye toward power. They 
examined courts and judges as political entities concerned with wielding power against 
other institutions and in society more broadly (Shapiro 1964). The resultant body of 
political science literature framed courts as political institutions, with judges‘ decisions 
largely informed by their own personal attitudes and policy preferences. 
Legal scholars approached American jurisprudence with emphasis on the law, 
with the concomitant body of legal scholarship placing great weight on rule of law and 
substantive elements of the law as determinants of judges‘ behavior. This body of 
scholarship is considerably broad, in part, because it examines many sources of law, 
including statutes, Congressional actions, executive orders, administrative decisions, 
rulings of other courts, and myriad state actions. The legal approach to judicial behavior 
often takes on a normative tone, but legal scholars support these normative conclusions 
with extensive analyses of court decisions and opinions about the law. Hence, the legal 
model of judicial behavior does not place nearly as much weight on courts and judges 
being political institutions as political science scholars do; instead, legal scholars 
acknowledge that law constrains judicial behavior. Disagreement continues over whether 
judges make decisions based on law or politics. 
The differences in these two approaches are rooted primarily in epistemology. 
Political scientists draw heavily on econometrics and other social science research 
methods. The vast legal scholarship is rooted more heavily in individual case analyses 
and theoretical considerations for how judges ought to behave. As Shapiro noted, 
avoiding feuds between lawyers and political scientists, or among political scientists 
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themselves, is of little value, as all techniques for examining courts are meritorious 
(1964, p. 7). It is not the intention of the present study to take sides in the debates 
concerning the most appropriate approach to examining the courts. I tend to agree with 
Shapiro that all approaches offer value to our understanding of the judicial system and its 
myriad players. It is the intent of the present study, however, to investigate the extent to 
which decisionmaking in the federal courts is a function of politics or law or both. 
THEORIES OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 
The judicial behavior literature in political science is rather prolific, with a 
number of competing and complementing approaches to judicial behavior emerging over 
the past half-century. James Gibson characterized judicial decisionmaking rather 
succinctly, ―In a nutshell, judges‘ decisions are a function of what they prefer to do, 
tempered by what they think they ought to do, but constrained by what they perceive is 
feasible to do‖ (Gibson 1983, p. 9). Further, he noted, ―Roughly speaking, attitude theory 
pertains to what judges prefer to do, role theory to what they think they ought to do, and a 
host of group-institution theories to what is feasible to do‖ (Gibson 1983, p. 9). 
Among these various theories of judicial behavior, the attitudinal model emerged 
in the past several decades as the predominant one in political science. The attitudinal 
model posits that judges vote according to their attitudes or personal policy preferences. 
This model views courts and judges as political entities, rather than objective, 
disinterested interpreters of the law. 
Among Gibson‘s host of group-institution theories is organization theory, which 
emphasizes the organizational constraints placed on various institutions such as public 
agencies, Congress and the courts. While not explicitly named so, organization theory is 
tangential to the legal model of judicial behavior, which emphasizes elements of the law 
as constraints on judges‘ actions. Within the framework of organization theory, the legal 
model suggests that Congress, the Presidency and public agencies constrain judge 
behavior. That is, courts do not substitute their policy preferences in place of other 
institutions‘ preferences, such as the preferences of Congress. Instead, courts interpret 
and apply laws created by these other institutions. 
The current study examines two leading models of judicial behavior—the 
attitudinal model and the legal model. To be clear at the outset, there are a number of 
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competing and complementing models and theories of judicial behavior beyond these 
two, such as role theory, cue theory, strategic and historical-institutional models (for an 
expanded discussion of models of judicial behavior, see Gibson 1983; Maveety 2003). 
However, the present study does not address these other models and does not suggest 
they are inferior to the attitudinal and legal models. Rather, as I discuss later in this 
chapter, the attitudinal and legal models necessarily emerge as competing models of 
judicial behavior when examining the relationship between federal courts and 
administrative agencies. Thus, the attitudinal and legal models serve as the starting point 
of inquiry and are the focus of the present study. The next sections provide dimension to 
the attitudinal and legal models and discuss their respective scholarly strengths and 
limitations. 
Attitudinal Model 
In her discussion of Pioneers of Judicial Behavior, Nancy Maveety (2003) notes 
the influence of behavioral psychology as a fundamental tenet of the attitudinal model. 
Judges come to the decision-making table with attitudes already in place that inform their 
behavior. Motivations for judges‘ votes are best explained as products of these attitudes 
and personal policy preferences (Maveety 2003). In this regard, attitudinalists view courts 
and judges as political entities, where judges‘ decisions are best explained as a function 
of their predetermined policy preferences. 
Attitudinalist research is characterized by a number of methods and assumptions 
that require it to focus on court decisions and outcomes. Since individual judge votes are 
the most basic components of court decisions, much of the judicial behavior research uses 
individual judge vote as the unit of analysis (e.g., Segal 1986). While a number of 
scholars have examined various background attributes of judges, such as race, gender, 
socioeconomic status, and party affiliation, the strongest predictor of individual judges‘ 
attitudes has been captured by judges‘ ideology. Using ideology as a proxy for attitudes, 
attitudinalists generally characterize judges dichotomously as either conservative or 
liberal (Segal and Cover 1989; Segal et al. 1995b; Segal and Spaeth 2002). By 
characterizing judges as either conservative or liberal, attitudinalist researchers use these 
ideologies to predict the ideological outcome of cases. This decision-based approach to 
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judicial behavior typifies the quantitative approach to research, which carries with it 
some advantages and disadvantages.  
The greatest advantage lies in studies that have a large number of observations. 
By specifying quantitative models that articulate the relationships between judges‘ 
ideologies and their voting decisions and applying these models to large datasets over 
time, attitudinalists compellingly argue that judges are political. The landmark studies in 
political science show that conservative judges have policy preferences that are 
conservative and tend to vote accordingly. Similarly, liberal judges have liberal policy 
preferences and tend to cast votes in accordance with their liberal views.  In sum, 
attitudinalists have found consistent evidence that conservative judges vote 
conservatively and liberal judges vote liberally, with little evidence of legal constraints.  
Distinguishing judges as political players is not exclusive to attitudinalists in 
political science. Among law scholars, legal realists similarly argue that judges may not 
neutrally and objectively interpret and apply the law, but advance their own personal and 
political preferences in their decisionmaking (for a review of legal realism, see Leiter 
1997). 
There are several notable shortcomings in attitudinalist research. Attitudinalists 
tend, as Shapiro (1968) warned, to view the courts very narrowly in terms of yes-no 
votes. They tend to base their findings on the outcomes of cases and do not consider other 
elements, such as opinions and specific legal issues raised in cases. In this regard, 
attitudinalists do not capture in their analyses, for example, whether a conservative 
decision is broad, reaching far into a policy arena or affecting a large segment of society, 
or whether the same conservative decision is narrowly construed to limit the scope and 
reach of its impact.  Focusing on broadly defined ideological directions of case decisions 
to the exclusion of the decisions‘ rationales and underpinnings risks overstating, 
understating, or incorrectly stating the impact of courts (see, for example, Carolyn 
Shapiro 2009, examining the limits of empirical research that overstates the impact of 
judge ideology when researchers code ideology too broadly without duly considering the 
substance of law). 
Attitudinalists tend to focus on cases where disagreement exists among judges 
and justices, mostly because of the limitations associated with quantitative analysis tools 
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and the concomitant need for observable variation  (for an expanded critique of 
attitudinal research and in particular, Segal and Spaeth's, "The Supreme Court and the 
Attitudinal Model Revisited," see Gerhardt 2003). For the U.S. Supreme Court, focusing 
on non-unanimous cases artificially inflates the percentage of time justices rely on their 
ideological preferences in decisionmaking. If justices are unanimous 25-40% of the time 
(Baum 2004), it is at least plausible that this agreement may be a functions of justices‘ 
adhering to clearly written law  or to justices deferring to other authoritative entities 
including Congress, the President, states, and administrative agencies. Despite political 
scientists‘ assertions that unanimous decisions should not be construed as consensual 
based on legal clarity (Brenner and Arrington 1987; Songer 1982; Spaeth 1989), the 
extant literature on this matter has not effectively teased out whether unanimity in the 
courts is or is not a function of law. 
Another limitation of the attitudinal model is the lack of studies examining a 
variety of policy areas. The hallmark attitudinal studies focus on civil liberties and 
economic issues (Segal et al. 1995a; Segal and Spaeth 2002). Civil liberties and 
economic issues are among the most politically salient, and judges may be more inclined 
to vote politically in these policy areas compared to other policy areas, such as utilities 
regulation or entitlements. Admittedly, all policy areas are arguably political, as any 
policy debate produces political proponents and opponents. However, my argument here 
is one of political magnitude. Civil liberties and economic cases may be more highly 
charged politically than cases in other policy areas. Hence, judicial behavior in civil 
liberties and economic cases may not be representative of judicial behavior more broadly. 
Finally, most attitudinal research focuses on the U.S. Supreme Court and gives 
little attention to other courts. Attitudinalists themselves acknowledge that the structure, 
dynamics and norms of other federal courts is substantially different from the Supreme 
Court, sufficiently so to reasonably question whether attitudinalists‘ findings can be 
generalized to other courts. For example, lower federal courts‘, unlike the U.S. Supreme 
Court, are unable to control their own dockets. The Supreme Court, with few exceptions, 
chooses the cases it hears through granting writs of certiorari compared to lower federal 
courts, which are generally required to hear all cases that come before them. To assess 
the full nature of judicial behavior in mandatory review courts, such as the U.S. Courts of 
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Appeals, attitudinalists must evaluate whether the nature of the cases that these courts 
must hear is substantively different from that of cases granted certiorari in the Supreme 
Court. Further, because lower federal courts must dispose of all cases that come before 
them, attitudinalists should also consider whether the concomitant high-volume caseloads 
in lower federal courts impact the way judges behave. Beyond docket control, a number 
of other lower-court norms and processes may make the external validity of attitudinal 
findings suspect. 
In sum, past attitudinal research produces compelling evidence using large-N 
quantitative studies showing a great propensity for judges to decide cases consistently 
with their ideologies. However, the results of these studies are limited. Specifically, 
attitudinal research may not fully capture the full scope of judicial behavior if these 
studies are based only on yes-no votes and broadly coded ideologies. Further, the results 
may apply only to certain policy areas and only to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Legal Model 
The term ―legal model‖ is an oft-used but ill-defined phrase that generally refers 
to judges adhering to the rule of law. As an empirical model of judicial behavior, political 
scientists have not specified, operationalized and measured the legal model to the same 
extent as the attitudinal model. Hence, the legal model has become an ill-defined term 
that is often defined only in terms of being the attitudinal model‘s nemesis. In the words 
of one scholar, ―given comments of judges that they base their decisions on legal 
principles, we must continue to treat the legal model as an alternative to the attitudinal 
model‖ (Hagle 1993, p. 98). 
A few scholars have tried to provide clarity to the legal model. For example, in 
their book chapter titled ―The Legal Model,‖ Segal and Spaeth suggest that the legal 
model ranges from mechanical jurisprudence to more sophisticated variants (2002, p. 48). 
Mechanical jurisprudence, which most modern scholars including Segal and Spaeth do 
not embrace, presumes there is a single correct answer to legal questions that judges must 
find (2002, p. 48 n. 11). Instead, the authors prefer a legal model with variants that are 
connected by the ―belief that … the decisions of the Court are substantially influenced by 
the facts of the case in light of the plain meaning of statutes and the Constitution, the 
intent of the Framers, and/or precedent‖ (2002, p. 48). Segal and Spaeth continue 
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developing their legal model by discussing the problems associated with gleaning 
legislative intent from statutes, including some Justices approaches to jurisprudence such 
as originalism. While this legal model does hold some merit, some scholars view it as an 
ill-defined straw man whose primary purpose is to show that law is not a force that 
demonstrates that justices behave in any systematic way (Canon 1993). 
The apparent problem with Segal and Spaeth‘s conception is that the elements of 
their legal model are, in part, justice‘s approaches to interpretation, which are not 
measurable elements of a model. Originalism, for example, is a jurisprudential approach 
that is not codified by Congress, nor is this approach dictated by common law in the form 
of Supreme Court precedent for lower courts to follow. It would not be valid to construct 
a legal model based on jurisprudential approaches to interpretation—these approaches 
speak more to judges‘ specific role perceptions and not to law or legal doctrines.
1
 In this 
regard, the elements of Segal and Spaeth‘s legal model are overly broad and encroach 
into jurisprudential philosophies that the authors do not operationalize and measure. 
Canon‘s criticism of Segal and Spaeth‘s conception of the legal model fairly 
summarizes the problems associated with conceptualizing and measuring the legal model 
in general (1993). He writes: 
Every fervent cause needs an enemy, so Segal and Spaeth create one by 
positing a so-called legal model as the only theoretical alternative to 
explaining the justices‘ behavior. They assert without references or 
follow-up discussion that ―legalists do claim that their model not only 
should explain decisions, but also that it actually does do so.‖ They then 
pose a test between the two models. But no test ever occurs. The legal 
model is too crippled to show up at the field and the attitudinal model wins 
by forfeit. The latter is a scientific model capable of being tested 
empirically. The legal “model” is not scientific; the authors concede that it 
cannot be empirically tested. It is not a model at all in the research sense 
of the term. It is merely a list of things such as textual meaning, drafters’ 
intent and precedent that judges are said to consider when making 
decisions. Because no one can say what weight each of the legal 
components should contribute or how a judge should select the most 
                                                 
1
 To be clear, in the last chapter of the present study, I discuss role theory as an alternative to the legal 
model and the attitudinal model. There, I suggest that scholars can and should conceptualize and measure 
elements of judges‘ role perceptions as informants of judicial behavior. These elements include originalism 
and purposivism, as well as legal norms, such as canons of construction. Here, the point is, as Canon states, 
―Of course, there would be difficulties in comparing the predictions of role theory with those of the 
attitudinal model, but comparison would not be impossible as it is with [Segal and Spaeth‘s] unsubscribed 
and ill defined legal model‖ (Canon 1993, p. 99). 
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relevant precedent (or the most relevant evidence of intent, etc.) from 
among those urged upon him or her, it is impossible to assess the strength 
of the legal model. In fact, the authors are not clear about the boundaries 
of the legal model (Canon 1993, p. 99, emphasis added). 
Defining the legal model in the legal discipline may also be as problematic as it is 
in political science. As Segal and Spaeth (2002) note, from the viewpoint of social 
scientists, a successful model validly and reliably explains and predicts behavior, and it 
does so parsimoniously. They go on to suggest that a model‘s explanatory ability must 
also be falsifiable or testable, which is to say that the model must be able to state a priori 
the conditions that, if observed, would refute the model. Based on this definition of a 
model, it is not the usual practice for legal scholars to build ―models‖ or to speak in terms 
of ―models‖ of judicial behavior.  
However, this is not to say that legal scholars do not provide conceptual 
assistance upon which other scholars can build a legal model. Legal scholars frequently 
extol and criticize legal principles and legal doctrines upon which judges and justices 
base their decisions. The ―model‖ that Segal and Spaeth developed is not entirely 
inaccurate. Legal theorists do emphasize legal constraints, such as stare decisis, statutory 
and constitutional language, legislative intent, and agency rules. In doing so, legal 
scholars also consider modes of interpretation, decisions of other courts and jurisdictions, 
and expertise of administrative agencies—all of which can be considered part of a legal 
model of judicial behavior. 
Although they are often normative in nature, legal theories are rooted in analyses 
legal principles and legal doctrines frequently found in of judges‘ opinions. Whereas 
attitudinal analysts rely on models of judicial behavior that are tested using decision 
analyses, many legal analysts largely assume that law and legal principles are the 
motivating factors behind judges‘ decisions, and legal analysts shift their foci to judges‘ 
opinions. It is upon the legal principles and doctrines found in opinions that a legal model 
of judicial behavior can be defined. 
While I agree with Canon that Segal and Spaeth fail to define a legal model 
because they fail to conceptualize its elements in measurable, testable terms, I disagree 
that ―legal norms cannot be quantified‖ (Canon 1993, p. 99). It is possible to 
conceptualize and operationalize a legal model that falls between the overly simplistic 
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mechanical jurisprudence model that Segal and Spaeth criticize and the amorphous 
variant of precedent, plain meaning and intent that they create (see Segal and Spaeth 
2002).  Admittedly, however, the task of positioning a legal model between these 
extremes may mean positioning the model closer to the mechanical jurisprudence in order 
to operationalize, measure, and test legal concepts.  
However ill-defined legal models may be, they also sustain other criticism. Most 
typically, legal models (loosely defined) are based on small-N case studies that are not 
generalizable beyond the specific set of facts at bar (see Segal and Spaeth 2002). This 
criticism notwithstanding, legal scholarship on a single topic is often extensive. For 
example, a cursory survey of ―deference‖ in legal journals and law reviews reveals a 
plethora of scholarship (see, for example, Bradley 2000; Crawford 1994; Criddle 2003; 
Epstein 1982; Gibbs 1992; Gossett 1997; Leahy 1989; Lovejoy 2002; Manning 1996; 
Matsubara 1994; Merrill 1992; Molot 2000; Nichols 2003; Oldham 1995; Stefan 1992; 
Walker 1999; White 2000; Yavelberg 1992). Nonetheless, legal scholars do not often 
utilize econometric techniques that provide causal explanations of judge behavior using 
large-N studies across space and time (for notable exceptions, see Cross 2007; Revesz 
1997; Sunstein et al. 2006). 
In sum, the legal model is ill-defined in political science and, subsequently, 
poorly measured. Legal models are also ill-defined in the legal academy because they are 
not reliable, parsimonious, and falsifiable. Thus, there remains a need to clarify what a 
legal model actually is. 
In this dissertation, I attempt to define a legal model of judicial behavior. It is my 
intent to use legal scholarship, including the writings of judges and justices in their 
opinions, to provide conceptual clarity for elements of a legal model. Here, I make 
special note that I am attempting to define a legal model, not the legal model, since the 
laws, legal principles, and legal doctrines informing a set of judicial decisions likely vary 
according to a number of criteria, including the type of institution being reviewed. For 
example, a legal model that explains and predicts judicial behavior when judges review 
agency decisions in administrative law may be different from a legal model that explains 
and predicts judicial behavior when judges review the U.S. District Courts‘ decisions in 
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criminal law. For the present study, I consider legal principles and legal doctrines 
associated with the judicial review of agency decisions. 
Toward a More Comprehensive Model of Judicial Behavior 
There is considerable concern in the political science discipline about the gap 
between theorists and empiricists. Although political scientists use sophisticated 
econometrics quite successfully, they often fail to produce theory in their research 
(Morton 1999). Bridging this divide is an important goal, and for judicial behavior, 
bridging the divide between empiricists and theorists may mean bridging research from 
the political science and legal disciplines. 
Cass Sunstein underscores the need to bridge the empirical and theoretical divide 
when he calls for a ―unified political economy of administrative law‖ (1990, p. 306). 
Where legal scholars attempt to reveal a ―discernible logic behind otherwise mysterious 
developments in case law,‖ political theorists explain court deference to agencies as 
failed attempts by non-agency participants in the legal system (Sunstein 1990, p. 306). 
For Sunstein, legal and political scholars have both failed to predict and explain judicial 
behavior in administrative law in part because the two disciplines do not recognize their 
own shortcomings and do not take advantage of the others‘ strengths (1990).  
The disconnect between the attitudinal and legal models of judicial behavior is 
likely rooted in an epistemological debate. Attitudinalists, relying on statistical models 
that predict behavior, are necessarily limited to examining determinants of judicial 
behavior that can be quantified. Legal model proponents, who suggest that law is the 
primary determinant of judicial behavior, must use qualitative methods to understand the 
nuances, complexity and depth of legal issues that courts also consider. The latter is not 
as easily quantified. Where these legal concepts are quantified, the categorical 
classifications are often too broad to capture the complexities of the law (Shapiro 2009). 
Hence, the disconnect between the attitudinal and legal models may be a disconnect 
between quantitative and qualitative research approaches to studying law and courts (for 
a review of epistemological debates in political science, see Brady and Collier 2004; 
Gordon 1991; King et al. 1994; Monroe 2005). 
The purpose of the present study is not to bring epistemological harmony to the 
study of judicial behavior, but it would be imprudent to ignore these differences and, 
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more importantly, it would be imprudent to ignore the contributions and strengths of 
each. I argue that neither the attitudinal model nor the legal model should be dismissed as 
readily as their respective critics are willing to do. 
Without analyzing any data or cases, both the attitudinal and legal models are 
plausible models of judicial behavior. Given the independent nature of the judiciary, 
where judges are constitutionally guaranteed life tenure with no reduction in salary, 
judges are able to vote their personal preferences with relatively little repercussion. 
Conversely, existing law and political and legal norms require judges not to insert their 
personal preferences into decisionmaking. The latter is especially true in certain areas of 
law, such as administrative law. 
Administrative law—in particular, review of administrative decisions in the 
federal courts—provides a unique set of cases in which to examine judicial behavior. In 
the following sections, I explain why this is so, and I review existing research that 
examines court reviews of agency decisions. 
STUDYING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
In Who Guards the Guardians?, Martin Shapiro (1988) asserts that the political 
science and public administration disciplines have taken wrong turns by omitting 
administrative law from their research programs. Shapiro makes the case for prudent 
students in these disciplines to study administrative law not only because administrative 
law is essential to understanding the policymaking process, but also because it is critical 
to understanding the substance of policy. I further add that studying administrative law 
can substantially broaden and deepen our understanding of judicial behavior. 
Despite the advantages that studying administrative law provides, administrative 
law remains an inchoate subject. A cursory survey of administrative law scholarship in 
the social sciences reveals a relative dearth of studies examining court-agency relations, 
especially compared to other sub-disciplines in political science.
2
 It is unclear whether 
                                                 
2
 Conducting a keyword search in top political science journals shows very little scholarship on 
administrative law. In the American Journal of Political Science during 1980-2004, only two articles 
contain ―administrative‖ and either ―law,‖ ―court,‖ or ―judicial‖ in the title or abstract of the article. Similar 
findings are true for the Journal of Politics (three articles) and the American Political Science Review 
(none). The Public Administration Review fares much better in a similar search (about 25 articles). Most of 
the PAR articles are either symposia or case studies focusing on a specific court decision and lack large-N 
empirical analysis. 
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this lack of research is because the subject matter of administrative law is difficult (Scalia 
1989; Shapiro 1988) or for other reasons. 
Administrative law is a broad field that includes a number of law-oriented matters 
related to public agencies. These matters include how agencies conduct their business in 
rulemaking, licensing, enforcement, and regulation. The substantive policy areas that 
administrative law touches are equally broad. For example, examining administrative law 
is essential to understand trade policy (Hansen et al. 1995) or budget decisions in prison 
reform (Harriman and Straussman 1983). 
The present study focuses on one area of administrative law—judicial review of 
administrative agency actions. These decisions run the gamut of policy activities, 
including utilities regulation, environmental regulation, economic regulation, labor 
disputes, alien petitions, securities regulation, benefits eligibility, and a host of other 
policy areas. In its most simplified form, court review of agency decisions concerns the 
legality and constitutionality of these agency decisions. 
The Review Process 
Review of agency decisions occurs through appeals. U.S. citizens have a right to 
appeal administrative agency decisions and to have those appeals heard in a federal court. 
Congress established the right of citizens to have administrative agency decisions 
reviewed in federal court in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
3
 which originally 
passed in 1946. The APA provides, ―A person suffering legal wrong because of agency 
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a 
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.‖ (Administrative Procedure Act  
1946). The APA made all agency actions subject to review unless applicable statutes 
precluded judicial review or the action was not committed to agency action discretion by 
law (Wald 1996). 
Cases are first heard in agencies, where the typical agency has multiple stages of 
review, such as lower supervisory review, administrative law judge review, executive 
review, and a number of other arrangements. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a 
                                                 
3
 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was originally passed in 1946 and amended many times since 
then. APA provisions are codified in Title V of the U.S. Code, specifically at 5 USC §§ 551-559, 701-706, 
1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, and 7521. In the present study, I refer to these sections of Title V 
collectively as the Administrative Procedure Act. Generally, I cite the APA as 5 USC §551 et seq. 
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legal doctrine that allows for court review of administrative decisions only after litigants 
have ―exhausted‖ the various reviews, hearings and appeals avenues offered by the 
agency. These remedies may also include reviews conducted by administrative law 
judges and panels that are external to the agency. 
Since the federal court system in the U.S. is an adversarial one, courts are limited 
to reviewing the real controversies that litigants bring before the courts. Courts are unable 
to review agency actions unless citizens or agencies themselves make an appeal to an 
appropriate reviewing court. While there are few real constraints on a federal court‘s 
ability to do so, there is little evidence that the Supreme Court strikes down agency 
actions sua sponte (of their own volition) without review being requested by litigants 
(Howard and Segal 2004).  
While a handful of agency decisions are reviewed by special courts, such as the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or the U.S. District Courts, most agency 
decisions are reviewed by one of the twelve regional circuit courts, including the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. With some exceptions, the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals review first-level appeals, and at its discretion through writs of 
certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court may hear second-level appeals. 
Scope of Judicial Review 
Inquiry into the relationships between federal courts and federal administrative 
agencies is a particularly good place to examine judicial behavior because of scope of 
review issues. Over the past half century, courts, agencies, academics, interested citizen 
groups, Congress and Presidents have all debated the appropriate scope of federal courts 
when reviewing agency actions (Wald 1996). 
Judicial review of agency actions has undergone several transformations, 
vacillating between an almost obsequious deference and an intense, hard-look scrutiny, 
with many attempts to merge and balance the two extremes (Wald 1996). Deference to 
agency decisions was the norm for judicial review from the mid 1940s when Congress 
passed the Administrative Procedure Act until the early 1970s when courts placed 
considerable emphasis on agency expertise and specialization (Wald 1996). During the 
period 1965-1981, Congress tripled the number of regulatory statutes it passed as well as 
tripled the number of regulatory agencies it created compared to the 1946-1965 period 
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(Aman 1988). Along with this increase in regulatory activity, a growing skepticism 
toward agencies grew as critics accused agencies of pursuing the interests of the 
industries they regulated rather than pursuing public interests (Wald 1996). As courts 
became warier of agency motivations and, during this same period, as courts increased 
their actions to protect the individual rights of minorities, women and the disabled, the 
era of obsequious deference to agencies effectively ended and shifted toward enhanced 
scrutiny (Wald 1996). 
The Supreme Court has made many attempts to clarify an appropriate standard of 
review when lower courts review agency actions. The least restrictive standard is de novo 
review, where courts examine agency actions and record development with no deference 
to the agency. Other, more restrictive standards include arbitrary and capricious, clearly 
erroneous, and substantial evidence. These standards afford agencies varying degrees of 
deference, provided the agency does not act arbitrarily or capriciously or with clear error, 
or where the agency provides substantial evidence to support its decisions. 
While the courts have wrestled with defining various standards of review, 
including carving out exceptions to these standards, the application of the standards in the 
lower courts may not have been consistent (Wald 1996). For example, in the 1980s, the 
Supreme Court issued a series of administrative law rulings to clarify appropriate review 
standards. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance 
Co. (1983), the Court adopted the hard-look approach to agency reviews to determine if 
the agency‘s actions were arbitrary and capricious, but emphasized that a court should not 
substitute its judgment for the agency‘s judgment (Wald 1996). Under the hard-look 
doctrine, an agency‘s action could be arbitrary and capricious if the agency: 1) did not 
consider all relevant factors, including those Congress deemed relevant, 2) offered an 
explanation that ran counter to the evidence or was implausible, or 3) failed to offer an 
explanation at all (Wald 1996). Applying State Farm, lower courts afforded little 
deference to agency actions compared to other standards, but applying the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard under the hard-look doctrine remained an art subject to judicial 
interpretation rather than a hard and fast science, which left considerable room for 
inconsistent application of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard across and within 
circuits (Wald 1996). 
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Contrarily, in 1984, the Court defined a two-step review process in Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council that created a more agency-friendly 
approach to review. Under the Chevron doctrine, courts are first required to examine 
agency fidelity to the plain text of the statute the agency administers. Here, the Supreme 
Court directed lower courts to extend deference to Congress, and to set aside agency 
actions that ran afoul of Congressional intent. Where the plain text of a statute is 
insufficient to guide agency actions, step two of the Chevron doctrine requires courts to 
determine only if an agency‘s interpretation of a statute is a reasonable (or permissible) 
one, and not necessarily an interpretation that the court would prefer. Under Chevron step 
two, the Supreme Court intended lower courts to defer to agency interpretations of 
statutes so long as the review court determined the interpretation was reasonable. The 
presumption in the Chevron doctrine is deference to Congress. That is, where a statute is 
ambiguous (i.e., where Congress has not clearly spoken in plain language to the case at 
hand, as evidence by examining the text of the statute in step one of the Chevron test), 
courts should presume that Congress intended administrative agencies to interpret the 
statute and courts should afford deference to agency decisions accordingly. The Chevron 
doctrine, then, is a common law manifestation of institutional deference, where courts 
defer to Congress‘s explicit preferences, and in the absence of express legislative intent, 
there is a presumption of deference to agencies. 
Although Chevron appears to frame court-agency interactions rather succinctly, 
there has been considerable legal commentary and disagreement among judges about the 
precise boundaries of Chevron deference. For example, Chevron‘s progeny clarifies that 
Chevron deference does not apply to informal rulemaking functions of agencies. 
Generally, in order to qualify for Chevron deference, agency rules must be made 
formally, through notice and comment procedures. 
However, the Court verified in U.S. v. Mead Corp. (2001) that even if an agency 
does not qualify for Chevron deference, the court can still extend some level of deference 
to the agency based on the agency‘s experience. In essence, Mead reiterated that the 
Court‘s decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. (1944)
4
 was still good law—agencies should 
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 The majority in Skidmore stated, ―We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the 
[agency], while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of 
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be afforded some level of deference by virtue of their expertise. That is, their expertise 
should be highly persuasive to the courts. 
Also in the 1980s, the Supreme Court clarified that certain agency actions are 
beyond the scope of any review. In Heckler v. Chaney (1985), the Court found that 
agency decisions not to act, namely non-enforcement decisions, are presumptively 
unreviewable (Wald 1996). Under Chaney, courts extend the greatest level of deference 
to agencies by virtue of their inability to review agency actions. 
These cases illustrate not only the Supreme Court‘s attempt to marry and balance 
the requirements of scrutiny and due deference, but also the alleged inconsistency in 
lower courts‘ application of review standards as a result of the mixed signals sent by the 
Court (Wald 1996). I further discuss standards of review in Chapter Four. Here, however, 
I note three points concerning the scope of review. 
First, federal courts have labored to clarify an appropriate scope of review for 
agency actions, and this labor reflects a desire to balance intense scrutiny with due 
deference. Second, Congress has also attempted to define an appropriate scope of review 
for the courts in its legislation, specifically with the passage of the Administrative 
Procedure Act in 1946. Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the present study of 
judicial behavior, courts and judges have consistently maintained that judges should not 
substitute their preferences in place of agencies‘ preferences when reviewing agency 
actions. As Judge Wald states: 
The contours of the debate about the appropriate role and scope of judicial 
review are remarkably unchanged. The concerns that animate the debate—
the desire for a check on agency absolutism or arrogance and a means of 
insuring that laws are actually carried out as intended—are pitted against 
deep-seated conviction, rooted in our constitutional format of separation of 
powers, that the courts should not take control of public policy from the 
two political branches. This may result in an unavoidable and irreducible 
tension inherent in any attempt to accommodate deference and scrutiny in 
the same jurisprudential doctrine (1996, p. 229-230). 
                                                                                                                                                 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The 
weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all 
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.‖ 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
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While judges, courts and legal scholars normatively note the desired goal for the 
judicial branch not to encroach into policymaking when agency decisions are under 
review, this prescription may or may not manifest in judicial behavior. However, in the 
face of such staunch insistence that judges and courts not substitute their preferences in 
place of agency preferences, there is ample plausibility that the legal model of judicial 
behavior may prevail over the attitudinal model in these cases. Hence, prescriptive scope 
of review in legal scholarship provides a foundation for a judicial behavior study if the 
prescribed standards of review are conceptualized and measured empirically in models 
that also measure judges‘ attitudes. That is, scope of review provides a theoretical 
foundation for how judges and courts should act, which should be analyzed with how 
judges and courts actually act. 
Separation-of-Powers Issues and Administrative Law 
The structure of the modern administrative state is the intersection of the three 
constitutionally defined branches of government, and left unchecked, there is 
considerable risk of bureaucracies abusing power. It is not uncommon for an executive 
agency charged with implementing a statute to engage in quasi-judicial adjudicatory 
functions over its own quasi-legislative rulemaking functions. This scenario substantially 
justifies the courts in taking hard-look approaches to reviewing agency actions, if the goal 
is to maintain a separation of powers among the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches. 
Similarly, for courts that review agency actions, court decisions can encroach into 
administration when these decisions overturn agency procedures. Where courts engage in 
policymaking, the review function of the courts can become a legislative one. So, courts 
must find the right balance of checking the power of administrative agencies without 
encroaching into executive and legislative functions. 
Few researchers have investigated the overlapping edges of these institutional 
boundaries, which ignores the realities of whether the concept of separation of powers 
has any actual meaning in American government and politics. Where scholars have 
examined court review of agency decisions, these studies have focused primarily on the 
Supreme Court. Little research examining the review of agency decisions in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals exists. 
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To summarize, I argue that administrative law is a particularly good arena to 
examine judicial behavior for a number of reasons, one of which is because there are 
numerous Supreme Court precedents and Congressional acts that explicitly call on courts 
to defer to agencies under certain circumstances. Earlier in this chapter, I also discussed 
that legal models have been poorly defined in the literature. In the next section, I offer 
both a theoretical framework and pragmatic considerations for why the legal model 
should be considered more fully. I then discuss the concept of deference as an element of 
the legal model. 
CONCEPTS OF A LEGAL MODEL 
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, I discuss pragmatic and theoretical 
considerations in support of a legal model. These considerations suggest that despite 
judges‘ ability to vote their personal preferences in cases, their votes may be constrained 
or informed by a number of factors, including agency expertise and competency, judge 
workload issues, legislative and executive checks, Supreme Court precedent, and formal 
attorney training. Second, I argue that deference is inherently part of the legal model. I 
consider several dimensions of deference that are relevant to judicial review of agency 
decisions, some of which I use in later chapters to inform hypotheses and to construct 
variables. 
Agency Expertise and Competency 
The civil service system in the United States helps ensure federal agencies retain a 
competent workforce of experts, whether in marine biology, nuclear energy, or public 
personnel practices. It is not unreasonable to assume that agencies hold a higher level of 
subject-matter expertise and competence than judges in many policy areas. What is 
uncertain in the literature is whether levels of agency support are a function of judges‘ 
confidence in agencies. At least one scholar assumes that agency adherence to prescribed 
procedures is positively correlated with a court‘s opinion concerning the quality of 
agency decisionmaking (Stephenson 2006). 
Whether agencies perform well is somewhat subjective and varies by agency (for 
an expanded discussion on the performance of federal bureaucracies and the public's 
opinion on federal agency performance, see Goodsell 2003). Nonetheless, accountability, 
equity, transparency, and sound discretion, all are themes of concern for modern 
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administrative agencies.
5
 Given agencies‘ attention to these themes, some judges may be 
willing to acknowledge their own limited knowledge of a particular subject matter, such 
as marine biology eco-systems and, further, may be willing to defer to agency expertise 
on these matters (Wald 1996). While this argument may not always be true, especially as 
attitudinalists have shown substantial influences of judges‘ ideologies on their votes, it 
might sometimes be true and is plausible. 
Judge Workload Issues 
Workload issues in the federal courts are of great concern to judges and the justice 
community. In the past half-decade, the number of cases in the courts of appeals 
increased (Wald 1996). Federal court dockets are over-burdened, and these workload 
issues constrain judges. As a matter of efficiency, judges may be forced to defer to 
agencies out of necessity. Judges may not have enough time or resources to ensure that 
every case is decided according to his/her personal preferences, and even dissent writing 
in complex cases is virtually nil because of the amount of time and resources it takes to 
dispose of such cases (Wald 1996). 
Legislative and Executive Checks 
Courts are players in a democratic system that fragments power. Congress and the 
President both take actions to constrain the courts. With respect to court review of agency 
decisions, one way the legislative and executive branches constrain courts is by passing 
statutes that require courts to defer to administrative agencies, such as the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), which was originally passed in 1946. Specifically, section 706 of 
the APA states, ―The reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.‖ These standards—often referred to as the 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard and the abuse-of-discretion standard—extend 
considerable discretion to agencies. Agency action is presumed to be valid, and there 
must be a clear error before a court overturns agency decisions based on this standard 
                                                 
5
 The mission of the Government Accountability Office is, in part, ―to help improve the performance and 
ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people‖ (see U.S. 
Government Accountability Office website at www.gao.gov/about). For a summary report of citizens‘ 
attitudes toward agency performance 1988–2000, see the Pew Research Center‘s study at www.people-
press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=41. 
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(Hall 2002). In this regard, courts have a legislative mandate, signed by the President to 
defer to agencies. While the extant political science literature has not borne out 
empirically whether this type of deference exists, it is plausible that some judges may 
view these types of restraint as part of their roles. 
Supreme Court Precedent and Stare Decisis 
Inasmuch as we are concerned with review of agency decisions in the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals, we must also consider legal norms of stare decisis and precedents established 
by the Supreme Court. Several Supreme Court cases specifically require lower courts to 
defer to agencies in a number of circumstances. In Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. 
(1945), deference meant that ―an agency‘s interpretation of its own regulations are 
conclusive and binding on the courts, so long as the agency‘s interpretation is neither 
arbitrary nor capricious,‖ (White 2000, p. 541). In the modern era, the Supreme Court 
continued to require court deference to agencies in cases such as Chevron (1984). The 
Chevron doctrine is summarized as, ―When Congress delegates administrative authority 
over a particular statute to an executive agency, courts will defer to the agency‘s 
reasonable statutory interpretations if not contrary to Congress‘s unambiguous intent,‖ 
(Criddle 2003, p. 1928). 
Chevron creates a hierarchy of deference, first to Congress and then to the agency 
(Wald 1996). In the first step, courts must determine if a substantive question interpreted 
by an agency is answered in the language of the statute. In this instance, no deference is 
extended to agencies. Rather, using a textualist approach, courts defer to the preferences 
of Congress, as evidenced in the historical examination of intent of statutes‘ language 
(Wald 1996; White 2000). Step two requires that, in the absence of clear language from 
the legislature, courts should accept agencies‘ interpretations as long as they are 
reasonable, even if the courts disagree with those interpretations (Wald 1996; White 
2000). If the rule of law and the norm of stare decisis have any bearing on lower federal 
courts at all, we would expect the U.S. Courts of Appeals would not substitute their 
preferences in place of those of Congress and agencies under the Chevron doctrine. 
Judges as Formally Trained Attorneys 
Although being an attorney is not a constitutional requirement before being 
appointed to the federal bench, as a matter of practice, all federal judges in the modern 
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era receive formal training in law before they are appointed to the bench. Legal training is 
influenced by the scholarship of legal academics, so it is plausible that attorneys and 
judges are influenced by the legal theories and normative arguments expounded in the 
legal literature. Formal legal training may constrain judges in two ways. First, judges may 
subscribe to the normative roles of judges as neutral appliers of the law. Second, judges 
know that the legal academy analyzes and writes prolifically about judges‘ decisions. 
Hence, judges may be less inclined to stray far from established principles of law if they 
know they must provide legal reasons for their decisions that legal scholars will accept as 
legitimate. If the legal training of judges influences at all the way judges conduct their 
business, then it behooves political scientists to embrace the legal literature as part of the 
scientific process. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that law and legal doctrine impacts the 
way the legal community views deference. 
Given these plausible theories of judicial constraint, many of which explicitly call 
for courts to extend deference to agencies, I question whether the attitudinal model 
accurately describes and predicts judicial behavior in the courts of appeals when agency 
decisions are under review. From the pragmatic considerations of workload issues and 
the legal training judges receive to the normative considerations of checks and balances 
and Supreme Court precedent, we have considerable reason to suggest that judges extend 
at least some level of deference to agencies. 
Nonetheless, these plausible considerations do little to advance the argument that 
judges and courts are constrained from voting their personal preferences unless we can 
measure and test these legal concepts. With an eye toward measurement, the next section 
focuses on conceptualizing deference with regard to court-agency relations and judicial 
behavior. 
Conceptualizing Deference 
My argument for adding structure to deference and a legal model is rooted in the 
same argument that Canon (1983) uses for providing structure to activism. Canon defines 
dimensions of activism and notes: 
If commentators have numerous and disparate concepts of activism and do 
not articulate them very well, serious general use of the term becomes 
difficult if not meaningless. Overall, we receive little more than a babel of 
loosely connected discussion; the utility of any particular idea is limited. 
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Those wanting to understand the discussion are left pretty much to their 
own devices (1983, p. 239). 
The same can be said for deference. While it is beyond the scope of the present study to 
outline fully the many dimensions of deference, especially as deference applies to entities 
other than administrative agencies, such as state governments, executive offices, 
legislative bodies, and other courts, several dimensions of deference are directly 
applicable to agencies.
6
 
Heretofore, deference in the political science literature has received little 
attention. Where deference does appear in the scholarship, researchers sometimes 
operationalize it simply as support for an agency (e.g., Caruson and Bitzer 2004). In the 
legal literature, the legal rules associated with deference have been examined rather 
prolifically, especially those related to Chevron. Still, as Emerson Tiller and Frank Cross 
note, ―positive political theory of legal rules … have received far too little attention,‖ 
(Tiller and Cross 2007, p. 13). 
The legal model is rooted in deference. Legal theorists and judges suggest that 
judges and courts make decisions based on neutral application of law. In doing so, they 
necessarily defer to the preferences of those who make the law. Deference manifests 
when courts, for example, apply legislative intent as expressed in the language of statutes, 
acknowledge the expertise of agencies, and uphold the authority of states. While the legal 
model may embody a number of caveats, deference is a clear indicator of the influence of 
legal factors. 
Institutional deference suggests that judges and courts defer to the preferences of 
other entities, such as Congress, the President, agencies, states, or other courts. This is the 
broadest level of deference and is based on a normative argument that an appropriate role 
of the courts does not include policymaking, activism, or politics. In other words, if the 
appropriate role of the court is to apply laws and policies as developed by other 
institutions, then we would expect courts to defer to those institutions‘ preferences. 
However, this level of deference at its extreme undermines the most basic elements of the 
doctrine of judicial review. If courts afford blanket deference to the actions of other 
                                                 
6
 For theoretical considerations of deference beyond the scope of court-agency relations, see (Charney 
1989; Delson 1972; Howard and Segal 2004; Kirby 1970). 
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government institutions, then there is no need for courts to review the actions of those 
institutions. While there is room for scholarly debate concerning the appropriateness of 
judicial review and institutional deference, the present study acknowledges that judicial 
review does, indeed, exist in the U.S. jurisprudential system and that courts do set aside 
actions of other institutions. 
Procedural deference concerns the degree to which the courts defer to agency 
procedural actions such as notice, comment, inspections, subpoenas, and record 
development, as specified in statutes such as an agency‘s enabling legislation, the 
Administrative Procedure Act (1946), Freedom of Information Act (1966) and the 
Government in the Sunshine Act (1976). Deference to procedures may also include 
deference to fact-finding and evidence, which concerns the degree to which courts accept 
agency facts and evidence at face value. For example, should a court review a case de 
novo, arguably the courts show less deference than if they accept case facts as established 
by the agency. 
Deference to procedures is different from institutional deference. Judges and 
courts that defer to a procedure may well choose not to support an agency in final case 
decisions if the agency did not follow procedure. In this example, judges or courts defer 
to procedure and not the agency. 
Functional deference concerns the degree to which courts might show more or 
less deference to agencies depending on the function the agency is performing. More 
specifically, courts may be less inclined to defer to agency rulemaking as compared to 
other agency functions, such as ratemaking, licensing, or adjudication. Since rulemaking 
applies to categories of people instead of individuals, it verges on lawmaking—a task 
constitutionally reserved for Congress (Caruson and Bitzer 2004). One might then deduce 
that rulemaking may merit a higher level of court scrutiny (i.e., less deference). However, 
the Supreme Court clarified in Chevron (1984) and its progeny that courts should defer in 
the second-step of Chevron to agency‘s reasonable interpretations of a statute so long as 
the rulemaking was formal (i.e., made through notice and comments procedures). 
Generally, speaking, Chevron deference does not apply to informal rules, but informal 
rulemaking may still qualify for expertise deference as discussed below. Although I do 
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not address functional deference in the present study, I include it as a separate dimension 
for deference, which may be helpful to inform future research. 
Expertise deference refers to the degree to which courts acknowledge the 
competency, proficiency and knowledge of agencies. It is conceivable that the higher the 
technical aspects of an agency‘s subject matter, the more willing courts might be to defer 
to agency expertise. As an extreme example, courts may defer to the National Marine 
Fisheries Service on highly technical questions related to marine biology and the 
ecosystems of the nation‘s fisheries (Nichols 2003). Under Mead (2001), which 
underscored Skidmore (1944), even if agencies are beyond the pale of Chevron deference, 
agency decisions and actions should still be afforded some level of deference. Under 
these cases, agency decisions and actions are viewed as highly persuasive. 
As previously mentioned, it is beyond the scope of the present study to define and 
examine all dimensions of deference fully. However, since deference is so closely 
associated with the legal model, it is important to recognize these dimensions for greater 
conceptual clarity in measurement. Primarily, the present study is concerned with 
procedural deference and whether the U.S. Courts of Appeals defer to agencies if 
agencies follow procedures.  This study also examines institutional deference inasmuch 
as the U.S. Courts of Appeals may or may not defer to agencies based on direction it 
received from other institutions—namely the U.S. Supreme Court in the form of case law 
and the U.S. Congress in the form of statutes. 
Before specifying a model of judicial decisionmaking, I first summarize the 
literature that examines relationships between federal courts and agencies. After 
reviewing the literature, I use the concepts of a legal model discussed here as well as past 
research findings to form hypotheses about judicial decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals when reviewing federal agency decisions. 
PAST STUDIES OF COURTS AND AGENCIES 
Review of federal administrative agency decisions occurs primarily in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court. While other special federal courts also 
hear administrative appeals, such as the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and the U.S. District Courts, the majority 
of administrative agency decisions are reviewed by the U.S. Courts of Appeals. 
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Disproportionate to the volume of agency actions it reviews, the majority of political 
science scholarship examining reviews of agency decisions focuses on the Supreme 
Court. 
U.S. Supreme Court Review of Agency Decisions 
Early studies of the Supreme Court‘s review of agency decisions show that 
agencies enjoy high rates of success in the Court. (Pritchett 1948). Pritchett devoted a 
chapter to the Court‘s treatment of agencies during the 1941-1946 terms in The Roosevelt 
Court, noting, ―The generally favorable attitude of the Roosevelt Court toward 
administrative regulation is indicated by the fact that these agencies were successful in 
almost three-fourths of the appearances before the Court‖ (1948, p. 168).  
During the decade of the 1940s, on the heels of a strained relationship between 
the President and the Supreme Court over the constitutionality of Roosevelt‘s New Deal 
programs, which significantly expanded the size of the federal bureaucracy, it is 
somewhat surprising that agencies enjoyed such a high rate of success. However, it is in 
this same decade that Congress unanimously passed the Administrative Procedure Act, 
indicative of the consensus that administrative procedure, rather than judicial review, was 
the best means of controlling agency discretion (Wald 1996). 
While Pritchett only speculated the reasons for these high levels of success, other 
researchers established a more solid theoretical groundwork for the study of Supreme 
Court support for administrative agency decisions in this period (Tanenhaus 1960). 
Tanenhaus argued that with the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, 
although it is well within the purview and responsibility of the Court to review 
administrative actions, the Court had little difficulty accepting the legitimacy of agencies‘ 
discretionary decisions. Also, given the highly technical nature of some administrative 
decisions, coupled with the high levels of subject matter and legal expertise retained by 
the agency, the Supreme Court was hard-pressed to find legal reasons to reverse agency 
decisions (Tanenhaus 1960). This resulted in a strong show of support for agencies from 
justices. Where justices render non-friendly decisions toward administrative agencies, it 
is because of disparities in justices‘ political and personal preferences over specific policy 
areas (Tanenhaus 1960). 
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Tanenhaus‘s research also suggests that how justices review matters of 
substantive policy may be different from how justices review procedural matters. 
Tanenhaus identified patterns in justices‘ votes for several substantive policy areas, 
including organized labor, restrictions on competition, freedom of person, and monetary 
gain/loss for the government, but he was unable to discern similar patterns in cases 
involving agencies‘ statutory authorities, procedures required by statute, or evidentiary 
questions (Tanenhaus 1960). This suggested that, in some instances, justices‘ attitudes 
toward administrative agencies might be guided by the justices‘ individual preferences 
for an agency‘s specific policies. However, for clearly legal matters that are procedural in 
nature, no identifiable patterns were present. While unable to show definitive causal 
mechanisms in these patterns of voting behavior, Tanenhaus‘ work suggests implicitly 
that justices treat matters of agency procedure differently from matters of substance. 
Other scholars found similar results when examining administrative law issues in 
the Supreme Court. Canon and Giles (1972) examined the Court‘s review of cases from 
six different agencies during the 1957-1968 terms.
7
 Here, they found disparities in levels 
of support the Court displayed for different agencies, where the level of support ranged 
from 50% to 90%. To explain these differences, Canon and Giles examined Court 
decisions using justices as the unit analysis. Initially, they examined whether justices 
displayed harmonic or dichotomized attitudes toward agencies. A harmonic attitude 
means that individual justices support agencies at roughly the same rate as the Supreme 
Court as a whole. Dichotomized attitudes suggest disparities in individual justice support 
for an agency compared to Court-level support. They concluded that justices largely have 
harmonic attitudes toward agencies. For example, if the Court as a whole ruled in favor 
of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) about 75% of the time, then individual 
justices should be supportive of the NLRB at about the same rate. 
Given that justices might be harmonic in their decisions toward agencies, Canon 
and Giles (1972) explain differentials in support across agencies by showing that justices 
tend to support agencies more harmoniously on questions of procedure, and less so on 
                                                 
7
 Agencies examined were the Federal Power Commission (FPC), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS), and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). 
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substantive questions. Concerning cases involving procedural questions, Canon and Giles 
suggest: 
[A]gencies which meet certain criteria more or less traditionally associated 
with the concept of due process of law (e.g., proper notice, impartial 
hearing, decisions made in accordance with ascertainable evidentiary 
rules, etc.) are supported by the Court and those which often fail to meet 
such standards are not supported (p. 187). 
Concerning cases that raise substantive questions—statutory or constitutional 
questions—Canon and Giles note, ―the Supreme Court ‗likes‘ or ‗approves‘ the overall 
goals and the substantive policies of some administrative agencies while it is at best 
dubious about the general goals and implementing policies of other agencies.‖ In sum, 
they conclude, ―variance in the Court‘s willingness to support an agency as a recurring 
litigant stems largely from the justices‘ attitudes toward the agency‘s substantive policies 
rather than its procedural behavior‖ (1972, p. 190).
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Building on this research, Crowley (1987) concluded that support for agencies in 
the Supreme Court is a function of justices‘ ideological agreement with agencies 
(Crowley 1987). This is to say that conservative justices support agencies when agency 
policies are conservative and liberal justices support agencies when agency policies are 
liberal. 
Similarly, in his examination of the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist courts, 
Sheehan (1990) suggested that justices‘ deference to agency decisions largely occurs 
when the ideological preferences of justices are in agreement with agency positions. 
Sheehan‘s findings undermine scope-of-review doctrines, and, specifically, the 
substantial-evidence doctrine, which holds that courts will defer to agencies on matters of 
substance so long as agencies provide substantial evidence to support their decisions. If 
justices‘ votes are based on congruence with agency policy positions, then whether or not 
agencies provide substantial evidence to support their decisions is of little consequence. 
However, Sheehan operationalized deference to agencies only as a vote in support of 
                                                 
8
 Canon and Giles‘ use of ―agency as a recurring litigant‖ in their conclusions can be misleading. In other 
research, recurring litigants refers to advantages associated with repeated appearances before federal courts. 
The repeat-player aspect of litigants is not borne out empirically in the Canon and Giles study. Instead, the 
scope of their research is limited to analyzing agencies that had a sufficiently large number of cases before 
the Supreme Court during the 1957-1968 terms. Canon and Giles exclude from their study agencies that did 
not have a large number of cases before the Court during this period. 
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agencies. This may be problematic, since a vote in support of an agency because a justice 
is in ideological agreement with the agency is not discernible from a vote cast in favor of 
an agency because of deference to the agency because it provided substantial evidence to 
support its decision. This observational equivalence is not borne out in Sheehan‘s study.  
Not only did the Crowley (1987) and Sheehan (1990) studies conclude that 
justices vote consistently with their ideologies, establishing the attitudinal model as a 
prevailing model of judicial behavior in the Supreme Court, but, also, these studies 
concluded that disparities in agency support were not a function of agency type. For 
Crowley, the difference in how the Supreme Court treats economic agencies and social 
agencies was indiscernible (1987). Sheehan concluded that rather than focusing on 
differences in the types of agencies before the court, researchers would likely benefit 
from focusing on the substance of the policies before the court (Sheehan 1990). In a later 
study, Sheehan (1992) expanded agency typology and found that agency type does 
matter. Specifically, he found that the Supreme Court is more likely to support agencies
 
that are independent in nature and perform a quasi-judicial
 
role in the bureaucracy 
(Sheehan 1992 478). Overall, he showed that independent agencies enjoy more support in 
the Supreme Court than executive agencies. 
More important than agency type, however, Sheehan‘s 1992 study found limited 
support for not only the attitudinal model of judicial behavior, but also the legal model. 
As in his earlier study, he concluded that variance in agency treatment is largely a 
function of justices‘ personal policy preferences (Sheehan 1992). However, support for 
the legal model was also present, suggesting that justices‘ votes are constrained, at least 
in part, by legal principles and not exclusively by their personal preferences (Sheehan 
1992). 
Different from other scholars, Horowitz (1994) brought an historical perspective 
to the study of judicial behavior and administrative law. He suggested that court-agency 
relations have undergone several shifts across time. Early courts up through the 
Progressive Era rejected administrative law per se, which essentially was a rejection of 
agency rulemaking and discretion. During the New Deal era and shortly thereafter, with 
the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, courts began to view agencies 
as experts (Horowitz 1994). The concomitant Court decisions were ones of deference to 
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agency expertise. However, this era was short-lived, as the courts later viewed agencies 
as incompetent and engaging in clientelism, which was largely influenced by interest 
groups representing the industries the agencies regulated (Horowitz 1994). Several court 
opinions indicated courts struggling to define court-agency relations across the post-New 
Deal era and at least some judges indicated a collaborative effort between courts and 
agencies (Horowitz 1994).  For example, courts‘ use of a reasonableness standard when 
evaluating agency decisions functionally meant courts would not substitute their own 
policy preferences over agencies‘ policies so long as the agencies‘ actions were 
reasonable (Horowitz 1994). 
Horowitz‘s study raises two points of interest. First, if courts undergo shifts in 
agency support across time, then past judicial behavior studies examining the Court‘s 
review of agency decisions may not be applicable to modern courts. Second, if a 
reasonableness standard of review holds any weight in case outcomes, scholars should 
focus on conceptualizing and measuring these standards of review in order to test their 
impact on judicial decisions. 
In summary, studies of Supreme Court behavior when agency decisions are under 
review all point to justices‘ voting according to their attitudes. Also, past scholarship 
suggests that justices tend to support agencies more on matters of procedure rather than 
matters of substance. Where justices support agencies on matters of substance, past 
scholarship suggests it is because of individual justices‘ ideological agreement with 
agency positions. Specifically, conservative justices support conservative agency 
decisions and liberal justices support liberal agency decisions. 
What remains unclear, however, is whether justices are constrained by elements 
of the law or whether they also defer to agencies, as the legal model suggests. Judicial 
behavior studies of the Supreme Court have not fully conceptualized and measured 
elements of the legal model, and have, therefore, been unable to measure and test the 
impact of legal and attitudinal variables in a quantitative model, ceteris paribus. 
U.S. Courts of Appeals Review of Agency Decisions 
Where political science scholars have addressed court review of agency decisions, 
their attention has been largely on the Supreme Court (Canon and Giles 1972; Crowley 
1987; Horowitz 1994; Jaffe 1965; Pritchett 1948; Shapiro 1964, 1968, 1988; Sheehan 
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1990, 1992; Tanenhaus 1960). Lower federal courts have received a modest nod in the 
literature (Caruson and Bitzer 2004; Haire and Lindquist 1997; Humphries and Songer 
1999; Willison 1986). Addressing this lack of scholarship is important for at least two 
reasons. First, as Songer, Sheehan and Haire note, ―appeals court judges must address 
every case in which the losing litigant in the … administrative agency decides to appeal‖ 
(2000, p. 8). Because of this mandatory review, we would expect the volume of the 
courts of appeals‘ reviews of administrative decisions to be substantial. Since the 1980s, 
about eight percent of the U.S. Courts of Appeals‘ dockets have been comprised of cases 
coming directly from administrative agencies (see Table 4.1 in Chapter 4). 
Second, the courts of appeals functionally serve as the courts of last resort for the 
vast majority of cases heard in the federal courts. For the years 1925–1989, 99.7% of 
circuit court cases were left undisturbed by the Supreme Court (Songer et al. 2000, p. 17). 
In sum, as Humphries and Songer note, ―if there is to be any legal check on abuse of 
discretion by administrative agencies, the courts of appeals are likely to have both the 
first and final word in the judicial arena,‖ (1999, p. 208). 
Given the substantive importance in the numerous policy areas where 
administrative law is present, understanding the relationship between the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals and federal agencies is warranted. If we are to understand the substance of 
policy and the policymaking process, as Shapiro (1968) suggests, further examination of 
the courts of appeals and federal agencies is likely not only warranted, but critical. 
In his influential essay on why ―haves‖ come out ahead in a legal system such as 
the American one, Marc Galanter (1974) developed a typology of parties before the 
courts and concluded that ―repeat players‖ have an advantage over ―one shotters.‖ 
Among the repeat players is the federal government, which retains a relatively high level 
of litigating expertise and benefits from developing reputational relationships with the 
courts over a long period of time (Galanter 1974). 
Under Galanter‘s influence, Songer and Sheehan (1992) examined litigant success 
rates in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. While not examining court review of agency 
decisions directly, they found that success in the U.S. Courts of Appeals is correlated 
with a continuum of litigants. This continuum is anchored on one end by ―upperdogs‖ 
that, in addition to more resources, have repeat player status. In their study, the federal 
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government enjoyed the greatest success frequencies in the courts of appeals, followed by 
state and local governments, and large businesses and corporations. The opposite end of 
the continuum is anchored by underdogs, who may have fewer resources and may be akin 
to Galanter‘s ―one-shotters.‖ Smaller businesses and individuals experienced 
disproportionately lower levels of success in court (Songer and Sheehan 1992; Songer et 
al. 2000). Songer and Sheehan summarize: 
[T]he ‗haves‘ will win more frequently both because they are likely to 
have superior material resources and because a number of advantages 
accrue to them as a result of their ‗repeat player‘ status. Superior resources 
allow the ‗haves‘ to hire the best available legal representation and to 
incur the expenses of extensive discovery, expert witnesses, and so forth, 
which may increase the chances of success at trial. In addition, as repeat 
players, they will reap the benefits of greater litigation experience, case-
selecting ability, and the ability to develop and implement a 
comprehensive litigation strategy that may include forum shopping, 
informed judgments of their chances to win at trial or appeal, and the 
capability to accept moderate losses through settlements when the 
prospects for victory at trial or on appeal are small (1992, p. 235). 
Accordingly, we would expect agencies to enjoy relatively high success rates in 
the circuit courts, since agencies have the benefits that come with repeat player status (cf. 
Sheehan et al. 1992a). 
I am aware of only one study that exclusively examines agency success rates 
across all courts of appeals. Haire and Lindquist (1997) examine circuit court review of 
appeals from the Social Security Administration (SSA) across circuits. During 1982–
1983, SSA success in court ranged from 22% in the Second Circuit to 65% in the Sixth 
Circuit (Haire and Lindquist 1997). While Haire and Lindquist found varying SSA 
success rates by circuit, their study does not address why this is so. 
 Humphries and Songer (1999) examined reviews of agency decisions in all 
circuits from 1969–1988 and found agencies were successful in about 62% of those 
cases. Humphries and Songer explained these levels of support using a model that 
integrates both legal constraints and personal preferences of judges. For legal constraints, 
they examined the presence of the substantial-evidence doctrine in a case, which 
mandates that the courts defer to agencies‘ assessments of fact provided there is 
substantial evidence to support their evaluation (Humphries and Songer 1999). They 
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hypothesized that if the substantial-evidence doctrine was present in a case, courts should 
show deference to agency decisions. Since interpretation of statutes is ―at the heart of‖ 
what courts do, they also examined cases where agency interpretation of a federal law 
was present, with the expectation that courts would be less likely to show deference to 
agencies where interpreting federal law was a central question in the case (Humphries 
and Songer 1999). Both of these legal variables were statistically significant in their 
model. To measure the impact of judges‘ personal preferences on their votes, Humphries 
and Songer constructed an ideology index of each review panel. They found that higher 
ideological congruence between the ideology of the panel and the ideological direction of 
the agency decision was a statistically significant predictor of courts rendering a decision 
favorable to an agency. Hence, agency support is, in part, a function of judges‘ 
ideological or personal preferences (Humphries and Songer 1999). 
Overall, Humphries and Songer concluded that judges ―are much more likely to 
uphold the exercise of discretion by the agency when the policy implications of that 
exercise are consistent with the policy preferences of judges‖ (1999, p. 217). Their 
findings also suggest that legal considerations are at play in the courts of appeals, and we 
should not dismiss judges‘ regard for the law. Finally, they also found that agency type 
appears to be irrelevant to whether courts support agencies. Their findings, however, do 
not fully disentangle the legal-attitudinal debate. They acknowledge their variables are 
rough indicators of the legal and attitudinal models and suggest the discipline will benefit 
from finding better measures of these concepts. 
Frank Cross (2003, 2007) examined decisionmaking more broadly in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals from 1925–1996. While his examination was not exclusively focused 
on review of agency decisions, he found substantial support for legal determinants 
constraining judicial decisionmaking in the courts of appeals. Cross makes an important 
contribution to the literature on court-agency relationships, especially concerning the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals, by clarifying the concept of deference and testing deference in 
regression models alongside attitudinal variables. As an element of the legal model of 
judicial decisionmaking, deference appears prominently in various standards of review 
(Cross 2007). With respect to reviewing lower court or agency decisions, the circuit 
courts consider a number of standards of review (arbitrary and capricious, abuse of 
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discretion, clearly erroneous, substantial evidence, and de novo). In a regression model 
with attitudinal variables, Cross found that how courts answered standard-of-review 
questions with respect to agencies had a statistically significant impact on final case 
decisions (Cross 2003, 2007). For example, courts were more likely to support the agency 
in the final case decision if it found that the agency had not acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously. The opposite was also true. If courts found that agencies acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously in their decision, courts were less likely to support agencies in the final 
case decision. 
What remains unclear in Cross‘ study is whether court answers to standard-of-
review questions mask judges‘ ideological preferences (see Segal and Spaeth 2002). 
Attitudinalists would argue that judges have preferences for case outcomes that are 
formed in advance of the legal reasoning they express in their opinions. In this regard, 
how courts answer standard-of-review questions may be window dressing for their 
preferences, which Cross does not address in his study. This problem is not unique to 
Cross, since other researchers have been unable to effectively measure elements of the 
legal model that withstand this attitudinal scrutiny. If courts‘ answers to legal questions 
are, indeed, masks for their ideological preferences, then Cross‘ study may be 
tautological. 
Judge ideology also mattered in Cross‘s studies. Studies of the impact of ideology 
on justices‘ voting in the Supreme Court have found that an individual judge‘s ideology 
predicts how an individual judge will vote in a final case decision (Segal and Cover 1989; 
Segal et al. 1995b; Segal and Spaeth 2002). Rather than individual judge ideology 
predicting that particular judge‘s vote in the final case decision, Cross pointed to the 
collegial nature of three-judge panels and the impact collegiality has on judicial 
decisionmaking in the courts of appeals. Cross found that the mean ideology of a three-
judge panel significantly influenced the final case decision. This finding is consistent 
with other studies showing the ideological composition of a three-judge panel is a 
significant predictor of final case decisions (Humphries and Songer 1999; Sunstein et al. 
2006). 
Studies of judicial decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals are less prolific 
than studies of judicial decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, especially studies 
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examining judicial review of agency decisions. There is consistent agreement among 
scholars that the U.S. Courts of Appeals support agencies in their final decisions in 
roughly 60-70% of published cases (Humphries and Songer 1999; Songer and Sheehan 
1992; Songer et al. 2000). Studies that examined review of agency decisions in all 
circuits found substantial support for the attitudinal model, where the ideological 
composition of the review panel is a statistically significant predictor of agency support 
(Cross 2007; Humphries and Songer 1999). While these studies all point to ideology and 
politics influencing judge voting, these influences appear to be tempered by legal 
constraints (Cross 2007; Humphries and Songer 1999). 
D.C. Circuit Review of Agency Decisions 
A number of scholars have focused on judicial decisionmaking in the D.C. Circuit 
for several justifiable reasons. First, the geographical jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit 
encompasses the federal seat of government, which means that for many administrative 
agency appeals, the D.C. Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction (Banks 1999; Caruson and 
Bitzer 2004; Edwards 1998). For example, the D.C. Circuit is an exclusive venue for 
reviewing certain cases involving environmental regulation (Revesz 1997, 1999). This 
contributes to the increased volume of agency appeals heard in the D.C. Circuit compared 
to the remaining circuits. Since the D.C. Circuit reviews more agency actions, it is 
reasonable to expect that judges in the D.C. Circuit develop greater expertise on 
administrative law issues compared to their counterparts in other circuits. It is also 
reasonable to expect judges in the D.C. Circuit to extend agencies greater or lesser 
deference based on this expertise. 
Pierce (1988) argued that because of the large number of administrative law cases 
that D.C. Circuit judges must address, these judges develop a more sophisticated 
expertise on administrative law issues. Therefore, D.C. Circuit judges may be more 
inclined to scrutinize agency actions more thoroughly than judges in other circuits and 
less inclined to defer to agency decisions. Less deference to agencies results in lower 
rates of agency success in the D.C. Circuit. Other scholars echo D.C. Circuit judges‘ 
administrative law expertise, their propensity to take ―hard-look‖ approaches to judicial 
review, and an overall inclination to scrutinize agency behavior more closely (Edwards 
1998; Revesz 1997, 1999). 
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In addition to the relatively large volume of administrative law cases reviewed by 
the D.C. Circuit compared to other circuits, past research suggests at least one additional 
reason for examining the D.C. Circuit separately. Scholars identify the tendency of D.C. 
Circuit judges to be political in their decisionmaking, and suggest they may be more 
political than their counterparts in other circuits (Pierce 1988; Revesz 1997, 1999; Tiller 
and Cross 1999). Judges from the D.C. Circuit, however, dispute these findings as 
inaccurate and maintain that their decisions are driven by the rule of law and not by 
political preferences (Edwards 1998; Wald 1999). 
Judges in the D.C. Circuit may be more political for two reasons. First, these 
judges are more likely to have been involved in politics than their counterparts in other 
circuits. ―Before their appointment to the bench, a disproportionate number of [D.C. 
Circuit judges] serve in Congress or in political positions in the Executive Branch,‖ 
(Revesz 1997, p. 1720). Second, there are no senators representing the D.C. Circuit, as in 
other circuits, to mitigate extremity in ideological appointing by the President. While 
D.C. Circuit judges must be confirmed by the Senate, the President has more leeway to 
appoint judges who are aligned with him politically without consideration of the 
preferences of senators from the states in a given circuit. In general, scholars disagree on 
whether judges in the D.C. Circuit exert their political preferences more prominently than 
judges in other circuits or whether D.C. Circuit judges apply legal standards more 
rigorously in their review of agency decisions. 
In his examination of the history and development of the D.C. Circuit, Banks 
(1999) concluded that D.C. Circuit judges are political. While his analysis lacks 
substantive quantitative analysis, he makes compelling arguments for these judges voting 
according to their ideologies. Specifically, he notes the ―polarizing‖ effect of Ronald 
Reagan appointees in the D.C. Circuit. In sum, Banks states: 
[M]uch of what the D.C. Circuit does in the federal judiciary is strongly 
influenced by political considerations. While the mythology of judging 
casts a long shadow over common perceptions of what courts do in theory, 
in reality circuit courts routinely face the prospect that their judicial 
function may be directly influenced by internal or external political forces, 
a fact that invariably reflects the full range of agenda opportunities and 
judicial philosophies that come to dominate local criminal appeals 
diminished by court reform in the 1970s, the court experienced another 
political change in the 1980s that fundamentally altered its bench and the 
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tenor of its judicial politics in a new era of deregulation. Whereas earlier 
court reform allowed the D.C. Circuit to redefine its judicial role and 
become a leader in administrative law through hard-look judicial review, 
Reagan‘s appointments to the D.C. Circuit polarized the liberal and 
conservative blocs on the court and brought into sharp relief the question 
of litigant access and judicial deference to agencies, two key issues in 
regulatory law. … Not only was the court willing to use substantive hard-
look review at times and act as a trustee for ghosts of Congresses past, it 
also proved that its judges could politically manipulate the law under the 
Chevron deference principle and still remain a quintessential skeptic of 
agency action during a time of deregulation. Perhaps a primary lesson to 
be learned from the 1980s D.C. Circuit is that the judicial politics of the 
court did not diminish its capacity to assert its judicial will over agencies 
trying to fulfill their own statutory missions under broad grants of 
delegated legislative authority (Banks 1999). 
 Clearly, Banks found support for politics at play in the D.C. Circuit. However, he 
did not go so far as to suggest that politics is the only factor influencing judicial behavior 
in the D.C. Circuit. 
[T]he decisions of the D.C. Circuit are not solely the product of judicial 
politics. Empirical analysis of the court‘s access decisions and its 
approach to judicial deference to agencies‘ cases … indicate that judicial 
behavior is more complex than that and is accordingly affected by a 
variety of nonideological factors. Social scientists studying courts 
sometimes fall into the trap of believing that political considerations 
exclusively drive court outcomes. This may not be true. Political ideology 
is an important, but not an omnipotent, element in affecting D.C. Circuit 
policymaking. Quite simply, the law counts, too (emphasis in original, p. 
86). 
Banks‘ analysis concludes that political ideology is important in judicial behavior, 
but that law is equally important. His comprehensive qualitative approach to studying the 
D.C. Circuit and these subsequent conclusions should serve as a theoretical foundation 
for future quantitative analysis. 
There are a couple of notable quantitative studies examining judicial behavior in 
the D.C. Circuit. David Willison (1986) examined cases in the D.C. Circuit from 1981–
1984 and found that the D.C. Circuit supported agency decisions in 66% of cases. Where 
there was variance in court support, Willison suggests the party of the judge is the most 
significant explanatory variable, with Republican judges supporting agencies more often 
than Democratic judges (1986). Willison‘s findings, however, are limited because he 
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examines only the D.C. Circuit over a relatively brief period and he does not explain why 
agencies receive the levels of support that they receive. As he acknowledges, ―To assess 
fully the court‘s role as an activist policymaker, case outcomes would need to be 
compared against the direction of decisions made at the administrative level‖ (Willison 
1986, p. 325). 
Caruson and Bitzer (2004) examined the D.C. Circuit over the period 1985–1996 
with findings similar to Willison‘s —court deference to administrative agencies is a 
function of both legal constraints and personal attributes of judges, namely judge 
ideology. While Caruson and Bitzer‘s comprehensive specification of a logistic 
regression model is useful for informing future statistical models, the researchers 
measured court deference only in terms of judges voting in favor of the agency. This one-
dimensional characterization of deference is problematic since we are unable to 
distinguish between a judge supporting an agency because of some legal doctrine that 
compels judicial deference and a judge supporting an agency because he/she is in 
ideological agreement with the agency. Before accepting Caruson and Bitzer‘s findings 
—judges defer to agencies—one must effectively distinguish between these seemingly 
equivalent observations. 
In summary, studies of judicial decisionmaking in the D.C. Circuit when agency 
decisions are under review generally have findings similar to studies of judicial 
decisionmaking in all circuits. D.C. Circuit judges vote according to their ideologies, but 
this ideological voting appears to be constrained by law (Banks 1999; Caruson and Bitzer 
2004; Willison 1986). What remains uncertain is whether D.C. Circuit judges are any 
more political in their voting behavior than their counterparts in other circuits and 
whether judges are influenced by the ideology of their panel cohorts (Edwards 1998, 
2003; Pierce 1988; Revesz 1997, 1999; Tiller and Cross 1999; Wald 1999). Studies of 
judicial behavior in the D.C. Circuit either improperly specify or do not specify at all 
models that include deference to agencies, other legal constraints, and panel ideology. 
Further, these studies have not tested attitudinal and legal theories of judicial behavior in 
the same empirical models. 
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Court-Agency Studies in Sum 
While there is considerable agreement concerning federal courts‘ propensities to 
support agencies around 65–70% of the time, scholars do not agree on the causes of this 
support. Beginning with the earliest studies on the Supreme Court (Shapiro 1964) to more 
recent studies on the U.S. Courts of Appeals (Humphries and Songer 1999), the crux of 
the differences in these studies is whether law or politics is the driving factor behind 
court decisions. Most political science scholars agree that variation in support for 
agencies in both the Supreme Court and circuit courts is, in large part, a function of 
judges‘ personal preferences (Canon and Giles 1972; Caruson and Bitzer 2004; Crowley 
1987; Humphries and Songer 1999; Shapiro 1964; Sheehan 1990; Tanenhaus 1960).  
However, a few scholars show that this imposition of personal preferences may be done 
within legal constraints, where courts and judges defer to agencies (Banks 1999; Caruson 
and Bitzer 2004; Cross 2007; Horowitz 1994; Humphries and Songer 1999; Sheehan 
1992). 
Most judicial behavior research finds only modest support for law as a 
determinant of judicial decisionmaking when agency decisions are under review, which 
reflects a general inability to effectively measure components of the legal model and to 
evaluate these components in statistical models with attitudinal variables. Recent research 
has made important advances on this front (see especially, Cross 2007), but measurement 
improvements are still needed, as are more focused studies on the courts of appeals in 
recent years. 
Several Supreme Court researchers have examined differences in support based 
on agency adherence to procedures versus more substantive policy areas (Canon and 
Giles 1972; Tanenhaus 1960). The results of these studies suggested that how courts treat 
agencies on matters of procedure is different from how they treat agencies on matters of 
substance. These findings merit further empirical investigation using models that 
effectively measure procedures and other legal rules. Whether the substantive-procedural 
distinction manifests in disparate behavior in the U.S. Courts of Appeals remains 
unexamined. 
Despite scholarly disagreement on the matter, there are considerable reasons to 
suggest that judges in the D.C. Circuit may behave differently from judges in other 
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circuits. These differences may be due to D.C. Circuit judges‘ relatively greater expertise 
in administrative law or because of their tendencies to be more political. There is 
disagreement in the literature over whether D.C. Circuit judges vote according to 
personal policy preferences, deference to administrative agencies, or a combination of 
these two. 
The prevailing question in the extant literature centers on whether judges interject 
their personal preferences into their decisions or adhere strictly to the rule of law as 
defined by other policymakers, such as Congress or agencies. Political scientists have 
been largely concerned with the political dimensions of decisionmaking in the courts, 
sometimes to the detriment of the legal dimensions. This may be due to epistemological 
differences to studying the courts, or to difficulties in specifying and measuring legal 
concepts, or as Scalia (1989) notes, simply because studying administrative law  and its 
legal concepts is difficult. 
Among the weaknesses in past judicial behavior research when agency decisions 
are under review is scholars‘ inability to adequately develop construct validity in their 
quantitative models. That is, these studies do not fully conceptualize deference. In some 
instances, political science scholars have mischaracterized support for agencies as 
deference if the courts simply render a decision in favor of an agency (Caruson and 
Bitzer 2004). 
Scholars, especially legal scholars, are quick to identify legal reasoning embedded 
in opinions as the motivations for judges‘ decisions. Legal principles, such as the 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review or the substantial-evidence standard of 
review, frequently typify judges‘ motivations to defer to agencies from a legal theorist‘s 
perspective. By broadening the role of the courts to include the substance of their 
opinions in addition to the outcome of their decisions, we can more effectively 
conceptualize, operationalize and measure deference. In this regard, drawing on the 
scholarship of both political theorists and legal theorists is particularly helpful for 
informing future judicial decisionmaking research. Where legal theorists tend to thrive in 
thoroughly analyzing cases, which produces thick, rich descriptions and theories, political 
behaviorists thrive on large-N studies producing broad trends with generalizable results. 
Both approaches can be incorporated in the study of judicial behavior by first looking to 
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the legal literature‘s theoretical descriptions of how judges behave, which can be 
modified into hypotheses that are testable using political science datasets and 
econometrics. 
PLAN FOR RESEARCH 
The present study attempts to address the dearth of scholarship examining court 
review of agency decisions and the even greater dearth of scholarship examining the 
review of agency decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Having provided a conceptual 
framework for procedural and institutional deference, in the next chapter I develop 
several hypotheses related to deference and the legal model, as well as the attitudinal 
model. I then test these hypotheses using data from the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database. 
More specifically, I test the extent to which judges and courts review agency actions 
based on attitudes and the law. Based on these results, I draw conclusions about how 
judges and courts behave in the U.S. Courts of Appeals when agency decisions are under 
review.  
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESIZING DECISIONMAKING BEHAVIOR IN THE U.S. 
COURTS OF APPEALS 
 
 
Judicial decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals has not been studied 
extensively despite these courts functionally serving both as courts of first-level review 
and courts of last resort for the vast majority of appeals in the federal system, especially 
appeals from administrative agencies. It is, therefore, unsurprising that a great number of 
questions remain unanswered concerning how judges and courts behave in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals. 
The aim of the present study is to examine behavioral issues in these courts and, 
specifically, to determine the extent to which agency success rates in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals are a function of deference to law and a function of judges‘ attitudes. The 
overarching research question guiding this study is, ―When agency decisions are under 
review in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, what are the effects of law and ideology on judicial 
decisionmaking?‖ Based on this question, I developed eleven hypotheses related to the 
attitudinal and legal models. 
I present hypotheses initially based on the substance of the topic they address. At 
the end of the chapter, I summarize the hypotheses and re-order them based on the unit of 
analysis necessary to conduct hypothesis testing. For ease of reference, I reference the 
final hypotheses numbers after each (e.g., H1, H2, etc.). 
Judicial Decisionmaking based on Procedural Deference 
As discussed in the previous chapter, procedural deference exists when courts 
acknowledge agency adherence to prescribed procedures and, accordingly, defer to 
agency decisions. Prescribed procedures come from several sources, the most 
fundamental of which is the Administrative Procedure Act (1946) (APA), which 
prescribes how agencies must conduct their business. The major administrative functions 
the APA addresses include licensing, formal and informal rulemaking, ratemaking, 
investigations and information collection, and adjudication. The APA is rather extensive 
and its provisions are often quite specific, as 5 U.S.C. §558(c) on licensing illustrates. 
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When application is made for a license required by law, the agency, with 
due regard for the rights and privileges of all the interested parties or 
adversely affected persons and within a reasonable time, shall set and 
complete proceedings required to be conducted in accordance with 
sections 556 and 557 of this title or other proceedings required by law and 
shall make its decision. Except in cases of willfulness or those in which 
public health, interest, or safety requires otherwise, the withdrawal, 
suspension, revocation, or annulment of a license is lawful only if, before 
the institution of agency proceedings therefor, the licensee has been given: 
1. notice by the agency in writing of the facts or conduct which may 
warrant the action; and 
2. opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance with all lawful 
requirements. 
When the licensee has made timely and sufficient application for a 
renewal or a new license in accordance with agency rules, a license with 
reference to an activity of a continuing nature does not expire until the 
application has been finally determined by the agency. 
In addition to procedures outlined in the APA, other statutes prescribe agency 
procedures, including the Freedom of Information Act and the Government in the 
Sunshine Act. Agencies must also adhere to procedures from sources unique to each 
agency, such as an agency‘s enabling legislation and an agency‘s own rules. 
As Canon and Giles (1972) found in their Supreme Court study, ―agencies which 
meet certain criteria more or less traditionally associated with the concept of due process 
of law (e.g., proper notice, impartial hearing, decisions made in accordance with 
ascertainable evidentiary rules or standards, etc.) are supported by the Court and those 
which often fail to meet such standards are not supported.‖ I hypothesize that this is also 
true in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The following hypotheses are based on procedural 
deference. 
Agency adherence to procedural standards, such as those outlined in the 
Administrative Procedures Act and other related statutes, increases the 
likelihood that a review panel will defer to the agency. Agency non-
adherence to procedural standards decreases the likelihood that a review 
panel will defer to the agency. (H1) 
Agency adherence to procedural standards, such as those outlined in the 
Administrative Procedures Act and other related statutes, increases the 
likelihood that a judge will defer to the agency. Agency non-adherence to 
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procedural standards decreases the likelihood that a judge will defer to the 
agency. (H6) 
Note that the above hypotheses are essentially the same. The only difference is 
that the first addresses decisionmaking of an entire review panel, and the second 
addresses individual judge decisionmaking. 
Institutional Deference and Standards of Review 
Institutional deference occurs when a review court preserves the integrity of the 
policy preferences of other branches of government, including Congress and 
administrative agencies. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a number of standards of 
review specifically require courts to defer to agencies under certain circumstances. As an 
indicator of the legal model, these standards of review suggest that judges and courts will 
not substitute their preferences in place of agencies‘ preferences and should not set aside 
agency actions, so long as courts meet minimum review requirements. 
A standard of review defines the degree to which a reviewing court extends 
deference to the decision of a lower court or agency. In administrative law, there are 
many standards of review that courts of appeals use when reviewing agency decisions 
depending on several factors including the type of agency action reviewed, whether the 
review concerns facts or law, or whether a particular precedent or statute mandates a 
particular standard. These standards vary in degree of deference from the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard, which extends the highest level of deference to agencies, to de novo 
review, which affords the least degree of deference (Cross 2007). Several other standards 
with varying degrees of deference exist between these two, including abuse of discretion, 
substantial evidence, and clearly erroneous. 
Some standards not only prescribe that review courts defer to agencies, but also to 
Congress. Specifically, the Chevron doctrine requires courts to defer first to 
Congressional intent before deferring to the agency. 
Where courts defer to other institutions and, specifically, to agencies, as a number 
of standards of review require, courts arguably exercise institutional deference. The 
following hypotheses concern institutional deference. As with procedural deference, I 
posit two hypotheses, one for review panels and one for individual judges. 
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If a court panel answers standard-of-review questions favorably toward an 
agency, the review panel is more likely to defer to the agency, resulting in 
support for the agency in the final case decision. (H3) 
If a court panel answers standard-of-review questions favorably toward an 
agency, a judge is more likely to defer to the agency and vote to support 
the agency in the final case decision. (H8) 
Inasmuch as standards of review are either prescribed by Congress, as in the 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard defined in the Administrative Procedure Act, or 
prescribed by the Supreme Court, as in Chevron deference, these standards are clear 
indicators of the legal model. If U.S. Courts of Appeals judges appropriately apply these 
standards without interjecting their personal policy preferences into the review process, 
these judges adhere to the legal model of judicial behavior. 
Ideologically Driven Decisionmaking 
Considerable research suggests that federal judges and justices decide cases 
according to their attitudes, and the best predictor of judge‘s attitudes is ideology (Canon 
and Giles 1972; Caruson and Bitzer 2004; Cross 2007; Crowley 1987; Humphries and 
Songer 1999; Segal and Spaeth 2002; Sheehan 1992; Tanenhaus 1960; Wilson 2006). 
Given the consistent findings of attitudinal research suggesting that liberal judges vote 
liberally and conservative judges vote conservatively, I posit the following hypotheses. 
Court panels decide cases consistently with panel ideology. Liberal panels 
tend to support liberal agency decisions, and conservative panels tend to 
support conservative agency decisions. (H4) 
A judge’s vote will be consistent with his/her ideology in a case. Judges 
will vote to support agencies if their ideology agrees with the agency 
position. Conservative judges will vote to support conservative agency 
decisions. Liberal judges will vote to support liberal agency decisions. 
(H9) 
Collegiality and Effects of Panel Ideology 
Since cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals are generally heard by panels of three 
judges, it is reasonable to assume that collegial and professional norms may influence 
judicial decisionmaking. Past studies show that the ideological composition of a panel is 
a statistically significant determinant for how individual judges and review panels decide 
cases (Humphries and Songer 1999; Sunstein et al. 2004). Sunstein et al. suggest that the 
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more ideologically conservative a review panel is, the more likely an individual judge 
will render a conservative decision (2004). Similarly, liberal panels tend to foster liberal 
decisions from individual judges (Sunstein et al. 2004). Accordingly, I posit the 
following hypothesis concerning panel composition. 
Individual judge votes to support agencies are influenced by the ideology 
of other judges on the reviewing panel. If the review panel is in 
ideological agreement with the agency position, individual judges are 
more likely to support agencies in final case decisions. (H11) 
Support for this hypothesis lends support for the attitudinal model of judicial 
behavior. While the purpose of the present study is not to evaluate all models of judicial 
behavior, it is worth noting that these hypotheses also suggest that judicial behavior is 
influenced by non-attitudinal and non-legal factors. Professional norms in the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals suggest that judges may put their personal policy preferences aside to 
preserve the integrity of professional relationships they have with other judges in their 
circuits (Howard 1977). However, these hypotheses are based on the assumption that the 
ideological composition of a review panel influences judicial behavior and final case 
decisions. In this regard, support for these hypotheses suggests that judges‘ ideologies 
inform their decisionmaking. 
Judicial Decisionmaking in the D.C. Circuit 
Scholars disagree on whether judges in the District of Columbia Circuit behave 
differently from their counterparts in other circuits because they have greater expertise in 
administrative law or because they are more political (Edwards 1998; Pierce 1988; 
Revesz 1997, 1999; Tiller and Cross 1999; Wald 1999). If D.C. Circuit judges develop a 
greater understanding of administrative law issues because of the greater volume of 
agency cases they review, it is reasonable to assume that these judges may scrutinize 
agency actions more heavily and be less inclined to defer to agencies simply because 
agencies followed procedures. I hypothesize the following. 
D.C. Circuit panels are less likely than other circuit panels to defer to 
agencies based on agency adherence to procedures. (H2) 
D.C. Circuit judges are less likely than judges in other circuits to defer to 
agencies based on agency adherence to procedures. (H7) 
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Judges in the D.C. Circuit might also be more political than other circuit judges 
for two reasons. First, D.C. judges tend to have political professional backgrounds more 
than judges in other circuits (Revesz 1999). Second, during the appointment of D.C. 
Circuit judges, Presidents may not be tempered in their appointments by ideologically 
different Senators, as with other circuits. Senators who represent states in other circuits 
may moderate extreme ideological appointments during the advise and consent process 
(Revesz 1999). Therefore, it is at least plausible that judges in the D.C. Circuit may be 
more political than judges in other circuits. Hence, I hypothesize the following. 
D.C. Circuit review panels tend to decide cases more consistently with 
panel ideology than review panels in other circuits. (H5) 
D.C. Circuit judges tend to decide cases more consistently with their 
ideologies than judges in other circuits. (H10)  
 
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES 
Based on my research question, I developed eleven hypotheses related to the 
attitudinal and legal models of judicial behavior. These hypotheses are divided into two 
categories that address the decisionmaking of courts (review panels) and the 
decisionmaking of individual judges. The court-level hypotheses are stated in terms of 
the typical review ―panel‖ of three judges. However, cases reviewed en banc will also be 
analyzed. 
For ease of reference and discussion in later chapters, I re-ordered and 
summarized the hypotheses below according to their respective units of analysis—court-
level and judge-level. These two sets of hypotheses each have several subsets aimed at 
measuring the impact of judge attitudes and the law as informants of judicial 
decisionmaking. Each set also includes hypotheses concerning whether D.C. Circuit 
judges behave differently from judges in other circuits. 
Court-Level Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Agency adherence to procedural standards, such as those 
outlined in the Administrative Procedures Act and other related statutes, increases the 
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likelihood that a review panel will defer to the agency. Agency non-adherence to 
procedural standards decreases the likelihood that a review panel will defer to the agency. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): D.C. Circuit panels are less likely than other circuit panels to 
defer to agencies based on agency adherence to procedures. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): If a court panel answers standard-of-review questions 
favorably toward an agency, the review panel is more likely to defer to the agency, 
resulting in support for the agency in the final case decision. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Court panels decide cases consistently with panel ideology. 
Liberal panels tend to support liberal agency decisions, and conservative panels tend to 
support conservative agency decisions.  
Hypothesis 5 (H5): D.C. Circuit review panels tend to decide cases more 
consistently with panel ideology than review panels in other circuits. 
Judge-Level Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Agency adherence to procedural standards, such as those 
outlined in the Administrative Procedures Act and other related statutes, increases the 
likelihood that a judge will defer to the agency. Agency non-adherence to procedural 
standards decreases the likelihood that a judge will defer to the agency. 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): D.C. Circuit judges are less likely than judges in other circuits 
to defer to agencies based on agency adherence to procedures. 
Hypothesis 8 (H8): If a court panel answers standard-of-review questions 
favorably toward an agency, a judge is more likely to defer to the agency and vote to 
support the agency in the final case decision. 
Hypothesis 9 (H9): A judge‘s vote will be consistent with his/her ideology in a 
case. Judges will vote to support agencies if their ideology agrees with the agency 
position. Conservative judges will vote to support conservative agency decisions. Liberal 
judges will vote to support liberal agency decisions. 
Hypothesis 10 (H10): D.C. Circuit judges tend to decide cases more consistently 
with their ideologies than judges in other circuits. 
Hypothesis 11 (H11): Individual judge votes to support agencies are influenced by 
the ideology of other judges on the reviewing panel. If the ideology of the review panel is 
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in agreement with the agency position, individual judges are more likely to support 
agencies in final case decisions. 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL SCIENCE 
The present study is a study of judicial decisionmaking. However, this study also 
contributes to several other areas within political science. 
Concerning judicial decisionmaking, support for the ideology-based hypotheses I 
presented will provide further evidence of judges voting according to their attitudes in the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals. Support for these hypotheses will show that the attitudinal model 
applies not only to civil liberties and economic cases, but also to administrative law 
cases. Support for the law-based hypotheses will provide evidence for the legal model of 
judicial behavior in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, which heretofore has received little 
quantitative support in the political science literature. 
Considered collectively, the attitudinal and legal hypotheses shed light on whether 
the judicial branch of government in the U.S. is a neutral, law-based one, a political one, 
or both. These hypotheses hold particular import in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, which 
functionally serve as the courts of first-level of appeals and also as courts of last resort for 
the vast majority of federal-level disputes.  
Concerning political theory, support for these hypotheses holds important 
ramifications for inter-branch relations in a government concerned with power sharing 
and checks and balances. To the extent judges either defer to agency discretion or engage 
in policymaking in the face of executive actions, the U.S. Courts of Appeals may be 
strengthening or weakening judicial power and concomitantly strengthening or 
weakening the power of the executive branch. Courts extending greater deference to 
agencies theoretically create a stronger executive branch. Political decisionmaking in the 
courts broadens judicial power to the detriment of executive power and, perhaps, 
legislative power inasmuch as agencies may or may not carry out the intentions of 
Congress. 
Support for these hypotheses also contributes to the public administration 
literature. Often, students of public administration have not been afforded the benefit of 
empirical studies examining the relationships agencies have with the courts. By 
understanding the complexities of public-sector decisions vis-à-vis the judicial branch of 
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government, students of public administration and public administrators themselves are 
better positioned to make decisions about their own actions and processes. 
Finally, support for these hypotheses, especially those related to the D.C. Circuit, 
may contribute to studies of judicial process and constitutionalism.  Specifically, if these 
hypotheses are true, then outcomes of cases may depend not only on the judges who hear 
a specific case, but also on the circuit that hears the case. This may bring into question 
equal application of the law in a democratic system based on the rule of law. If litigant 
success depends on the level of administrative law expertise retained by judges, panels 
and circuits, arguably the rule of law may not be applied uniformly. Similarly, if judges 
in the D.C. Circuit are more political, then changes in the processes of judge selection 
and case assignment may be warranted. If the outcome of a case depends on the circuit in 
which the case is heard, principles of constitutionalism may be undermined. 
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CHAPTER 4: BUILDING A MODEL OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING—
DATA AND METHODS 
 
 
In earlier chapters, I distinguished the strengths and limitations of attitudinal and 
legal research. Ultimately, I concluded that future researchers will benefit from 
acknowledging epistemological weaknesses associated with each approach and 
capitalizing on their strengths. This premise guides the remainder of this research. 
The primary shortcoming of the legal model of judicial behavior is that it has been 
poorly specified, or not specified at all, which prevents researchers from creating 
objective models based on falsifiabilty. Models should be not only falsifiable but also 
based on a priori observations (Segal and Spaeth 2002). The primary limitation of the 
attitudinal research is that results are based on models that do not incorporate properly 
specified elements of law and other behavioral informants alongside attitudinal variables 
(e.g., Segal and Spaeth 2002). Hence, the results of attitudinal research may be 
overstated. 
Roughly speaking, the strength of legal research is depth of knowledge, coupled 
with detailed conceptualization of legal principles and doctrine. The strength of 
attitudinal research is in the formal modeling of judicial decisionmaking based on 
falsifiable hypotheses using statistical analysis with large datasets. 
Given these strengths and limitations, I attempt, in this chapter, to build a model 
of judicial decisionmaking for the U.S. Courts of Appeals when agency actions are under 
review. To do so, I specify regression models using variables informed by legal concepts 
and past attitudinal research. 
Since the present study is concerned with both court-level and judge-level 
decisionmaking in the Courts of Appeals, I have two dependent variables in the research, 
each corresponding with the two units of analysis. The court-level dependent variable is 
dichotomous, and measures whether review panels in the courts of appeals support 
agencies in final case decisions.
9
 The judge-level dependent variable is also dichotomous, 
and measures whether individual judges vote to support agencies in final case decisions. 
                                                 
9
 Includes cases reviewed en banc. 
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To test whether courts of appeals panels and judges extend deference to agencies 
in their decisionmaking, I construct several variables based on standards of review and 
agency adherence to procedures. To measure whether panel and judge votes in support of 
an agency are a function of judges‘ ideologies, I construct variables based on judge 
ideology scores developed by Giles, Hettinger and Peppers (2001; 2002). 
In this chapter, I describe the data and the legal and attitudinal variables used in 
analysis. I conclude by specifying a logistic regression model to test my hypotheses. 
DATA 
My primary data source is the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database,
10
 a stratified 
random sample of published cases for the years 1925–2002. For years 1925–1960, the 
sample consists of 15 randomly selected cases per circuit per year. For years 1961–2002, 
the sample consists of 30 randomly selected cases per circuit per year. The database also 
includes all U.S. Courts of Appeals cases that were eventually heard in the U.S. Supreme 
Court. In total, there are 20,355 cases in the database. Cases in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals Database were coded for over 200 variables related to the case, litigants, judges, 
and votes. As frequent litigants in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, federal agencies are well 
represented in the dataset. Additionally, a number of administrative law variables 
pertinent to the research question and hypotheses in the present study are included in the 
database. Therefore, the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database is very useful in examining 
court-agency relations, and serves as the primary source of data for this study (for an 
expanded discussion of the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database, see George and Sheehan 
2000; Songer et al. 2000). 
Years of Study 
I focus on the years 1982–2002 for three reasons. The Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals Reorganization Act (1980) divided the Fifth Circuit into two circuits effective 
October 1, 1981. I chose 1982 as the starting point for analysis, since this is the first full 
calendar year of the Eleventh Circuit‘s creation. This also allows for consistency in the 
                                                 
10
 The data and codebook for the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database are available through the University of 
Kentucky‘s S. Sidney Ulmer Research Project for Law and Judicial Politics at 
www.as.uky.edu/academics/departments_programs/PoliticalScience/PoliticalScience/FacultyResources/Res
ources/Ulmer/Pages/default.aspx. The database was funded by National Science Foundation grants, with 
Donald Songer as the principal investigator for data in the years 1925-1996, and Ashlyn Kuerston as the 
principal investigator for updates – years 1997-2002. 
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number of cases I examine per year, since there are a consistent number of circuits during 
the observation period. During this period, the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database consists 
of a random sample of 30 cases per circuit per year, which means that weighting cases in 
analysis is not necessary. 
Prior studies of the circuit courts and their relationship to administrative agencies 
that used the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database were restricted to 1925–1988, which 
coincided with the years the data were collected originally (see for example, Humphries 
and Songer 1999). Phase three of the U.S. Courts of Appeals database updated the data 
through 1996.  The last wave of data is updated through 2002. I end the date range to 
coincide with the most recent available data in the database. 
Source of Cases Selected 
I limit observations to cases that come to the U.S. Courts of Appeals directly from 
administrative agencies. These cases are based on the database‘s source variable, which 
indicates the court or agency that dealt with the case immediately before being received 
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. A similar variable in the database, origin, indicates the 
court or agency that made the first decision in the case. In most instances, these two 
variables are the same. However, there are instances where the two variables differ. For 
example, if the Supreme Court remanded an agency review case to a circuit court, the 
source would be the Supreme Court, but the origin would be the administrative agency. 
Since I am more interested in the relationship between the U.S. Courts of Appeals and 
agencies, and less interested in the mediating effects other institutions may have between 
an agency‘s original decision and final courts of appeals disposition, I limit analysis to 
cases coming directly to the courts of appeals from administrative agencies. 
For 1982–2002, the number of cases in the sample that came directly from an 
administrative agency is 553. I also include cases coming from administrative law judges, 
since these judges are part of the overall collective of federal government agencies and 
not part of the judiciary. The number of cases that come from an administrative law judge 
is 30. The total number of cases coming to the U.S. Courts of Appeals directly from 
federal agencies during this period is 583, which is 7.7% of the courts‘ docket of 
published cases. Table 4.1 shows the sources of cases heard and the respective 
percentages of the U.S. Courts of Appeals‘ collective docket from the database. A small 
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number of cases are omitted from this total for reasons I address later in this study. The 
actual number of cases used in analysis is 556, of which 28 come from administrative law 
judges. For purposes of determining the percentage of agency review cases, the higher 
number (583) is the accurate number of cases upon which to base this percentage. 
About 86% of all cases come to the Courts of Appeals from the District Courts, 
but the next largest group of cases is from administrative agencies and administrative law 
judges—almost eight percent of the courts‘ docket of published cases. This suggests that, 
at least by volume, the number of cases from administrative agencies handled by the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals is not trivial. Table 4.2 shows the percentage of the caseload in the 
courts of appeals that comes from administrative agencies by year. There is considerable 
variation from year to year. The range is from 5.57% in 2002 to 12.5% in 1982. In most 
years, the percentage of agency cases handled by the circuit courts was between 
approximately six and nine percent. 
Circuits of Study 
Twelve courts are represented in the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database—the First 
through Eleventh Circuits and the District of Columbia Circuit. Table 4.3 shows the 
number and percentage of cases by circuit where the source is a federal agency. 
Unsurprisingly, of the total number of agency cases reviewed in the circuit courts, the 
D.C. Circuit reviewed 39.3 percent. The D.C. Circuit consistently reviews more 
administrative appeals than the other circuits because its geographical jurisdiction is the 
federal seat of government and because it is an exclusive venue for many policy areas, as 
previously noted (Revesz 1997, 1999). 
This study distinguishes between the D.C. Circuit and all other circuits for two 
primary reasons. First, the volume of administrative law cases reviewed in the D.C. 
Circuit is considerably larger than any other circuit. Thus, judges may develop greater 
administrative law expertise compared to their counterparts in other circuits, and may 
subsequently behave differently because of this expertise. Second, some scholars suggest 
that D.C. Circuit judges may be more ideologically driven in their decisionmaking than 
other circuit judges (Pierce 1988; Revesz 1997, 1999; Tiller and Cross 1999). This 
distinction will ensure that all case types are included in the dataset and analysis, which 
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essentially allows for ―controls‖ of any differences that may exist between D.C. Circuit 
and other circuits. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE—COURT SUPPORT FOR AGENCIES 
There are two dependent variables in this study. Court support indicates whether 
a court supported an agency in the final case decisions, and judge support indicates 
whether an individual judge voted to support an agency in the final case decision. Both of 
these variables are dichotomous, where 1 indicates a supportive vote or decision and 0, 
otherwise. Support means that the outcome of the case is favorable to the agency, which 
most often means the court affirms the agency decision. Similarly, the most common 
non-supportive decision is a reversal of the agency decision. However, there are other 
dispositions besides affirm and reverse that I consider in this analysis. 
To construct these dependent variables, I relied on the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
Database‘s treat variable. The treat variable indicates how the circuit courts treated the 
lower court or agency. The treat variable is coded for a variety of court actions, including 
reversals, remands, affirms, vacates, and so forth. Values for the treat variable are 
nominal, and are described in the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database codebook as shown in 
Table 4.4. Table 4.4 also shows the frequency and percent of each treat value in the 
sample. 
As expected, one of the most common ways for courts to dispose of cases when 
reviewing agency decisions is by affirming the agency decision (about 21% of cases). 
These agency-supportive actions are coded as treat = 1 (affirmed, or affirmed and 
petition denied) or as treat = 11 [affirmed, vacated (with no mention of reverse), and 
remanded]. It is not uncommon, however, for courts to dispose of cases in ways that are 
not supportive to the agency. Non-support for the agency consists, generally, of cases 
where the court reversed, remanded, or vacated the case (treat = 2, 3, 4, or 7). 
Collectively, these non-supportive values comprise about 25% of court dispositions. 
Coding for Denied Petitions and Dismissed Appeals 
Other dispositions can also be considered supportive or non-supportive toward the 
agency, namely when courts deny petitions or dismiss appeals (treat = 8). A ―petition‖ 
for review is the ordinary method for a party to have its case reviewed in the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals after an agency has made its final decision. Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of 
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Appellate Procedure states, ―Review of an agency order is commenced by filing, within 
the time prescribed by law, a petition for review with the clerk of a court of appeal 
authorized to review the agency order‖ (see Fed. R. App. P. 15). Additionally, Rule 15 
states, ―‗petition for review‘ includes a petition to enjoin, suspend, modify, or otherwise 
review, or a notice of appeal, whichever form is indicated by the applicable statute‖ (see 
Fed. R. App. P. 15). Although petitions are generally associated with discretionary 
review, such as petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, petitions for 
review of agency orders are not discretionary in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Therefore, 
values for the treat variable coded as 8 (petition denied or appeal dismissed) have the 
same weight as other final dispositions coded in this variable. A case example taken from 
the sample illustrates. 
In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co. (1992), 
Liberty Mutual petitioned the court to review the Benefits Review Board‘s decision 
concerning which insurance company was liable for a worker‘s asbestosis disability 
claim. The First Circuit considered this case fully and responded in its opinion to the 
arguments in the litigants‘ briefs. After considering relevant facts and case law 
surrounding the case, including medical and administrative obstacles, and congressional 
intent, the court held, ―the carrier which last insured the liable employer during the period 
in which the claimant was exposed to the injurious stimuli and prior to the date the 
claimant became disabled by an occupational disease arising naturally out of his 
employment and exposure is responsible for discharging the duties and obligations of the 
liable employer‖ (Liberty Mutual 1992, p. 756). Although the court gave full 
consideration to the case at bar, the judgment stated, in relevant part, ―The petition to 
review is dismissed and the Board‘s decision is affirmed.‖ In sum, petitions for review 
are not discretionary, and court decisions to deny petitions can be considered as either 
support or non-support for the agency, depending on the party that filed the petition. 
Depending on whether the agency is the respondent or appellant in a case, a 
court‘s denial of a petition or dismissal of an appeal (treat = 8) can sometimes be 
supportive of the agency and sometimes not. Agencies are the respondent in about 86% 
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of the observations.
11
 Where the agency is the respondent, a court‘s denial of a petition or 
dismissal of an appeal has the effect of leaving the agency decision in place, as illustrated 
in Liberty Mutual (1992). I equate these decisions with support for the agency.  In about 
14% of the observations where the courts deny petitions or dismiss appeals, the agency is 
the appellant. In these cases (generally, petitions to enforce agency actions) denial of a 
petition means the agency‘s decision is not enforced. Hence, where the agency is the 
appellant, denials of petitions are non-supportive decisions. In order to code the 
dependent variable, court support, accounting for when the agency is the appellant and 
the respondent in these cases, some recoding is necessary. I rely on two additional 
variables in the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database—appfed and r_fed. 
The database codes the variable, appfed, indicating the number of appellants in 
the case that are federal agencies. All values greater than zero indicate that a federal 
agency in the case was an appellant. Therefore, when appfed is greater than zero, I 
assume if an agency is a party in the case, the agency is the appellant. In these instances, I 
recoded values of 8 in the treat variable as 18 (value chosen arbitrarily) to distinguish 
agencies as either appellant or respondent in cases where the petition was denied or the 
appeal was dismissed. To check this assumption, I also examined the database‘s r-fed 
variable, which indicates the number of respondents that are federal agencies. Table 4.4.5 
is a cross-tabular presentation of the appfed variable and the r_fed variable when courts 
deny petitions or dismiss appeals (treat = 8). Generally, my assumption is accurate—
where appfed is greater than zero, an agency is an appellant in the case. However, there 
are a handful of instances where an agency is not listed as either an appellant or a 
respondent (N=4), or an agency is an appellant and another agency is the respondent 
(N=3). There are also four cases where the number of agency appellants or agency 
respondents could not be determined (appfed = 99 (N=1) or r_fed = 99 (N=3)). For these 
anomalies, I examined the cases individually to determine how to code the dependent 
variable, court support. Appendix A documents the coding for these eleven exceptions. 
                                                 
11
 This figure is based on the appfed variable in the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database, which indicates the 
number of appellants that are federal agencies. This variable is coded as 0 in 86% of the observations, 
which means that an agency is not an appellant, and, therefore, a respondent. 
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Omitted Cases—Mixed Decisions and Non-final Agency Decisions 
Two types of cases are excluded from analysis—those with mixed dispositions 
and non-final agency decisions. First, I exclude cases where courts rendered decisions 
that were mixed with respect to support for agencies (about 6.7% of cases). In these 
cases, courts affirmed part of the agency‘s decision and reversed part of the agency‘s 
decision (treat = 5 or 6). Researchers who have used the U.S. Courts of Appeals database 
in ways similar to the present study either exclude mixed cases without documenting 
their justifications for doing so (Humphries and Songer 1999; Kaheny et al. 2008)
12
 or 
researchers inappropriately classify mixed-decision cases (Cross 2007). In their model of 
judicial review that tests for the possible joint influence of the law and judicial 
preferences, Humphries and Songer (1999) omit mixed decisions from analysis. In 
establishing values for their dependent variable, agency success, they simply state, 
―Mixed decisions, where the agency was supported in part and reversed in part, were 
excluded from analysis‖ (Humphries and Songer 1999, p. 214). They give no reasons to 
support their decision to exclude these observations, nor do they give an explanation for 
how this exclusion may bias the results of their study. 
Alternatively, in his examination of the effects of law on court decisions, Cross 
(2007) groups mixed-decision cases with other cases where the courts affirmed the 
agency action. He states, ―Although the database codes decisions for many judicial 
outcomes, I have reduced the codes to a simple binary value reflecting whether the lower 
court decision was at least in part affirmed or reversed‖ (Cross 2007, p. 48). Counting 
mixed decisions the same as decisions that fully affirm lower courts and agencies biases 
the results by overstating affirmance rates, but Cross does not address this bias. 
I omit these mixed-decision cases based on the following analysis. I examined a 
sample of the mixed-decision cases to determine whether or not to include them and to 
assess how their inclusion or exclusion may bias the results of this study. At the outset, I 
reject coupling these observations with the group of affirmed cases. While the number of 
mixed decision cases is small, grouping them will overstate the level of support agencies 
                                                 
12
 These scholars include principal investigators for the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database. Donald Songer 
served as the principal investigator responsible for overseeing the original phases of the database coding. 
Susan B. Haire served as one of the principal investigators responsible for the latest updates to the dataset. 
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actually receive from courts. But this is not the only option available for keeping these 
cases in the dataset. 
It might also be an option to have a dependent variable that is ordinal, based on 
three points—non-support, mixed support, and support. Although ordered regression 
models allow for analyzing dependent variables in this way, this is not methodologically 
desirable for two reasons. First, and perhaps most critically, the number of intermediate 
values (mixed cases) is small (N=37), which will cause an ordered regression model to 
fail to converge (see Long 1997, p. 125). This number further diminishes as I examine 
separately legal issues that are not present in every case. For example, as I explain later in 
this chapter, one of the legal variables I examine is the arbitrary and capricious standard 
of review. This standard occurs in only eight cases with mixed-decision dispositions. The 
alternative to working around these small numbers in an ordered regression model is to 
combine these observations with a neighboring category of observations. Since it is not 
appropriate to combine mixed-decisions with other observations and since such small 
numbers prevent ordered regressions from converging, I exclude these cases from 
analysis. 
Alternatively, using an intermediate value in the dependent variable might also be 
misleading, since it implies incorrectly that a middle value for the dependent variable 
actually exists. Statistically, this implication is incorrect as in many single-issue cases 
where a mixed-support option does not exist. Mixed-decision cases contain more than 
one issue, docket or party that makes the case disposition separable. To construct a 
dependent variable with an intermediate value that is not an option for every observation 
makes interpreting results difficult or nonsensical. The following case helps explain.  
In Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Benefits Review Board, U.S. Dept. of 
Labor, the only issue before the court was whether the Board provided substantial 
evidence to support its decision to award black lung benefits to a miner‘s surviving 
spouse. In this case, the court was asked to make a definitive decision about a single 
issue, which restricted the court to one of two outcomes—either the Board did or did not 
provide substantial evidence to support its decision. Here, it does not make sense for the 
court to affirm in part and reverse in part, because there was only one agency action to 
consider. While this case is not coded as having mixed dispositions, statistically, an 
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ordered regression model would assume that one exists. An ordered regression model, 
which is a maximum-likelihood model, computes an independent variable‘s impact on 
the dependent variable‘s probable change from the first cut point (non-support) to the 
second cut point (mixed support) and from the second cut point to the third cut point 
(support). This would not be a problem if there were multiple issues or multiple decisions 
being reviewed in every case. Mixed-decisions would always be interpretable. However, 
an ordered regression model would assume that an intermediate value existed for all 
observations, even when this value does not always make sense (for a fuller discussion of 
interpreting ordered regression models, see Long 1997, pp. 127-40). In Freeman, to 
suggest there is an intermediate value available to the court with respect to agency 
support would be the equivalent of the court nonsensically finding that the Benefits 
Review Board sort of provided substantial evidence to support its decision. 
In addition to problems interpreting statistics, it is also misleading to construct an 
intermediate value for the dependent variable, court support, because there is no 
theoretical reason for doing so. I am unaware of a study that suggests a theoretical 
explanation for why courts of appeals would render a mixed decision. While this may be 
an interesting inquiry for future studies, extant research typically does not include mixed-
decisions in analysis, much less provide theoretical explanations for their existence. 
Neither does my analysis of other case attributes for mixed-decision cases readily 
reveal a plausible pattern suggesting a theoretical reason for why a court would render a 
mixed decision. For mixed-decision cases, I examined patterns by circuit, judge ideology, 
cross appeals, and parties (particular agencies). None revealed patterns in mixed-decision 
cases that were substantially different from the remaining cases. Although I did not 
conduct difference of means tests or other statistical tests for all variables, I examined 
two variables where intuitively one might expect to see differences in mixed-decision 
cases—dissents and multi-dockets. 
One might expect there to be a relationship between mixed-decision cases and 
cases with a dissent. If a case contains multiple issues for which the majority of judges do 
not agree fully with the agency, then the case might also invite disagreement from one 
particular judge. The percentage of cases with a dissent is higher among mixed-decision 
cases (18.9%) compared to other cases (9.8%). When all cases are considered together, 
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the percentage of cases with a dissent is 10.5% (see Table 4.4.6). To test whether these 
differences may matter, I constructed an intermediate variable, mixed, indicating whether 
a case had a mixed-decision outcome (treat = 5 or 6). This variable is coded 1 if the final 
disposition is mixed and 0, otherwise. I also coded a variable, dissent, indicating whether 
a case has at least one dissenting judge (based on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database‘s 
dissent variable, which indicates the number of judges who dissented in a case). Where 
dissent is greater than zero, dissent is coded as 1 and is coded as 0 otherwise. Table 4.4.6 
shows the results of a chi-squared analysis between the mixed and dissent variables. The 
chi-squared value approaches conventional levels of statistical significance, but is only 
p<0.084. This suggests that the difference between dissent rates among mixed-decision 
and other cases may not be systematic, and the higher percentages of cases with dissents 
among mixed-decisions may be confined only to this sample. 
Similarly, one might expect there to be more mixed decisions when the courts 
consider multiple dockets in the same case. A multi-docket case means that the legal 
issues and facts are sufficiently similar across more than one dispute, so the court 
considers these disputes dockets together in the same case, although parties filed their 
complaints with the court in separate dockets. This is not to say, however, that dockets 
decided in the same case are necessarily decided in the same way. The facts may be 
sufficiently different to warrant different outcomes for different dockets. Based on the 
database‘s multdoc variable, which indicates the number of dockets in a case, the 
percentage of mixed-decision cases with multiple dockets is 37.5%, compared to 9.8% 
for the remaining cases (see Table 4.4.7). To test whether these differences are 
significant, I created a multiple dockets variable, coded 1 if there was more than one 
docket in a case and 0, otherwise. I conducted a chi-squared analysis between mixed and 
multiple dockets as reported in Table 4.4.7. Although the chi-squared value  is 
statistically significant (p<0.001), I hesitate to place much emphasis on the relationship 
between multi-docket cases and mixed-decision cases, since over one-third of the 
observations in question have no code for the multdoc variable. These missing data 
coincide with years 1982–1988, which are the years used in the present study from phase 
one of the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database. Apparently, the multdoc variable was not 
coded during the first phase of data collection for the database, but I can find no 
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documentation to support this assumption. Without more complete data, I can only say 
that this data indicates there may be a relationship between cases with mixed-decision 
and cases with multiple dockets. 
As the previous paragraphs attempt to show, there is no theoretical reason to 
include mixed-decision cases as an intermediate value in the dependent variable. With the 
exception of a possible relationship between mixed-decision cases and multiple-docket 
cases, my examination of other case attributes, including dissents, does not reveal a 
justification for doing so. 
Finally, another option for keeping mixed-decision cases in the present study 
might be to recode them. However, it is not methodologically acceptable to recode 
mixed-decision cases without recoding the remaining cases, since recoding would 
confound the unit of analysis. Currently, the unit of analysis is case. Recoding mixed-
decision cases would mean that the unit of analysis in these cases would be an ill-defined 
smaller unit than case—generally, issue. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court Database, the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals Database does not contain code all case attributes based on the 
separate issues in each case. In order to code accurately the dependent variable, court 
support, in mixed decision cases, it is necessary to split the observations into multiple 
observations based on different issues and their corresponding court decisions. A case 
example helps illustrate. 
In Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), 
(1983) the three-judge panel unanimously set aside and remanded one order of the ICC 
and affirmed three others. In this case, the railroad company applied for permission to 
abandon a portion of its railroad, which the ICC approved contingent on no offers to buy 
the land materializing during the required waiting period. During the waiting period, a 
grain company made an offer to purchase the railroad land. Since the two companies 
were unable to settle terms of the sale, the ICC, acting within its authority, intervened to 
help facilitate the real-estate transaction. The railroad challenged four ICC actions and 
orders related to this transaction. Based on the language in the opinion, the court found: 
1) ICC did not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it established that the grain company 
was financially sound and its offer to buy the land was a bona fide offer, 2) ICC did not 
abuse its discretion by extending the closing date at the grain company‘s request, 3) ICC 
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did not violate the railroad‘s due process rights by treating its untimely-filed motion to 
dismiss as an appeal, and 4) ICC was arbitrary and capricious in setting the purchase 
price, since it based its decision on an erroneous reading of the record. 
In order to code the decisions in this case, I would need to create four separate 
observations. The first observation would code the dependent variable as 1, indicating 
court support for the agency, but I would also need to code the reasons the court gave for 
support (e.g., ICC action was not arbitrary and capricious). The second observation 
would code the dependent variable as 1, but provide a different reason for the decision 
(i.e., ICC did not abuse its discretion). The third and fourth observations would follow 
similar coding patterns, except I would code the court support variable as 0 for the fourth 
observation, indicating the court‘s non-supportive position by remanding to the ICC the 
issue of the purchase price. Recoding would require a greater level of specificity, 
notwithstanding scholarly disagreements over appropriate issue coding (see Shapiro 
2009, 2010 (forthcoming)).  
Recoding mixed-decision cases with this level of specificity means that the unit of 
analysis for these cases is issue, while the unit of analysis for the remaining cases is case. 
Not only does this confound the unit of analysis, but this recoding scheme places undue 
weight on other variables in mixed-decision cases. For example, had the court decided 
the fourth issue in favor of the ICC in Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, all four issues 
would have been affirmed. Accordingly, the arbitrary-and-capricious legal issue would be 
coded only once (as opposed to twice), the court‘s support for agencies would be coded 
only once (as opposed to three times), and the judges‘ ideologies would be counted only 
once (as opposed to four times). Therefore, it is not an option to recode only the mixed-
decision cases, since doing so would bias the data. To be clear, I can alleviate the 
measurement problems by recoding all of the cases based on issue, but this is not feasible 
since it would require not only recoding multiple variables for all issues in all cases, but 
also restructuring the architecture of the database to change the unit of analysis from case 
to issue.
13
 
                                                 
13
 For an example of database architecture that codes cases based a number of units of analysis including 
issue, case, legal provision, and disposition, see the U.S. Supreme Court Database and related 
documentation at http://scdb.wustl.edu/. 
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Keeping the mixed-decision cases in the analysis would require either 1) creating 
a theoretically unjustified intermediate value in the court support variable, the small 
number of which creates problems for ordered regression models or 2) compromising the 
integrity of the unit of analysis. Therefore, the best decision is to omit these 37 
observations from analysis. As previously discussed, it is not apparent that excluding 
these cases biases the data, other than a likely concomitant exclusion of a 
disproportionate number of multi-docket cases, which is not central to the questions of 
the present study. This exclusion does not create any other apparent biases in the data, as 
discussed above. 
The second category of cases I omit from analysis are cases that concern stays, 
petitions or motions, which generally occur before the agency‘s actions is final, such as 
interlocutory decisions. As shown in Table 4.4, these cases are coded as treat = 0, and 
make up about 15% of courts‘ dispositions when agency decisions are under review. 
While the courts‘ handling of non-final agency decisions does raise questions of interest 
to the legal community, such as when an agency‘s action constitutes finality (see, e.g., 
Curtiss 2007; Fowler 2004), many of these questions are beyond the scope of the present 
study. Therefore, I exclude them from analysis. Total, I exclude 81 observations where 
treat equals zero. This omission does not bias the results of this study, but it does place a 
caveat on its findings. Findings are based on court reviews of final agency actions. 
Summary of Coding for Dependent Variable 
In sum, the dependent variable, court support, asks whether the circuit court 
supported the agency in its final decision. Values are 0 for no and 1 for yes, based on the 
values for treat. Supportive decisions are those where the court affirms the agency (treat 
= 1 or 11) or when the court denies an appellant‘s petition to review the agency‘s action, 
decision, or order (treat = 8). These actions leave the agency action, decision, or order 
intact. Non-supportive decisions are those where the court reverses, vacates or remands 
the agency‘s decision (treat = 2, 3, 4, or 7), or denies the agency‘s petition to have its 
order reviewed (enforced) (treat = 8). Table 4.5 summarizes this coding.  
Agencies enjoy support from the circuit courts in about 65% of cases, as shown in 
Table 4.6. In the D.C. Circuit, agency support is 66%, and in the remaining circuits, it is 
about 64%.  
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Notice, from Table 4.6, that administrative agencies enjoy a relatively high level 
of support from the circuit courts during the period 1982–2002. These figures are 
somewhat higher than the agency success rates of 58% reported by Humphries and 
Songer  for the period 1969–1988 using the same database (1999, p. 215). These 
differences may be the result of the impact of a fuller manifestation of Supreme Court‘s 
1984 Chevron decision requiring circuit courts to show agencies more deference. Or, 
these differences may reflect changes in the ideological composition of the courts, 
leadership in administrative agencies, or a number of other reasons heretofore 
indiscernible. 
Up to this point, I have developed the dependent variable, court support, which 
indicates whether courts render decisions supportive to agencies. Later, I modify this 
variable to construct a judge-level variable that captures whether individual judges vote 
to support agencies in final case decisions. For now, however, I focus on court-level 
variables for ease of discussing research design and methods. The next section describes 
explanatory variables. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
This study is interested in the levels of support federal administrative agencies 
receive in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Past scholarship has been concerned with whether 
judges, when reviewing agency decisions, make decisions based on personal preferences 
(attitudinal model) or whether judges defer to agencies based on law (legal model). 
Political science scholars have conducted considerable research on the attitudinal model, 
particularly but not exclusively, in the U.S. Supreme Court. Most often, these scholars 
use judge ideology as the best indicator of judge attitudes. Few political science scholars 
have been able to develop quantifiable measures for the legal model (for notable 
exceptions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, see Cross 2007; Humphries and Songer 1999). 
Frank Cross (2007) suggests there are pragmatic issues that have prevented scholars from 
conceptualizing and objectively measuring legal and attitudinal elements. To distinguish 
and measure the competing attitudinal and legal theories of judicial behavior, I develop 
several categories of independent variables that inform judicial decisionmaking, and 
concomitantly, that influence whether courts support agencies in final case decisions. The 
three categories of independent variables are legal, attitudinal, and other controls. Legal 
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variables are further subdivided into two categories—standards of review and procedural. 
Appendix B summarizes dependent and independent variables used in this study and how 
they are coded. 
LEGAL VARIABLES 
When the U.S. Courts of Appeals review agency decisions, judges consider a 
number of legal doctrines, many of which address whether courts should defer to 
agencies under certain circumstances. Several statutes explicitly call on the courts to 
extend deference to agencies. Likewise, several Supreme Court precedents direct lower 
federal courts to show deference to agencies under certain circumstances. As previously 
discussed, deference has many dimensions defined in specific legal terms.  
As principal investigator for the original U.S. Courts of Appeals Database, 
Donald Songer coded various administrative law issues from the opinions of the cases in 
his dataset. The issues coded in the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database are coded from the 
West headnotes. While there are no studies that address the validity and reliability of the 
West headnote system, attorneys and legal scholars rely heavily on this system, and 
generally accept that the issues identified in the headnote system are reasonably accurate, 
complete and not based on obiter dicta
14
 (for a discussion of systematic coding of judicial 
opinions in legal databases, see Hall and Wright 2008). From the administrative law 
variables coded in the Courts of Appeals Database, several are appropriate measures of 
deference and other legal principles pertinent to the present study. The following sections 
discuss these variables and their use as indicators of law and legal doctrine that may 
constrain or inform judicial decisionmaking. 
The primary goal in specifying legal variables is to acknowledge the normative 
legal concepts established by Congress and the Supreme Court that lower federal courts 
should use when reviewing agency decisions. However, I am also mindful that critics of 
legal-reasoning-as-rationale for judicial behavior suggest that legal reasoning may be 
                                                 
14
 Obiter dictum is ―a judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is 
unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be considered 
persuasive).‖ Black‘s Law Dictionary, 8
th
 ed. 2004 (Thompson-West). 
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nothing more than window dressing for judges‘ attitudes (Segal and Spaeth 2002). These 
critics argue that final case decisions occur before judges answer the legal questions that 
they include in their opinions. While this phenomenon may be true, I intend to construct 
tests to definitively show that it is true or not true. For now, however, I construct legal 
variables based on legal scholars‘ normative views of legal concepts. 
Standards of Review 
Remember from previous discussions that a standard of review is the degree to 
which a reviewing court extends deference to the decision of a lower court or agency. 
That is, standards of review are criteria that a court exercising appellate jurisdiction uses 
to measure the constitutionality or legality of an order, finding, or judgment entered by a 
lower court. 
Courts use many different standards of review when reviewing agency actions. 
While there is a rather developed body of administrative case law discussing and 
debating the definition of and appropriate use of standards of review for agency actions, 
the Administrative Procedure Act is the statutory source for many standards. Section 706 
of the APA addresses scope of review, and states that courts are permitted to find agency 
actions unlawful which are, among other things: 1) arbitrary and capricious, 2) an abuse 
of discretion, 3) unsupported by substantial evidence, or 4) unwarranted by the facts. In 
reliance on the APA, courts at times have struggled to choose an appropriate standard of 
review for agency actions. The application of a particular standard, and its accompanying 
level of deference to agency action, depends on whether the question before the court is a  
question of fact, question of law, or a mixed question of fact and law (Fox 2008). 
Specific statutes, including the agency‘s enabling legislation, might also delineate a 
specific scope of review, as might the type of agency action being reviewed. For 
example, the substantial-evidence standard generally applies only to agency 
adjudications. 
These standards vary in degree of agency deference. Some scholars suggest that 
the arbitrary-and-capricious standard compels the highest level of deference to agencies, 
and de novo review affords the least degree of deference (Cross 2007). Several other 
standards with varying degrees of deference exist between these two, including abuse of 
discretion, substantial evidence, and clearly erroneous. 
73 
 
How a court answers standard-of-review questions may constrain judges‘ 
behavior in the final outcome of the case, especially if the standard of review requires 
judges to defer to agency decisions. Standards of review that require less deference may 
leave more room for judges to support agencies based on other non-legal determinants, 
such as judges‘ policy preferences. The less legal variables constrain judges, in theory, 
the more latitude judges should have to interpret agency actions, which could open the 
door wider for judges to substitute their policy preferences in place of agency 
preferences. In general, courts may have less room to substitute their preferences in cases 
involving factual questions than they do in cases involving mixed questions of law and 
fact (Fox 2008). 
Before discussing each of the standards of review specifically, I note a couple of 
issues and coding conventions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database. Several legal 
standards are included in the database, including arbitrary and capricious, substantial 
evidence, clearly erroneous, abuse of discretion, de novo, and Chevron deference.
15
  
These legal standards are coded in terms of court support for agencies, which is 
not the same as the previously discussed dependent variable, court support. Instead, 
support in the Courts of Appeals Database indicates whether courts supported agencies in 
answering specific legal questions, but does not indicate court support for the agency in 
final case decisions. In the database, standard-of-review questions are coded 1 if the court 
answered the question negatively (i.e., did not support the agency), 2 if the court 
answered the question affirmatively, and 9 if the court gave a mixed answer. I recoded 
these values as 0 if the court answered the question negatively and 1 for questions 
answered affirmatively. 
The majority of these cases appear to be ones where the application of a particular 
standard of review is separable, either because there are multiple counts in a case, 
multiple parties or multiple dockets. In National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) v. 
Instrument Corp. of America, the Fourth Circuit review panel determined that NLRB 
provided substantial evidence to support its conclusion that Instrument Corp wrongfully 
                                                 
15
 Some of these standards appear under different names in the Courts of Appeals database, which I note 
later in this research. I renamed the standards to comport with common legal references and for ease of 
discussion in this research. Specifically, the abuse of discretion standards is referred to in the database as 
―deference‖ and the Chevron standard is referred to as the ―general standard.‖ 
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terminated four of five employees who engaged in collective bargaining activities. As to 
the fifth employee, NLRB did not provide substantial evidence to support its position, 
and the court held, instead, that the employee had been rightfully terminated for poor 
performance. The database codes Instrument Corp. with a mixed response with respect to 
the courts answer to the substantial evidence question. Accordingly, the court granted in 
part and denied in part NLRB‘s petition to enforce its order. 
Similarly, the database codes the court‘s answer to the substantial evidence 
question as mixed in L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc. v. Donovan.
16
 In this case, a D.C. Circuit 
panel reviewed the Department of Labor‘s ruling that L.R. Willson & Sons violated the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678) when it failed to provide 
netting and temporary flooring during the construction of a building. The court found that 
the Department of Labor provided substantial evidence to support a violation finding with 
respect to temporary flooring, but not for the netting. The database codes L.R. Willson & 
Sons as a mixed decision with respect to the substantial evidence question. The database 
also codes this case as mixed final outcome (affirm in part and reverse in part). Hence, 
most of the cases when standard-of-review questions have mixed answers have already 
been omitted from analysis because they correspond with cases that have mixed-decision 
dispositions. 
The remaining cases that are not already excluded are also omitted for reasons 
similar to the reasons for omitting other mixed-decision cases. Primarily, however, 
retaining these cases would require recoding them, and, subsequently, all other cases, 
according to issue in order not to confound the unit of analysis. Since this is not feasible, 
I omit the remaining cases from analysis where courts provide mixed answers to 
standard-of-review questions. 
The number of mixed-answer cases omitted for each standard of review is 
relatively small for each standard of review and is summarized in Table 4.7. Omitting 
these twelve observations does not bias the data, since these cases are of the same general 
nature as the other cases as noted in Instrument Corp. and L.R. Willson & Sons. A final 
case demonstrates this similarity. In Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (1990), a D.C. Circuit review panel found that the 
                                                 
16
 Raymond L. Donovan is the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor. 
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was not arbitrary and capricious in its 
regulations governing injections of hazardous wastes into wells located thousands of feet 
beneath the surface of the earth. The court denied the petitions claiming that the EPA‘s 
regulations were too stringent. The exception is the court‘s finding that the EPA was 
arbitrary and capricious in promulgating rules governing hazardous waste dispose in 
geologic repositories (salt domes, salt beds, underground mines, and caves), for which the 
court remanded the case to the EPA. 
In the following sections, I define and discuss the most common standards of 
review used in the federal courts when reviewing agency actions. I also conduct 
preliminary quantitative analyses of the frequency of each standard in the data sample. 
Arbitrary-and-Capricious Standard of Review 
Congress addresses the arbitrary-and-capricious standard directly in the 
Administrative Procedure Act, which states: 
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the 
terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law. 
For example, in Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (1992),
17
 the Ninth Circuit denied the petitioner‘s request to have all 
municipalities on the same permitting schedule, a rule which was promulgated by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  
What constitutes arbitrary and capricious behavior is not clear-cut. Depending on 
whether a court takes a hard-look approach to reviewing agency actions, arbitrary-and-
capricious behavior could mean an agency 1) did not consider all relevant factors 
Congress deemed relevant, 2) offered an explanation that was counter to evidence or was 
implausible, or 3) failed to offer an explanation at all (Wald 1996). In Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. EPA (1992), it is not apparent that the Ninth Circuit took a hard-look 
                                                 
17
 This case should not be confused with the case discussed in the previous section by the same name. The 
earlier case was decided in 1990 by the D.C. Circuit. When referring to these cases, I distinguish them by 
including the year they were decided.  
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approach to reviewing the EPA actions. Rather, the court found that the EPA‘s failure to 
include deadlines for permit approval was arbitrary and capricious. Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. EPA (1992) exemplifies instances when circuit court judges find fault 
in agency procedures under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review, but still 
uphold the agency‘s actions. 
Under the legal model of judicial behavior, one would expect judges to show a 
relatively high level of deference to agencies using this standard. The arbitrary-and-
capricious standard requires courts to defer to agency expertise and opinions so long as 
their decisions are not willfully or unreasonably in disregard of facts or law. We might 
also expect the converse: where agency actions are arbitrary and capricious, we would 
expect courts not to render agency-supportive decisions. However, as Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. EPA (1992) demonstrates, finding that an agency acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously is not sufficient to predict whether judges will support the agency overall. 
The Courts of Appeals Database includes an arbitrary-and-capricious variable, 
which asks, ―Did the court‘s use or interpretation of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard 
support the government?‖ I recoded this variable so that affirmative answers to this 
question are coded 1, and negative answers are coded 0. During the period under study, 
the arbitrary-and-capricious standard is raised in about 23% of cases in the D.C. circuit 
and about 10% of cases in the remaining circuits collectively. 
If Chief Judge Wald of the D.C. Circuit is correct in suggesting that the courts of 
appeals at times have shown an almost obsequious deference to agencies (Wald 1996), 
then the mere presence of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard in a case may suffice to 
predict a supportive agency decision in the final case decision. A simple chi-squared 
analysis can test whether this is true. 
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 show the results of a chi-squared analysis of court support for 
agencies if the arbitrary-and-capricious standard is raised in a case. These tables show 
there is no statistical difference in how courts treat agencies in cases where the arbitrary-
and-capricious standard question is raised and in cases where this standard of review is 
not raised. This is true for the D.C. Circuit alone and the remaining circuits collectively. 
Neither of the chi-squared values is statistically significant. Therefore, it does not appear 
that the arbitrary-and-capricious standard is a proxy for obsequious court deference. 
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Normatively and according to the legal model of judicial behavior, how courts 
answer the arbitrary-and-capricious question should be an indicator of how the court will 
decide a case overall. Tables 4.10 and 4.11 show the chi-squared results of how courts 
answered the arbitrary-and-capricious question compared to support for the agency in 
final case decisions. 
Here, we find preliminary support for the legal model. If courts find agencies did 
not act arbitrarily or capriciously, they support agencies overall in the final case decision 
88.2% of the time in the eleven regional circuits and 100.0% of the time in the D.C. 
circuit. If courts find agencies acted arbitrarily and capriciously, the courts support 
agencies in only 28.6% of cases in the eleven regional circuits and 6.3% of cases in the 
D.C. circuit. Unsurprisingly, the court-support variable and the arbitrary-and-capricious 
variable are highly and positively correlated. For the eleven regional circuits, r = 0.60 
(p<0.002), and for the D.C. Circuit, r = 0.95 (p<0.001). 
Abuse-of-Discretion Standard of Review 
The abuse-of-discretion standard is not a ―standard of review‖ in a literal sense, 
but, in application, it serves the same function. Abuse of discretion is specifically 
mentioned in the Administrative Procedure Act as reason for courts to set aside agency 
actions. It is not always clear when a court uses the abuse-of-discretion standard instead 
of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard, but this standard suggests that courts should 
defer to agency decisions as long as their exercise of discretion is not clearly an abuse. 
An example of abuse of discretion could be when an agency acts ultra vires, outside its 
statutory limitations or outside the scope of law. Although the nuances of the abuse-of-
discretion standard are not easily quantified, this question occurs regularly in court 
opinions. Abuse-of-discretion questions are raised in about 17% of cases in the eleven 
regional circuits. In the D.C. Circuit, this number is about 21%. 
In Gonzalez v. Reno (2000), the Eleventh Circuit found that Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) had not abused its discretion. Appellants claimed INS 
abused its discretion when it denied asylum based on the application of standards 
developed by the agency but not specified by Congress. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that 
INS had acted within the scope of its mandate and had not abused its discretion, and 
ultimately, the review panel supported the agency‘s decision. 
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Tables 4.12 and 4.13 compare levels of support an agency receives depending on 
whether the abuse-of-discretion standard is present in a case opinion using a chi-squared 
analysis. The presence of this standard in a case is not significantly associated with court 
support for agencies in the court‘s final decision, since the chi-squared values are not 
statistically significant (p<0.110 for circuits 1-11 and p<0.272 for the D.C. Circuit). This 
suggests that under this standard, court deference to agencies is not a rubber-stamp 
action. 
In the Courts of Appeals database, the abuse-of-discretion
18
 variable asks, ―Did 
the court conclude that it should defer to agency discretion?‖ I recoded this variable so 
that a supportive answer to this question is coded as 1; otherwise, 0. Tables 4.14 and 4.15 
show the chi-squared results of how courts answered the abuse-of-discretion test 
compared to agency support in final case decisions. 
If courts find agencies did not abuse discretion, they support agencies in final case 
decisions 93.8% of the time in Circuits 1-11 and 100% of the time in the D.C. Circuit. If 
courts find agencies did abuse discretion, they support agencies in only 18.2% of cases in 
the eleven circuits and 16.7% of cases in the D.C. Circuit. As with the arbitrary-and-
capricious variable, the abuse-of-discretion variable is highly, positively correlated with 
court support. For Circuits 1-11, r = 0.76 (p<0.001), and for the D.C. Circuit, r = 0.88 
(p<0.001). 
Substantial-Evidence Standard of Review 
The substantial-evidence standard of review predates the Administrative 
Procedure Act (Wald 1996), but is also incorporated into the APA.  The APA requires 
federal courts to defer to agency decisions so long as those decisions are supported by 
―substantial evidence.‖ 
Judges and scholars disagree on whether there is any meaningful difference 
between substantial-evidence and the arbitrary-and-capricious tests (Fox 2008). Antonin 
Scalia, when he was a judge in the D.C. Circuit, suggested in Association of Data 
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Federal Reserve Board (1984): 
                                                 
18
 The U.S. Courts of Appeals Database names this variable ―deference.‖ For the present study, I rename 
this variable ―abuse of discretion‖ for clarity. 
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[Substantial evidence] is only a specific application of [arbitrary and 
capricious] separately recited in the APA not to establish a more rigorous 
standard of factual support but to emphasize that in the case of formal 
proceedings, the factual support must be found in the closed hearing 
record as opposed to elsewhere (p. 683). 
While judges do not apply this language consistently across the circuits, most 
agree with Scalia‘s basic message that these two tests are concerned with the 
reasonableness of agency actions (Fox 2008). Where agencies reasonably provide 
substantial evidence to support their decisions, courts should defer to those decisions; 
otherwise, courts should overturn agency actions. For example, in Wilson & Sons 
Heating and Plumbing, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board (1992), the Board 
(NLRB) held that Wilson violated statute in refusing to comply with a union request to 
audit the company‘s books. The D.C. Circuit concluded there was ―virtually no support 
for a finding essential to the Board‘s conclusion,‖ and reversed the board for ―want of 
substantial evidence.‖ 
For years 1982-2002, circuit courts addressed the substantial-evidence standard in 
about 36% and 18% of agency review cases in the eleven regional circuits and D.C. 
Circuit, respectively. Tables 4.16 and 4.17 show the results of a chi-squared analysis of 
court support for agencies if the substantial-evidence standard is used. In the eleven 
regional circuits, there is virtually no difference between levels of court support when the 
substantial-evidence standard is raised in a case and when this standard is not raised. 
Agencies enjoy support about 64% of the time irrespective of litigants invoking the 
substantial-evidence doctrine as a standard of review. In the D.C. circuit, courts support 
agencies in 12% more instances when the substantial-evidence standard is raised as a 
question in a case. The chi-squared values in these models are not statistically significant. 
Normatively, the substantial-evidence test as a standard of review extends 
considerable deference to agencies. We would expect when courts answer substantial-
evidence questions in favor of the agency, courts would also extend considerable 
deference to agencies in final case decisions.  
In the Courts of Appeals Database, the substantial-evidence variable asks, ―Did 
the court's interpretation of the substantial evidence rule support the government?‖ This 
variable is coded as 1 when courts answer this question favorably toward agencies and 0 
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otherwise. Tables 4.18 and 4.19 show the chi-squared results of how courts answered the 
substantial-evidence test compared to whether courts supported agencies in final case 
decisions. 
Where review panels find agencies did not provide substantial evidence to support 
their positions, they support agencies 9.1% of the time in the eleven regional circuits and 
11.1% of the time in the D.C. Circuit. Similarly, if courts find agencies did provide 
substantial evidence, they support agencies in final case decisions 94.7% of the time in 
the eleven regional circuits and 100% of the time in the D.C. Circuit. As we have seen 
with the other standard-of-review variables, the substantial-evidence variable is highly 
and positively correlated with the court-support variable. For the eleven regional circuits, 
the correlation is 0.86 (p<0.001). In the D.C. Circuit, r = 0.9 (p<0.001). 
I make a special note here that testing this variable in a regression model may not 
be possible in the D.C. Circuit because of the lack of observable variation. Little or no 
variation also exists with other legal variables. Hence, as I discuss later in this chapter in 
the section, Variables for the D.C. Circuit, it is necessary to combine the observations for 
the D.C. Circuit with the remaining circuits and to include a dummy variable for the D.C. 
Circuit in each model. In some instances, it is not possible to test the effects of legal 
variables at all, such as the clearly erroneous standard of review. 
Clearly-Erroneous Standard of Review 
The clearly-erroneous standard of review finds its roots in civil litigation and civil 
rules of procedure. In civil litigation it generally applies to court reviews of lower 
tribunals‘ findings of fact. This standard of review is not often used in administrative law, 
but where it is used, it suggests that courts should defer to agency decisions unless there 
has been a clear error. 
For example, in Kentucky Utilities Company v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (1985), Kentucky Utilities claimed that ―to allow accounting rules to govern 
ratemaking is a classic example of unreasoned decision making.‖ Here, Kentucky 
Utilities claimed that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) made a clear 
legal error in regulating energy rates, arguing that allowing accounting principles to 
govern whether ratepayers should share the cost of risk is unreasoned decisionmaking, 
since accounting principles, rather than policy, governed the agency‘s actions. The D.C. 
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Circuit review panel found that FERC‘s accounting principles were rooted in policy, and 
denied Kentucky Utilities‘ petition. The court concluded, ―In light of well-established 
principles of utility rate regulation, we discern no error in the Commission's decision. 
Application of the settled accounting principle that accrual of AFUDC must cease once 
the new plant is put into service furthers the substantive policy with respect to risk 
allocation which informs the principles governing the establishment of new wholesale 
rates.‖ 
Use of the clearly-erroneous standard occurs less frequently than the other 
standards previously discussed. In the eleven regional circuits, only 3.2% of cases raised 
the clearly-erroneous standard, compared to 14.4% in the D.C. Circuit. Like other 
standards I have examined, raising the clearly-erroneous question in a case is not 
sufficient to increase the likelihood that courts will support an agency in final case 
decisions. Tables 4.20 and 4.21 report the results of chi-squared analyses for the presence 
of the clearly-erroneous standard and court support for an agency. In neither the D.C. 
Circuit nor the remaining circuits are the chi-squared values statistically significant. This 
suggests court deference is not automatically compelled simply because the clearly-
erroneous standard of review is used in a case. 
In the Courts of Appeals Database, the clearly-erroneous variable asks, ―Did the 
court‘s use of the clearly-erroneous standard support the government?‖ This variable is 
coded 1 where courts answer this question favorably toward agencies and 0 otherwise. As 
we have seen with the other standard-of-review variables and as Kentucky Utilities 
illustrates, how courts answer the clearly-erroneous question should be an indicator of 
how the court will decide a case overall. Tables 4.22 and 4.23 report the results of chi-
squared analyses for the clearly-erroneous and court-support variables. These data show 
the relationship between how courts answer the clearly-erroneous test and how courts 
decide final case outcomes. 
Although the number of cases in the eleven regional circuits is small, the results 
point consistently in the same direction as the other standards of review. If courts find 
agencies did not act clearly erroneously, they supported agencies in 100% of final case 
decisions in the eleven regional circuits and in 89.5% of cases in the D.C. Circuit. If 
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courts found agencies acted clearly erroneously, the courts supported agencies in only 
50.0% of cases in the eleven circuits and 0% of cases in the D.C. Circuit. 
The chi-squared values for the relationship between court support and the clearly-
erroneous test are statistically significant at p<0.064 in the eleven regional circuits and 
p<0.001 in the D.C. Circuit. The correlation between the court-support variable and the 
clearly-erroneous variable is 0.86 (p<0.001) in the D.C. Circuit and 0.65 (p<0.078) in the 
remaining circuits. 
Although discussing this variable here clarifies instances where the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals may extend deference to agencies, I exclude the clearly-erroneous standard from 
further investigation. Given the very small number of observations for the clearly-
erroneous standards in circuits 1-11 (N=8) and the small number (N=28) and lack of 
variation in the D.C. Circuit, examining the clearly-erroneous variable in logistic 
regression models is not possible. 
De Novo Standard of Review 
De novo review is the most restrictive standard of review in terms of deference 
the circuit courts extend to agencies. No deference is given to the factual findings of an 
agency. Instead, courts review agency findings of fact anew. 
De novo review occurs in about 2% of cases in all circuits combined. In the D.C. 
Circuit, the de novo standard was addressed only once, which was in 1990. Alvarez-
Flores v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1990) illustrates the infrequent use of 
the de novo standard of review in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Alvarez-Flores petitioned 
the court to review his case de novo after the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied 
his asylum request. The opinion of the court states:  
Asylum requires a showing that the applicant has a well-founded fear of 
persecution. Although we have yet to define the "final contours" of the 
"well-founded fear" standard, the BIA requires that an applicant show that 
a "reasonable person in his circumstances would fear persecution." We 
review findings of fact by the BIA under a deferential "substantial 
evidence" standard. Moreover, given the BIA's Congressional mandate 
and the legal requirement that we show its decisions of this sort 
considerable respect, we will not reverse simply because we disagree with 
the BIA's evaluation of the facts. Petitioner argues that the BIA has 
misstated and misapplied the law. Yet, even accepting petitioner's 
suggestion that questions of law, such as whether the BIA applied the 
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appropriate legal standard, are reviewed de novo, we are cautioned that 
when Congress, implicitly or explicitly, leaves gaps in a statutory 
program, the courts must respect the interpretation of the agency to which 
Congress has delegated the responsibility for administering the … 
program. Although questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de 
novo, the court is obliged to defer to the BIA's interpretation of the 
applicable statute if that interpretation is reasonable. Deference to the 
agency's interpretation is called for particularly when Congress 
incorporates into the statute terms of some ambiguity like 'well-founded 
fear' which can only be given concrete meaning through a process of case-
by-case adjudication. Thus, whether or not review is termed de novo, we 
are required to respect the Board's legal decision as to whether the facts, 
as found, fall within the scope of the relevant statutory authority‖ 
(emphases in original). 
This case illustrates the court‘s deferential position toward the Board of 
Immigration Appeals. It also illustrates reasons for the infrequency of de novo review as 
an appropriate standard in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. 
Since there is only one case in the D.C. Circuit, I include it with the other circuits 
in the chi-squared analysis examining the relationship between the presence of de novo 
review and court support for agencies in final case decisions. Table 4.24 reports these 
results. Notice that there is no statistically significant difference (p<0.409) in court 
support for agencies whether or not the de novo standard is raised in a case. 
In the Courts of Appeals Database, the de novo variable asks, ―Did the court‘s use 
of the standard of review, ‗de novo on facts,‘ support the government?‖ As with other 
standards of review, this variable is coded 1 if courts answer this question in support of 
the agency and 0 otherwise. 
Table 4.25 shows the results of how courts answered the de novo question with 
respect to agency support.  Although the number of cases is small, the chi-squared results 
are statistically significant at p<0.003. If courts answer de novo questions in support of 
the agency, courts support the agency 100% of the time in the final case dispositions. 
Similarly, in the two cases where the court did not answer the de novo test in favor of the 
agency, the courts did not support the agency in the final case decision. The correlation 
between the court-support variable and the de novo variable is perfect—r = 1.00 
(p<0.001). Since the de novo standard of review is raised so infrequently in the courts of 
appeals, further analysis of the de novo standard in this study is not beneficial, especially 
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since the de novo and court-support variables are perfectly correlated, which is 
problematic for regression analysis. 
Chevron Review and Institutional Deference 
The last standard of review I examine, Chevron deference, is not a standard of 
review per se. However, this Supreme Court precedent requires courts to defer to other 
government institutions and not to substitute their policy preferences when reviewing 
agency action. Recall that the Chevron decision is a two-step process where courts first 
look to the plain language of the statute an agency implements to determine whether 
agency action adheres to Congressional intent. Second, where statutes are ambiguous, 
courts should defer to agencies‘ interpretations of those statutes so long as the 
interpretations are reasonable (Crawford 1994).  
Institutional deference refers to the extent courts defer to the preferences of other 
institutions, such as Congress and administrative agencies. The Chevron doctrine is a 
good example of institutional deference, since the doctrine prescribes courts to defer, 
first, to Congress, and, second, to agencies. 
The Courts of Appeals Database does not specifically code cases for Chevron 
deference. However, one of the database‘s variables does code cases concerned with 
whether agencies interpreted statutes correctly. This variable, genstand, codes for the 
―rational basis test, plain meaning, reasonable construction of the statute, Congressional 
intent, etc.‖ While not stated as such in the codebook, this variable is akin to the Chevron 
doctrine, and I, therefore, use it as a rough proxy for Chevron deference as the following 
case examples help illustrate.  
In many instances it is clear from the case opinions that coding for this variable is 
based on a Chevron analysis. In Molina v. Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(1992), for example, the First Circuit reviewed the interpretation by Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) of the word ―conviction,‖ an ambiguous term that Congress 
did not explicitly define in the relevant statute. Molina unsuccessfully argues that INS 
lacks the legal power to provide an interpretation of the word. The court disagrees, 
relying on Chevron deference logic, which presumes that Congress delegated 
administrative agencies the authority to interpret vague statutes, to which courts should 
extend deference. The opinion states: 
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The application of the immigration term ―conviction,‖ at least in the 
context of varying state ―expungement‖ laws and practices, raises issues 
that involve administration of the statute, that demand administrative 
expertise … That being so, one would expect courts to hold that Congress 
has delegated a degree of legal power to the INS, the agency charged with 
enforcing the statutory scheme, to provide a reasonable interpretation of 
the word ―conviction.‖ See generally Chevron v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (citation included in original). 
As Molina shows, the database‘s genstand variable includes issues directly related 
to Chevron deference. This variable becomes murky as a proxy for Chevron for two 
reasons. First, scholars and judges do not always agree when Chevron deference should 
apply. Second, this variable contains instances of courts reviewing agencies‘ 
interpretations that fall into other categories of deference that are stronger and weaker 
than Chevron deference. Further, these two reasons are sometimes intertwined. 
There is disagreement among scholars, judges and justices on the exact 
parameters to which Chevron deference applies (see Eskridge and Baer 2008). For 
example, Eskridge and Baer find that the Supreme Court is not consistent in the level of 
deference extended to agencies when the Court reviews agency interpretations of its own 
regulations (2008, p. 1103-05). When an agency interprets its own rules, the Supreme 
Court has invoked different authorities to support its reasoning to either defer (or not to 
defer) to agencies. These authorities are its own precedents, including Seminole Rock 
(strong deference if an agency interprets its own rules), Chevron (deference if agency 
interpretations are reasonable), and Skidmore (weak deference based on agency‘s 
persuasiveness, which is rooted in agency expertise and experience) (Eskridge and Baer 
2008, p. 1103-05). The Court of Appeals Database‘s genstand variable includes reviews 
of agency interpretations of its own rules and regulations. In Exportal Ltda. v. U.S. and 
Clayton Yeutter, Secretary of Agriculture (1990), the D.C. Circuit reversed the 
Department of Agriculture because the agency‘s decision ―is contrary to the agency‘s 
own regulations.‖ In this case, a Chilean fruit producer challenged a DOA bond 
requirement. In relevant part, the D.C. Circuit review panel said: 
Department of Agriculture (DOA) regulations provide that the bond 
requirement ―shall be waived‖ if a foreign complainant can show that its 
nation does not require a United States complainant to file a bond in a 
proceeding against a citizen of that nation. Exportal‘s request for a waiver 
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of the bond requirement was denied because, according to the Secretary, 
such waivers remain discretionary even when a foreign complainant 
makes the requisite showing pursuant to agency regulations. We find this 
decision to be flatly inconsistent with the plain terms of DOA’s 
regulations. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings 
… We hold that the petitioner’s challenge must be upheld because the 
Secretary’s decision is contrary to the plain language of the agency's own 
regulations (emphasis added). 
 
The relevant point for the present study is that application of the Chevron doctrine 
is inconsistent when the Supreme Court reviews agency interpretations of its own rules 
and regulations. Some scholars and judges view this as falling within the purview of 
Chevron and some do not, as Eskridge and Baer note. There may be similar inconsistent 
applications of the Chevron doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Hence, the database‘s 
genstand variable is a rough proxy for Chevron deference, since this variable includes the 
gamut of interpretation issues, including agency‘s interpretations of its own regulations 
that may merit greater or lesser Chevron deference, depending upon the judge reviewing 
the case. Nonetheless, the genstand variable is an appropriate variable to include in the 
present study, since generally, it is an indicator of deference and captures the essence of 
whether courts support agencies based on interpretation issues. Broadly speaking, issues 
of plain meaning, Congressional intent, and reasonable construction of statutes are 
encapsulated in either step one or step two of Chevron. As a proxy for Chevron, the 
genstand variable measures agency deference more broadly than Chevron and captures 
the essence of court deference to agencies quite similar to Chevron. 
For ease of discussion, I refer to this variable as Chevron (also, Chevron 
deference and Chevron doctrine). Chevron-type review occurs in over one-third of cases 
in the D.C. Circuit (38.6%) and in about one-fourth of cases (24.4%) in the remaining 
circuits.  
Since this type of review deals with substantive interpretations of law more than 
the other standards of review, it is unsurprising that the mere presence of Chevron-type 
review in a case has no statistically significant relationship with whether or not a court 
supports an agency in final case decisions. That is, it appears that Chevron review is not 
synonymous with obsequious deference, but appears to be a meaningful review of agency 
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action. See Tables 4.26 and 4.27, which report the results of the chi-squared analysis of 
court support for agencies when Chevron is used. 
The Chevron-deference variable is coded 1 if courts answered interpretation 
questions favorably toward agencies and 0 otherwise. Tables 4.28 and 4.29 show cross-
tabulations of how courts answered Chevron-deference questions and whether courts 
supported agencies in final case decisions. As with the other standards of review, if courts 
answer Chevron-deference questions in support of the agency, courts generally support 
the agency in the final case disposition. Correlations between the court-support variable 
and the Chevron-deference variable are almost perfect in the D.C. Circuit, r = 0.97 
(p<0.001). For the remaining circuits, the correlation is positive and very high, r = 0.84 
(p<0.001). 
Standards of Review—Summary 
Standards of review are good indicators of the legal model of judicial behavior, 
since they prescribe that courts defer to agencies under certain circumstances. 
Normatively and as hypothesized, how courts answer standard-of-review questions with 
respect to agencies should predict how courts treat agencies in final case decisions. As 
the data in the preceding sections indicate, there is a high, positive correlation between 
courts‘ answers to standard-of-review questions and how courts treat agencies in final 
case decisions. This is true for all six of the standards examined—arbitrary and 
capricious, abuse of discretion, substantial evidence, clearly erroneous, de novo, and 
Chevron deference.  
Court review of agency decisions appears to be a meaningful review in the sense 
that courts do not simply rubber stamp agency decisions. Some scholars have noted 
periods when the circuit courts extended an almost obsequious deference to agencies, 
such as in the 1940s (Wald 1996). However, for the period 1982-2002, such a high 
degree of deference does not appear to be the case, since conventional levels of statistical 
significance are not met for correlations between the mere presence of a particular 
standard in a case and agency support in final case decisions. In other words, no 
particular standard of review commands automatic deference to agencies. 
Further, the data suggest that when a court evaluates agency actions, these 
reviews are substantive and non-trivial. For example, in 37% of the cases where the 
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substantial-evidence standard was used in circuits 1-11, courts determined that agencies 
did not provide substantial evidence to support their decisions (see Table 4.18). Similarly 
in the D.C. Circuit, 27% of substantial-evidence cases resulted in courts answering this 
question unfavorably toward agencies (see Table 4.19).  Thus, the mere presence of 
certain legal standards in a case does little to advance our understanding of the levels of 
support agencies receive in the courts of appeals. 
Contrarily, how courts answer standard-of-review questions does provide insights 
into agency success rates in the courts of appeals. Table 4.30 summarizes the percentages 
of agency support when standard-of-review tests support the agency. Notice that in the 
D.C. Circuit, if agencies receive favorable answers in standard-of-review tests, they 
receive support in a court‘s final decision in more than nine out of ten cases. In circuits 1-
11, these success rates range from 88-100%. 
Although the relationship between courts‘ answers to standard-of-review 
questions and courts‘ final case dispositions is highly and positively correlated, a 
correlation analysis is insufficient to establish a causal direction between the two. One 
cannot yet conclude, for example, that so long as an agency provides a reasonable 
interpretation of a statute under the Chevron doctrine, that courts will indeed defer to 
agencies and render a case disposition supportive to the agency. As attitudinalists note, 
judges decide cases according to their ideological preferences, and then find legal 
rationales to support these preferences (Segal and Spaeth 2002). If attitudinalists are 
correct, final case decisions will predict how courts answer standard-of-review questions, 
and not the other way around. Further inquiry is necessary to resolve causality. 
Standards of Review Are Highly and Positively Correlated 
Before moving on to specify the remaining legal and attitudinal variables, a few 
words about the correlations between the standard-of-review variables are necessary. It is 
not uncommon for a court to address more than one standard in a case. For example, a 
case might contain more than one legal question, each question requiring a different 
standard of review.  Tables 4.31 and 4.32 show frequencies of different standards of 
review raised in a case. About 30% of cases in the sample raise no legal questions 
concerning standards of review. Of the cases where a standard of review is raised, almost 
half (48.4%) raise only one in the eleven regional circuits, and 40.8% in the D.C. Circuit 
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raise only one question. In the D.C. Circuit and the remaining circuits, the respective 
percentages of cases with more than one standard-of-review question raised are 30.6% 
and 21.3%. 
Since a substantial number of cases address more than one standard of review, I 
examined the correlations between these variables, anticipating their use in a regression 
model to predict court support. These variables are highly and positively correlated with 
each other, as shown in Tables 4.33 and 4.34. In several instances, such as substantial 
evidence and arbitrary and capricious, these variables are perfectly correlated. Perfect 
correlation (r = 1.00) means that when two standards are addressed in a case, courts either 
answer both questions favorably toward the agency or answer both questions unfavorably 
toward the agency. These correlations are expected if legal scholars and judges are 
correct that there are many overlapping edges between these standards (Wald 1996) and 
that the common thread that runs through them, as then-Judge Scalia suggests, is 
reasonableness (Fox 2008). What is unfortunate for quantitative analysis is that 
collinearity among these independent variables prevents their being used in the same 
statistical models either because the models fail or because it skews the model‘s results. 
In either case, this may mean examining these standards of review separately in different 
models. I revisit this point at the end of this chapter in the section, Specifying Regression 
Models. 
Procedural Variable 
Past scholarship has examined whether court support of agencies is a function of 
procedure rather than substance (see, for example, Canon and Giles 1972), but procedural 
distinctions have been merely generalized. Standards of review, which are concerned 
with degrees of deference courts should extend to agencies, are arguably procedural in 
nature. One could reasonably say, for example, that an agency acting ultra vires not only 
abuses its discretion, but also violates established procedures. In the present study, I 
distinguish standards of review from routine agency procedures and refer to the latter as 
―procedures‖ or ―procedural‖ for clarity. 
Agency procedures are defined broadly by statute. An agency‘s primary law of 
governance is its enabling legislation, which, at a minimum, includes the legislation that 
created the agency. Many statutes specific to a particular agency address the procedures 
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administrative agencies must follow in their rulemaking and adjudicatory functions. 
However, the Administrative Procedure Act governs administrative functions more 
broadly, and therefore serves quintessentially as the statute governing how agencies 
conduct their business. 
Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act, in part, as a measure to ensure 
that agencies followed due process requirements in their adjudicatory functions. 
However, the act details procedures that all federal government agencies, unless 
otherwise exempted, must follow in carrying out their day-to-day functions, including 
promulgating rules, adjudication, hearings, and appeals. When agencies do not adhere to 
these prescribed procedures, citizens have grounds for appeal. Typically, an agency has 
several levels of internal review to address citizen concerns. Many agencies use 
administrative law judges to adjudicate citizens‘ appeals. If citizens have exhausted 
administrative remedies, they can then appeal agency decisions in the federal courts. 
Quite often, appeals are concerned with the agency procedures. These procedural 
variables are not standards of review, though each one may entail judges‘ deciding (or 
not) to extend agencies some sort of deference.  
Beyond the Administrative Procedure Act, a number of other statutes govern 
agency procedures. In an effort to promote accountability in government, Congress 
passed statutes governing the ―openness‖ of federal agencies. These statutes include the 
Freedom of Information Act (1966) and the Government in the Sunshine Act (1976).  
The U.S. Courts of Appeals Database includes a number of procedural variables 
relevant to the present study. Like the standard-of-review variables, procedural variables 
are coded based on how courts answered specific questions raised in a case. Each 
procedural variable poses a question about whether the court ruled in favor of the agency. 
I recoded the variables so 0 represents a negative response to the question. Questions 
answered in the affirmative are coded 1, and represent an answer supportive of the 
agency. As with the standard-of-review variables, the database includes coding for mixed 
answers to procedural questions, meaning that a review panel supported an agency only 
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in part. Since I am unable to determine from the data which part of the case the court 
supported, I exclude mixed answers from analysis (N=3).
19
  
The following sections describe the procedural variables I use from the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals Database. In general, procedural questions are raised relatively 
infrequently, which prevents analyzing them separately. I combine these variables into 
one procedural-adherence variable. The following sections discuss the specific 
procedures that are included in the procedural-adherence variable. 
The information-acquired variable asks, ―Did the court rule for the government 
in an issue related to agency acquisition of information, such as physical inspections, 
searches, subpoenas, and records?‖ Similar to the exclusionary rule used in criminal law 
cases, the APA and other statutes define the rules agencies must follow in the acquisition 
of information. When these rules are not followed, information obtained may not be used 
against citizens. Cases where the court answered this question favorably toward agencies 
are coded 1 and 0 otherwise. Questions regarding agency acquisition of information are 
raised very infrequently in the courts of appeals. There are only two instances in this 
sample, once in the D.C. Circuit in 1997 and once in the Tenth Circuit in 1982. 
The information-provided variable asks, ―Did the court rule in favor of the 
government when the administrative action in question related to the agency‘s providing 
information to those who request it?‖ This variable is related to several public acts 
requiring public agencies to provide information to citizens, including the Freedom of 
Information Act and Government in the Sunshine Act. Similar to agencies acquiring 
information, questions related to agencies providing information are raised infrequently 
in the courts of appeals. In the current sample, the D.C. Circuit addressed these issues in 
only six cases. The Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit addressed agencies providing 
information once each, and the remaining circuits did not deal with cases where issues of 
providing information were raised. 
 The notice variable asks, ―Did the agency give proper notice?‖ Generally, 
agencies are required to give ample notice to any rulemaking actions it intends to take. 
Notice requirements are specified in the APA. A related variable, comment, asks, ―Did 
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 In circuits 1-11, I exclude one case related to agency acquisition of information and one related to record 
development. In the D.C. Circuit, I exclude one case related to notice requirements. 
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the agency give proper opportunity to comment?‖ Also according to the APA, agencies 
are required to provide ample time for public comment on any proposed rules. Similar to 
the procedural variables already discussed, agency adherence to notice and comment 
procedures are not questioned with any regularity in the courts of appeals. This may 
suggest that agencies follow these procedures fairly well. 
The record variable, asks, ―Did the agency fail to develop an adequate record?‖ 
This question is concerned with whether the courts are able to determine the doctrine or 
reasoning the agency used as the basis for its decision. While this variable is related to 
certain standards of review, the issue coded here is one of administrative record-keeping. 
Section 552(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act gives agencies detailed instructions 
for records development and management. Since the question in this variable is worded 
negatively compared to the other procedural variables, I recoded it to be consistent with 
other procedural variables for ease of analysis. I recoded this variable so that 1 represents 
an answer supportive to the agency and 0 otherwise. 
Procedural Variable—Summary 
These procedural variables provide an important test of courts‘ support for 
agencies. Normatively, according to the legal model, these questions, when answered 
negatively with respect to supporting agencies, should be perfectly correlated with courts‘ 
final decisions to support agencies overall. If an agency does not follow procedure, courts 
should not rule in favor of the agency. This is not to say, however, that if agencies do 
follow procedures, courts vote in favor of agencies. Other legal factors, such as standards 
of review, must be considered once these rudimentary procedural questions are affirmed. 
These questions, then, serve as thresholds through which agencies must pass in order to 
be successful in court. 
Table 4.35 summarizes the frequencies with which these procedures are raised in 
cases. The relative infrequency with which procedural questions are raised, especially in 
circuits 1-11, prevents meaningful analysis of them individually. Table 4.36 shows the 
combined frequency of procedural questions raised in cases. In circuits 1-11, procedural 
questions are raised in 6.6% of cases at least once, and in 5.4% of cases exactly once. In 
the D.C. Circuit, procedural questions are raised in 17.8% of cases at least once, and in 
16.4% of cases exactly once. 
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Since the frequency of these individual procedures is relatively low, I combine 
them into one variable—procedural adherence. Through a simple summation, 
procedural adherence equals the sum of the following variables: information acquired, 
information provided, notice, comment, and record. Coding for this variable is 1 if courts 
determined agencies followed procedures and 0 otherwise. 
Procedural adherence is highly and positively correlated with the dependent 
variable, court support. In circuits 1-11, this correlation is 0.72 (p<0.001), and in the D.C. 
Circuit, it is 0.83 (p<0.001). Tables 4.37 and 4.38 report the results of chi-squared 
analyses for these variables. In circuits 1-11, if the courts found that agencies followed 
procedures, they supported agencies overall in their final decisions in 91.7% of cases. 
Similarly, in the D.C. Circuit, this figure is 91.3%. 
Where courts do not answer procedural questions in support of agencies (i.e., 
agencies do not follow procedures), courts support agencies in only 20.0% of their final 
decisions in circuits 1-11, and 7.1% of cases in the D.C. Circuit. What is apparent is the 
court‘s tendency to support agencies when agencies do follow procedures. 
These correlations lend preliminary support to the hypothesis that adherence to 
procedure matters in final case decisions when agency decisions are under review in the 
courts of appeals. However, correlation analysis is insufficient to establish causation. 
Attitudinalists would argue that final case decisions are decided based on judges‘ 
ideological preferences and before judges articulate legal reasoning to support these 
decisions. Thus, one cannot say from this analysis that how courts answer questions 
related to procedural adherence is an a priori indicator of agency support in final case 
decisions. 
ATTITUDINALIST CHALLENGES TO THE LEGAL MODEL 
Showing causality between decisions and opinions is problematic. Attitudinalists 
argue that court reasoning on legal matters in their opinions is mere window dressing for 
judges‘ ideological preferences (see Segal and Spaeth 2002). That is, judges base their 
decisions on ideology, and then write opinions to match those ideologically-based 
decisions. This may be one reason the standard-of-review variables previously discussed 
are highly and positively correlated with each other. If all these variables are proxies for 
the personal preferences of judges, it is not unreasonable that standard-of-review tests 
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will be answered in the same way—either both supporting the agency or both not 
supporting the agency. 
Legal proponents argue that judges are constrained by the law, and although 
judges may prefer a certain outcome, they are bound by decisions such as Chevron, 
which requires judges not to superimpose their policy preferences on agencies so long as 
agencies provide a reasonable interpretation of a statute. The preliminary analyses 
heretofore support the legal model. However, to claim that law matters in the courts of 
appeals when agency decisions are under review, these legal issues must be squared with 
attitudinalists‘ challenges that opinions are merely window dressing. The next sections 
operationalize and make preliminary assessments of the attitudinal model. This includes 
developing measures to examine the impact of judge ideology on decisionmaking. I 
revisit the window-dressing argument in the results chapter. 
CHANGING THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
Up to this point, I have used court-level decisions as the unit of analysis. In order 
to develop a court-level measure of ideology, I need to examine the ideologies of 
individual judges on each panel and then create a court-level ideology index. Bear in 
mind, however, that I have two sets of hypotheses—a set that is court-based and a set that 
is judge-based. Therefore, the following discussion is pertinent to both sets of analyses. 
While some scholars argue that decisions of a court are the most appropriate unit of 
analysis for certain issues, such as panel effects (Cross 2007), many judicial behavior 
scholars argue that analyzing individual judge votes is necessary to understand the 
behavior that drives decisionmaking (Gibson 1983; Maveety 2003; Segal 1986). These 
scholars argue that individual judge votes are the smallest components of court decisions, 
and predicting case decisions requires analyzing these individual votes. 
Changing the unit of analysis from case to judge is relatively simple using the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals Database. For an explanation of the steps required to change the 
unit of analysis from case-centered to judge-centered, see the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
Database codebook (for step-by-step instructions to change the unit of analysis using 
Stata, see Collins 2008). In sum, these steps create a line of code for each judge variable 
in the dataset, which are then stacked atop one another. There are sixteen sets of judge 
variables in the dataset for each case, to allow for coding up to sixteen judges who hear 
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cases en banc. The final steps clean up the data by eliminating unnecessary lines of code 
where cases were not heard en banc. Using these steps, I created a unique identifier for 
each line of code, since the unique identifier in the unmodified database (casenum) is no 
longer unique. 
Changing the unit of analysis in the dataset roughly triples the number of 
observations, since each case is generally heard by a panel of three judges. To be clear, a 
unique observation in the dataset is not individual judge; rather, it is individual judge vote 
for each case. Each observation is based on an individual judge who voted in a particular 
case, but an individual judge can, and frequently does, appear more than once in the 
dataset. Table 4.39 shows the number of judge votes by circuit when agency decisions are 
under review for years 1982-2002. The total number of judge votes in the sample is 
1,296, which takes into account missing data and omitted observations described in the 
dependent variable section.
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Judge votes from all circuits are well-represented in the sample, but there is 
considerable variation by circuit. About 44% of the votes come from D.C. Circuit judges 
(N=570). Each of the remaining circuits has an average of 5.1% of the votes in the 
sample. The mean number of judge votes per circuit is 66, not including the D.C. Circuit. 
The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have the fewest number of judge votes in the sample, 
2.9% and 1.9%, respectively. By comparison, the percentage of judge votes in the Ninth 
Circuit is well above this mean, at 8.5%. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE—JUDGE SUPPORT FOR AGENCIES 
To test the hypotheses that are based on individual judge decisionmaking, I 
construct my second dependent variable, judge support, which indicates whether an 
individual judge voted to support an agency in final case decisions. I construct this 
variable using the court-support variable, which indicates the level of agency support 
received by the court as a whole. A simple comparison of the court-support variable to 
other information in the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database indicates whether individual 
judges voted with the majority or dissented. 
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 This total also reflects three cases omitted from the sample because of inconsistent ideology coding, 
which I address later in the section on attitudinal variables. 
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I initially set judge support equal to court support. The first judge coded in each 
case is the opinion author, and I therefore safely assume, in accord with the codebook, 
that the first judge voted with the majority. This means that if the court supported the 
agency, then the first judge on the panel also supported the agency. So, for the first judge, 
judge support equals court support. 
For subsequent judges on the panel, I examine whether they voted with the 
majority or dissented. I do not distinguish whether judges joined a majority opinion or 
wrote a separate concurring opinion (or joined a concurring opinion in en banc cases). If 
a judge voted with the majority, then judge support equals court support. If a judge 
dissented in a case where the majority supported the agency, I changed the code for this 
judge to 0, indicating a non-supportive vote. If a judge dissented in a case where the 
majority did not support the agency, I changed the code for this judge to 1, indicating a 
supportive vote. 
En banc cases are also included in the sample. In smaller circuits, en banc 
generally means that all judges in the circuit review the case. In larger circuits, such as 
the Ninth Circuit, en banc may mean only eleven of the judges heard the case, rather than 
all the judges in the circuit. Using the same comparisons described above, I include all 
judge votes in the sample irrespective of whether the case was heard by a panel of three 
judges or by the entire circuit of judges. 
In sum, the dependent variable, judge support, is a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether an individual judge‘s vote supports the agency in final case decisions. 
Values are coded 0 for a non-supportive vote and 1 for a supportive vote. Table 4.40 
shows the frequency of supportive and non-supportive judges votes by circuit. Agencies 
receive roughly the same level of support from judges in the D.C. Circuit (64.6%) as they 
do from judges in the remaining circuits (65.6%). 
ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES 
Judge Ideology 
Judicial behavior researchers generally agree that ideology is the best indicator of 
judges‘ attitudes (Caruson and Bitzer 2004; Cross 2007; Humphries and Songer 1999; 
Segal and Cover 1989; Segal et al. 1995a; Segal and Spaeth 2002). For example, in his 
study of decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, Frank Cross (2007) considers 
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several background characteristics of judges, including race, gender, religion, prior 
professional experience, and wealth as proxies for judges‘ attitudes. Consistent with other 
attitudinal research, he concludes that ideology is the best proxy for measuring judge 
attitudes (Cross 2007). Accordingly, I use judge ideology as a proxy for judge attitudes in 
the present study. 
Similar to Cross (2007), I use the common-space scores for U.S. Courts of 
Appeals judges developed by Giles, Hettinger and Pepper (2001), hereinafter referred to 
as the Giles measure.  These scores are based on Poole and Rosenthal‘s (1997) common-
space policy scores for the U.S. Senate and Poole‘s (1998) common-space estimates for 
policy preferences of the President (for an expanded discussion on the predictive validity 
of this measure, see Giles et al. 2001). Each judge ideology score considers the scores of 
senators from the home state of the judge nominee when these senators are in the same 
party as the President. While the notion of senatorial courtesy is most prominent in the 
selection of U.S. District Court judges, ―seats on the Courts of Appeals in fact are often 
associated with a particular state, giving senators of the President‘s party a claim to 
influence if not control of the appointment. Even when the allocation of a circuit seat is 
unclear upon vacancy, senatorial claims apply once the seat is assigned,‖ (Giles et al. 
2001, pp. 628-629). Rather than traditional, dichotomous measures for ideology, these 
scores are continuous, ranging from –1 for the most liberal judges to +1 for the most 
conservative judges. The Giles scores are updated to include all U.S. Courts of Appeals 
judges for the period under study in the present research. 
The ideological composition of judges in the sample is well-balanced. Table 4.41 
summarizes the ideological composition of judges in this sample using the Giles measure. 
In total, there are 283 unique judges in the sample, of which 33 are in the D.C. Circuit. 
The mean ideology score of D.C. judges is –0.012, and the mean is 0.024 in the 
remaining circuits. This suggests that the ideological composition of judges in the sample 
is relatively balanced. 
Table 4.42 shows the number and percentage of judges based on their ideology 
scores. There are no judges in the sample who have extreme ideology scores; the range of 
scores is from –0.623 to 0.581. Within this range, there is an even spread of liberal and 
conservative judges in the sample. In circuits 1-11, liberal judges make up 46.6% of the 
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sample and conservative judges make up 53.4% of the sample. In the D.C. Circuit, 51.4% 
of judges in the sample are liberal, and 48.5% are conservative. In all circuits, liberal 
judges make up about 47% of the sample, and conservative judges, 53%. Overall, the mix 
of votes cast by liberal and conservative judges in the sample is sufficiently varied for 
quantitative analyses. 
Judge Ideological Agreement with Agency Position 
Past studies of judicial behavior when agency decisions are under review in the 
federal courts all indicate that support for agencies is, at least in part, a function of judge 
ideological agreement with an agency‘s position (Canon and Giles 1972; Caruson and 
Bitzer 2004; Humphries and Songer 1999; Sheehan 1992; Sheehan et al. 1992b; 
Tanenhaus 1960). Attitudinalist researchers, however, have not used direct measures for 
this concept. For example, Humphries and Songer (1999) use an interactive variable to 
get at this information. They multiply their ideology variable with their agency direction 
variable, and assume that a review panel‘s ideological agreement with the agency 
position is a product of the two. This is unnecessary, since judge ideological agreement 
with the agency position (and as I discuss later, panel ideological agreement with the 
agency position) can be derived by simple comparison outside a regression model. Doing 
so means that the variables used to construct this measure must not be included in the 
regression model, which produces a more parsimonious model of judicial decisionmaking 
that is simpler to interpret. 
Fortunately, the U.S. Courts of Appeals database contains several variables, 
which when used collectively and recoded, allow me to construct a measure of judges‘ 
ideological agreement with agency positions. In his study of decisionmaking in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, Frank Cross (2007) uses a similar method to derive judges‘ 
ideological agreement with agency positions. The following sections describe the 
construction of the ideological agreement variable, using several intermediate variables. 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals Database codes the ideological direction of case 
decisions using liberal and conservative conventions developed by Harold Spaeth. By and 
large, I agree with these coding conventions, with a couple of exceptions. First, ―attorney 
cases‖ concern attorney disbarment, and coding these as either liberal or conservative is 
inappropriate. I therefore omit two attorney cases from analysis. Second, ―other national 
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security‖ cases are coded as liberal if the final case decision supports the government. In 
recent national security debates involving the federal government‘s wiretapping practices, 
a decision in support of the government would be a conservative position. Therefore, I 
question the correctness of this coding convention and omit the one case dealing with this 
issue.
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Next, I develop a dichotomous variable called ideological direction of case 
decision, where 0 indicates a liberal direction and 1 indicates a conservative direction. 
This variable is based on the database‘s direct1 variable, which is nominal and coded as 
follows. A value of 3 is assigned if the overall decision of the case produced a liberal 
decision. A value of 1 is assigned if the overall decision of the case is conservative. 
Mixed and intermediate decisions are coded 2. 
I exclude ―mixed‖ decisions from analysis. While it is arguable that agencies 
could have a moderate position on certain issues, ―mixed‖ ideological values in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals Database do not indicate a moderate position. These values are mixed 
because part of the decision is liberal and part of the decision is conservative, which is 
not the same as a moderate ideological position from the standpoint of the agency. For 
example, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. v. United States (1990), the 
D.C. Circuit concluded: 
Agency action comes before us for review accompanied by a presumption 
of regularity, and we hesitate to overturn it because an agency has 
published an unartful statement of basis and purpose in the Federal 
Register. Particularly with respect to relatively minor changes like those 
made by the agency in this case, we would not interfere with the agency's 
decision where its course ―may reasonably be discerned.‖ We therefore 
uphold the agency's modification of the recordkeeping requirement to 
permit drivers to use their own forms. However, the agency has failed to 
demonstrate that it engaged in reasoned decision-making or that it had any 
basis at all for its decisions to omit the seven items of information and 
expand the exemption from the recordkeeping requirement. For this 
reason, we hold that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 
adopting the new rules to the extent that they omit the seven items of 
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 Other questionable coding conventions are those surrounding admiralty, patents and Indian cases. 
However, none of these types of cases is included in my sample. I also reviewed immigration (N=6) and 
alien petition (N=59) cases, which are sometimes questioned under the Spaeth coding conventions. I 
determined that decisions supporting government regulation in the immigration cases coded as liberal are 
consistent with other notions of government regulation in general. Alien petitions are coded liberal if they 
support the petitioner, which I also view as appropriate. 
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information from the recordkeeping requirement and to the extent that 
they expand the exemption from the recordkeeping requirement. 
In this particular case, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the agency decision in part and 
vacated it in part. The panel reviewed two agency procedural actions with two different 
outcomes. One outcome is viewed as a conservative and the other liberal. The U.S. 
Courts of Appeals database does not distinguish the ideological direction of various parts 
of cases. Instead, these cases are coded simply as ―mixed.‖ Therefore, I am unable to 
determine the ideological direction of the case decision, and so exclude cases with 
―mixed‖ decisions from analysis. For the years 1982–2002, the number of cases with 
mixed decisions is relatively small (N=52), compared to liberal decisions (N=266) and 
conservative decisions (N=226). 
I assign binary values to the intermediate variable, ideological direction of case 
decision, so that liberal decisions are coded 0, and conservative decisions are coded 1. 
Table 4.43 summarizes coding and recoding values for this variable. 
Next, I construct an intermediate variable called ideological direction of agency 
position. This variable indicates whether the agency‘s position is liberal or conservative. 
Although based on a comparison of the ideological direction of case decision variable 
and the court-support variable, which is the dependent variable in the present study, the 
new variable is independent and a priori.  Humphries and Songer (1999) include an 
agency direction variable in their research, which they develop by examining and coding 
all of the cases directly. This is unnecessary, since, as Cross (2007) notes, the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals Database includes sufficient data to make these determinations. 
Four if-then statements determine the ideological direction of the agency‘s 
position. If the ideological direction of a case decision is conservative and a court 
supports the agency, then the ideological direction of the agency position is conservative. 
If the ideological direction of a case decision is liberal and a court supports the agency, 
the ideological direction of the agency position is liberal. Using similar logic, if the 
ideological direction of a case decision is conservative and a court does not support the 
agency, then the ideological direction of the agency position is liberal. Likewise, if the 
ideological direction of a case decision is liberal and a court does not support the agency, 
then the ideological direction of the agency position is conservative. Table 4.44 
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summarizes the values for ideological direction of agency position, which I derived by 
comparing court support and ideological direction of case decision. 
In sum, ideological direction of agency position is coded 0 if the agency position 
is liberal and 1 if it is conservative. These conservative and liberal positions are based on 
the coding conventions used in the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database, which mirror the 
conventions developed by Harold Spaeth for the U.S. Supreme Court Database. I re-
emphasize that while I use the dependent variable, court support, to determine the 
ideological direction of the agency position, the ideological direction of agency position 
is determined before a case is considered by the courts of appeals, and is therefore a 
priori and truly independent (see Cross 2007). 
Since I know the ideological direction of the agency position for each case and 
since I have a measure of judge ideology for each judge, I develop a new variable 
indicating the degree to which a judge‘s ideology is in agreement with an agency‘s 
position. This variable, judge ideological agreement, is operationalized as follows. 
If the ideology of the agency position is conservative, then judges‘ ideological 
agreement is equal to judge ideology, where lower values (–1) indicate less agreement 
with the agency, and higher values (1) indicate more agreement with the agency. So, 
where ideological direction of agency position is equal to 1, ideological agreement is 
equal to judge ideology. For example, if the ideological direction of the agency position 
is conservative, the judges who will be in most ideological agreement with the agency 
position are those whose ideology scores are closest to 1 (on a scale from –1 to 1). 
Where ideological direction of agency position is equal to 0, judge ideological 
agreement is equal to negative judge ideology. This means that when the ideological 
direction of the agency position is liberal, the judges in most ideological agreement with 
this position are the ones closest to –1 on the Giles scale. In order to have consistency in 
the ideological agreement measure, I multiply this score by –1, so the liberal judges‘ 
scores are now positive and the conservative judges‘ scores are now negative. 
In sum, I constructed a variable indicating judge ideological agreement with an 
agency‘s position. The values of this variable are continuous from –1 to 1, where values 
of –1 indicate the least amount of agreement and values of 1 indicate the most agreement. 
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Since I am only interested in testing if a judge‘s ideological agreement with an 
agency position predicts whether the judge votes to support an agency, judge ideological 
agreement is the only attitudinal measure I need. The other variables used to construct 
this variable are not needed in any regression models, since the variable is not an 
interactive one. This single variable will indicate whether a judge makes a decision based 
on ideological agreement with the agency. 
Judge Ideological Agreement with Agency Predicts Judge Support 
Judge ideological agreement with agency position may predict the dependent 
variable, judge support. As a preliminary test of the attitudinal model, I used the judge-
ideological-agreement variable as an independent variable in a bivariate logistic 
regression model to predict whether judges support agencies in final case decisions. The 
results of these models are mixed. Table 4.45 summarizes these results, and reports only 
relevant and key statistics for the bivariate models. 
In the D.C. Circuit, judge ideological agreement is statistically significant at 
p<0.130, which approaches conventional levels of statistical significance. In circuits 1-
11, this variable is significant at p<0.001. Substantively, this means that judges who are 
more ideologically aligned with the ideological direction of the agency‘s decision are 
more likely to support the agency in the final case decision. For conservative agency 
positions under review, this means the more conservative a judge is, the greater the 
probability that he/she will support the agency‘s decision. The more liberal a judge, the 
greater the probability that he/she will not support the agency‘s conservative decision. 
Results of bivariate logistic regressions find preliminary support for the attitudinal 
model, but I note from Table 4.45 that the model pseudo R
2
 values are very small. While 
I am most concerned with whether the judge-ideological-agreement variable is 
statistically significant in these models, the pseudo R
2
 values may indicate that ideology 
substantively may not weigh heavily in a judge‘s decision-making calculus. 
Examining individual judge ideological agreement with agency positions, 
however, is not the only method for examining the impact of judge ideology on judicial 
voting behavior. The next section constructs a variable that can be used to assess the 
impact of the ideological composition of the entire review panel. 
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Panel Ideology 
Recent studies examining decisionmaking in the courts of appeals have shown 
that the collegial nature of a three-judge panel in the courts of appeals may be more 
important in predicting the outcome of cases than individual judge ideology (Cross 2007; 
Sunstein et al. 2006). These ―panel effects‖ indicate that judges‘ votes may be influenced 
more by the ideological composition of fellow panel members than by judges‘ own 
ideologies (Cross 2007; Humphries and Songer 1999; Sunstein et al. 2006). Whether the 
collegial nature of panels on the U.S. Courts of Appeals has a substantive impact on 
judge‘s votes is controversial, especially among judges who insist that their decisions are 
guided only by law and legal doctrine (for a review of these issues, see Edwards 1998, 
2003). However, given the empirical findings of recent scholars on the impact of panel 
effects, the issue is worth investigating to see if these findings are also true when circuit 
courts review agency decisions. 
The argument for panel effects is simple. Judges may prefer to join majority 
opinions, rather than to dissent and write a separate opinion, if they are able to influence 
breadth and scope of case outcomes. For example, a conservative judge on a panel with 
two liberal judges could conceivably convince his/her colleagues to write a narrower 
liberal opinion, or a more moderate opinion overall, in exchange for not dissenting. 
Considering the large volume of cases in the circuit courts, it is rational for individual 
judges not to write separate opinions if only to reduce personal workload. Further, since 
judges work with the same set of judges on a number of different cases, individual judges 
may join fellow judges on the panel in order to maintain professional relationships. By 
design, the courts of appeals are courts of compromise and reasonableness, normatively 
speaking, where decision occurs only if at least two judges agree on the outcome. 
Professional relationship and workload issues notwithstanding, past studies show 
that the ideological composition of a panel affects the outcomes of cases (Cross 2007; 
Humphries and Songer 1999; Sunstein et al. 2004). Cass Sunstein (2006) and his 
colleagues found that the ideological composition of a panel, more than a judge‘s own 
ideology, influences whether an individual judge will vote ideologically. More 
specifically, they found that Democratic judges—those appointed by Democratic 
presidents—are most likely to vote liberally when they are on a panel with two other 
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Democratic judges. Similarly, Republican judges are more likely to vote conservatively 
when they are on a panel with two other Republican judges. They also found that 
Democratic judges who vote conservatively are more likely to do so when they are on a 
panel with two Republican judges. Republican judges who vote liberally are more likely 
to do so when they are on panels with two Democratic judges.  
There are a number of methods for evaluating panel effects. One can assign 
judges a party affiliation based on the party of the appointing president. If this is done, it 
is relatively easy to evaluate the voting patterns based on the number of Democratic and 
Republican judges on a panel. However, rather than assigning binary figures to judges 
based on party affiliation, I prefer to use Giles‘ ideology scores, since they are more 
nuanced. Using these scores, however, still leaves a few options. Frank Cross (2007) 
examines panels based on the sum of judges‘ ideology scores and also on the median 
ideology score, both of which perform reasonably well in his models predicting case 
decisions. For the present study, the median voter approach is better since it allows me to 
keep en banc cases in the analyses. Relying on the total ideology measure would exclude 
en banc cases, since the total ideology of a three-judge panel would not be comparable to 
the total ideology of an eight-judge panel. 
The following example demonstrates the utility and logic of the median judge 
approach. Assume that on a particular panel there is a conservative judge, a moderate 
judge and a liberal judge. If the moderate judge leans left, then he/she forms a majority 
with the liberal judge. The conservative judge can choose either to join the majority or to 
dissent and write a separate opinion. Likewise, if the moderate judge leans right, he/she 
forms a majority with the conservative judge, and the liberal judge is faced with the same 
two options. In either situation, whether a court chooses to support an agency decision 
hinges greatly on the ideology of the median judge. 
What the median voter measure may fail to capture is the magnitude of judges‘ 
ideologies. By examining only the median judge on a panel, we cannot assess, for 
example, whether a moderately conservative judge is any more or less able than an 
extremely conservative one to sway moderate judges on the panel. Examining the panel 
mean ideology, then, accounts for the impact of the ideology of all judges on the panel. 
Examining means, as opposed to medians, may indicate the pull that extreme judges have 
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on their panel cohorts. As one might expect, median panel ideology and mean panel 
ideology are correlated (r = 0.88). However, rather than speculating on which measure is 
best, as the next section discusses, I ran models for both measures to determine which 
one best predicts agency support. 
Panel Ideological Agreement with Agency Predicts Judge Support 
Similar to how I constructed a variable indicating individual judges‘ ideological 
agreement with agency positions, I construct median and mean panel-ideological-
agreement variables. Based on each judge‘s ideological agreement with the agency, I 
determined the mean and median ideologies for each panel. Tables 4.46 and 4.47 
compare mean panel ideology with median panel ideology as predictors of the dependent 
variable, judge support. Note that these tables report coefficients and key statistics for 
two separate regression models. 
Both sets of models predict judge support, which suggests that the ideological 
composition does impact how individual judges vote in final case decisions. This is 
consistent with past research showing that individual judges‘ votes are influenced by the 
ideologies of their cohorts on the review panel (see Cross 2007; Humphries and Songer 
1999; Sunstein et al. 2006). 
The panel mean coefficients are larger than panel median coefficients. This is true 
for the D.C. Circuit, as well as the combined remaining circuits. This may suggest that 
the magnitudes of judges‘ ideologies are also important. Hence, I use the mean panel-
ideological-agreement variable for the remainder of this study. 
Panel Ideological Agreement does not Predict Court Support 
Since the ideological composition of a review panel appears to influence 
individual judges‘ decisions to support or not support agencies in final case decisions, it 
is reasonable to assume that panel ideology also influences court decisions. Tables 4.48 
and 4.49 report the results of bivariate regressions predicting court support using the 
panel-ideological-agreement variable. Quite unexpectedly, the ideological composition of 
a review panel does not predict agency support. The panel ideology variable approaches 
statistical significance at conventional levels (p<0.059) in circuits 1-11, but not in the 
D.C. Circuit (p<0.211). 
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These results challenge all past studies of court-agency relations, many of which 
find that court support for agencies is a function of the court‘s ideological agreement with 
agencies (e.g., Humphries and Songer 1999). It is unlikely, if the panel ideology variable 
is not statistically significant in bivariate regressions, that it will be significant in 
multivariate regressions. Since there is a healthy body of literature suggesting that 
conservative panels support conservative agency decisions and liberal panels support 
liberal agency decisions (Humphries and Songer 1999), I continue examining the effects 
of panel ideology in this study. 
Ideology as a Predictor of Support for Agencies—Summary 
Preliminary analyses indicate that ideology influences judge voting when agency 
decisions are under review. At a minimum, the above analyses indicate a positive 
association between an individual judge‘s ideological agreement with an agency and the 
judge‘s support for the agency in final case decisions. Similarly, there is a positive 
relationship between an individual judge‘s support for an agency and whether the review 
panel is in ideological agreement with the agency.  
Curiously, however, the ideological composition of a review panel appears not to 
be associated with court support. That is, it does not appear to be true that the likelihood 
of courts supporting an agency in final case decisions increases as the ideological 
agreement between the review panel and the agency increases. However, the panel 
ideology variable approaches statistical significance in circuits 1-11 and reaches 
conventional significance levels when all circuits are combined. This warrants further 
investigation. 
VARIABLES FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT 
There is disagreement in the extant literature concerning D.C. Circuit proclivities 
to be more political in their decisionmaking compared to other circuits. There is also 
disagreement over whether D.C. Circuit courts and judges retain greater administrative 
law expertise, which may result in different behavior when agency decisions are under 
review. With such, I posited several hypotheses concerning decisionmaking in the D.C. 
Circuit. 
As noted in the Standards of Review section in this chapter, standard-of-review 
variables lack sufficient variation in the D.C. Circuit, which prevents running regression 
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models separately for the D.C. Circuit. For example, there are no instances in the D.C. 
Circuit when a court panel answered the arbitrary-and-capricious test in favor of an 
agency and did not support the agency in the final case decision (see Table 4.11). To test 
the D.C. Circuit hypotheses, I combine the D.C. Circuit with all other circuits for analysis 
and included a dummy variable for the D.C. Circuit. This dummy variable, DC, is coded 
1 if the circuit is D.C. and 0, otherwise. This variable allows me to test whether judges in 
the D.C. Circuit behave differently from the remaining circuits. However, this variable 
cannot indicate whether these differences are based on law or ideology; this variable only 
indicates individual judges‘ and review panels‘ tendencies to support an agency.  
As an indicator for whether these differences (if they exist) may be because of 
ideology or law, I also include two types of interactive terms. The first type interacts the 
D.C. Circuit dummy with legal variables, and the second with ideology variables. These 
interaction terms will be particularly useful to determine whether D.C. judges may be 
ideological or deferent in their decisionmaking. They will allow me to test whether 
judges in the D.C. Circuit are more (or less) inclined to be ideological or deferent 
compared to review panels and judges in other circuits. In sum, the interactive terms 
indicate whether differences in behavior that may exist in the D.C. Circuit are because of 
law or ideology. They also indicate whether judges and review panels in the D.C. Circuit 
are any more or less ideological or deferent than their cohorts in other circuits. These 
interactive terms are used in both judge-level and court-level models as I later describe. 
CONTROLS FOR TIME AND PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE UNNECESSARY 
Controls for time and presidential influence are unnecessary in the present study 
because of the way I constructed the judge- and panel-ideological-agreement variables. 
Past scholarship shows public agencies and courts behaving more conservatively or 
liberally during certain periods than in others (e.g., Horowitz 1994). This is almost 
intuitive if U.S. Presidents have any influence over agency head appointments and 
judicial appointments. For example, Ronald Reagan appointed more conservative judges 
than other presidents, and Bill Clinton appointed more moderate and liberal judges (Cross 
2007). It might be prudent, then, to include a variable that controls for judicial behavior 
over time. Scholars who have done so rightly assume that agencies and courts behave 
differently because of influences from the Chief Executive. However, past scholarship 
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has controlled for different periods of agency and court liberalism and conservatism out 
of necessity due to how they construct their models and ideology measures. In order to 
determine if conservative judges vote conservatively, scholars needed to compare judges‘ 
ideologies to sets of cases coming from agencies they assumed were more conservative 
or liberal in nature because of the influence of the Chief Executive.  
While there may be other reasons to examine conservative and liberal periods in 
federal agencies and in the courts of appeals, the aim of the present study is concerned 
with the extent to which judges and courts vote according to law or ideology. Since I 
have constructed a variable that captures the ideological agreement of judges and courts 
with agency positions, it is unnecessary to analyze sets of cases separately by year or 
other time-bound periods to determine patterns of liberalism and conservatism. Further, it 
is not necessary to assume that particular sets of decisions from specific agencies are 
liberal or conservative, since I have considered the liberal-conservative nature of each 
case separately. The legal and attitudinal variables already included in the study are 
sufficient to test all hypotheses. 
SUMMARY OF VARIABLES 
There are two dependent variables in this study—court support and judge 
support. Both are dichotomous and measure whether courts (judges) supported agencies 
in final case decisions. There are three categories of independent variables—legal, 
attitudinal, and DC. Appendix B summarizes these variables, including how they are used 
and coded. Appendix C summarizes the correlations among these variables. 
A JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING MODEL SHOULD COMPORT WITH DESCRIPTIVE DATA 
A model of judicial decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals should account 
for the high number of unanimously decided cases and the high success rates of agencies. 
In the present study, I examine a sample of cases coming to the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
directly from federal administrative agencies over the 20-year period, 1982-2002 (N = 
437). In these cases, the courts of appeals support federal agencies about 65% of the time 
(see Table 4.6). Also, courts decide about 90% of cases unanimously; only 10% of cases 
contain dissents. 
These data suggest that any plausible explanation for judicial decisionmaking in 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals must acknowledge two notions. First, a judicial 
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decisionmaking model should account for courts‘ proclivities to render decisions 
supportive to agencies. Second, a judicial decisionmaking model must explain that 
ideological voting gives way to law, collegiality, or other factors that promote unanimity 
among judges. 
The ideological composition of judges in this sample is roughly equal among 
liberals and conservatives (See Table 4.42). In circuits 1-11, liberal judges make up 47% 
of the sample, and conservative judges, 53%. In the D.C. Circuit, liberal judges comprise 
51% of the sample, and conservative judges, 49%. This makeup suggests that judges do 
not vote along ideological lines with any great frequency, since 90% of the cases are 
unanimous. 
In order for judges to vote ideologically and to decide 90% of cases unanimously, 
a judge must always, or nearly always, sit with two ideologically like-minded judges on a 
panel. This is not the case, since circuits assign cases to judges randomly, with scant few 
exceptions (Tiller and Cross 1999; Wald 1999). It is impossible for conservative judges 
to vote in accord with their ideology and also to agree with liberal judges 90% of the 
time. Likewise, liberal judges cannot simultaneously vote their liberal preferences and be 
in agreement with conservative judges 90% of the time. 
Therefore, any explanation of judicial decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals necessarily must acknowledge that ideological voting gives way to law, 
collegiality, or something else in order to garner such high levels of unanimity in case 
decisions. Additionally, any accurate model of judicial decisionmaking should also 
account for courts‘ tendencies to render decisions supportive to agencies. 
On its face, the legal model comports with both of these requirements. If judges 
decide cases according to law, then it is not paradoxical that 90% of the decisions will be 
unanimous. Further, since both statutory law and case law require courts to defer to 
agencies under prescribed circumstances, we would expect courts to decide a relatively 
high number of cases in support of agencies. 
Alternatively, the attitudinal model could account for the high levels of agency 
success, but may not be able to account for the high levels of unanimity. This is not to say 
that ideology cannot contribute to either of these phenomena, but it does suggest that 
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ideology cannot account for all judicial decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
when agency decisions are under review. 
SPECIFYING REGRESSION MODELS 
Logistic Regression for Dichotomous Dependent Variables 
Having established indicators for the legal and attitudinal models, I can now 
assess the impact of law and politics in regression models, ceteris paribus. I specify two 
sets of regression models. The first set uses court decisions as the unit of analysis. The 
dependent variable for this set is court support, which indicates whether a review panel 
supported an agency in its final decision. The second set uses individual judge as the unit 
of analysis. The dependent variable is judge support, which indicates whether an 
individual judge votes to support an agency in the final case decision. Since both 
dependent variables—court support and judge support—are dichotomous, logistic 
regression is an appropriate statistical estimation tool to analyze the data (Long 1997; 
Long and Freese 2006). 
Legal Variables Examined in Separate Models 
Each regression model examines only one legal issue at a time. Remember that 
about 40%-50% of cases contain only one standard of review, which means that a logistic 
regression model with more than one standard of review accounts for only cases where 
both standards are present in a particular case. Even in cases that raise multiple standard-
of-review questions, the standard-of-review questions are highly and positively correlated 
with each other. These correlations range from 0.79 to 1.00, which present 
multicollinearity problems in regression models. 
Since I am interested in all cases where a particular standard is present, not only 
cases where more than one exists, I examine each standard-of-review variable in a 
separate model. The standards of review I examine are limited to the ones with sufficient 
observations for logistic regression analysis—substantial evidence, arbitrary and 
capricious, abuse of discretion, and Chevron deference. Because of insufficient 
observations in the sample, I do not examine the de novo and clearly-erroneous standards 
of review. 
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Like standard-of-review variables, I examine the procedural-adherence variable 
apart from other legal variables. Remember that procedural questions are raised relatively 
infrequently as legal questions in the courts of appeals. Therefore, as a practical matter, 
the small number of cases that raise both procedural and standard-of-review questions, 
coupled with the lack of observable variation among these variables, prevents examining 
the procedural variable with any other legal variable. Therefore, I also examine 
procedural adherence separately from other legal variables. 
Legal Variables Are Court-based 
All of the legal variables discussed in this chapter are based on questions that the 
reviewing court answered. That is, standard-of-review questions and procedural-
adherence questions are coded based on how the court answered those questions. The 
courts of appeals database does not code these questions based on how individual judges 
answered these questions. Generally, the case opinions do not indicate whether an 
individual judge disagreed with the majority on a particular legal question, unless the 
judge dissented in the case, which is rare, and unless the judge also spoke to the particular 
legal question as part of the dissent. 
For court-based analyses, using the court-level legal variables is not an issue. For 
judge-based analyses, using court-level legal variables is also not an issue; however, I 
note that legal variables in the judge-centered models suggest that how a court answers 
legal questions predicts whether individual judges vote to support agencies in final case 
decisions. There is no way to determine whether a specific judge agreed or disagreed 
with a particular legal question in these models. 
At the outset, I assume, based on normative notions of the legal model, that court 
panels decide these legal issues before they decide case outcomes. Once the analysis is 
complete, this assumption will either become apparent as a reasonable one, or the 
assumption will be undermined. If the assumption is true, then the answers to legal 
questions should inform individual judges‘ decisions to support agencies in final case 
decisions. However, this argument is circular—one cannot show that the assumptions of a 
legal model are true based on models that assume the legal model is true. What is not 
circular, however, is prescribing and testing a priori the conditions under which the 
assumption is false. 
112 
 
The attitudinal model assumes that judges have ideological preferences that 
inform their decisions, and the opinions judges write are masks for this ideology. Thus, 
decisions to support an agency necessarily come before judges‘ write the rationales for 
those decisions (i.e., before they answer the legal questions in opinions). Therefore, if the 
attitudinal model is correct, decisions come before opinions. This undermines a critical 
component of the legal model—that legal reasoning and laws inform decisions, not the 
other way around. I revisit this point in Chapter Five, in the section titled, Case Opinions 
as Masks for Ideology, which further tests this assumption. 
Attitudinal Variables Examined in Separate Models 
To test the attitudinal model, I use two variables. First, I use the panel mean 
ideology variable since it performed slightly better than the panel median ideology 
variable, as shown and discussed in the section, Panel Ideology, earlier in this chapter. 
Hereafter, I refer to this variable as panel ideological agreement. This variable can be 
used in both court-level and judge-level analyses. In court-level analyses, this panel 
ideological agreement is simply a measure of ideology. However, in judge-level analyses, 
this variable speaks not only to ideological influences on individual judge 
decisionmaking, but also to the effects that judging on a collegial court has on individual 
judge decisionmaking. 
The second attitudinal variable is judge ideological agreement. This variable 
will be used only in judge-level analyses. The correlation between these two variables is 
high (r = 0.60), which presents multicollinearity problems in logistic regressions. 
Therefore, to insure that neither masks the other‘s effects, I test the ideology variables in 
separate models. Doing so does not undermine the purpose of the present study, which is 
to test between the competing attitudinal and legal models. 
Models of Court Decisionmaking 
As discussed in the hypotheses chapter, I developed two sets of hypotheses for the 
present study. The first set (H1–H5) concerns decisionmaking of courts. To test these 
hypotheses, I use court decision as the unit of analysis, and I use court support for 
agency as the dependent variable.  The general model for court support includes a legal 
variable, the panel-ideological-agreement variable, and variables for the D.C. Circuit. 
The basic model is expressed as follows.  
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Court Support for Agency = β0 + β1 (legal variable) + β2 (panel ideological 
agreement) + β3 (D.C. Circuit dummy) + β4 (D.C. Circuit dummy x legal 
variable) + β5 (D.C. Circuit dummy x panel ideological agreement) + e, 
where, β0 is the constant and e is the error term. 
Models of Judge Decisionmaking 
The second set of hypotheses (H6–H11) is judge-centered. Therefore, I use 
individual judge votes as the unit of analysis and judge support for agencies as the 
dependent variable to test these hypotheses. I specify two sets of judge-level models that 
include a legal variable, an ideology variable, and variables for the D.C. Circuit. As 
discussed in earlier sections of this chapter, the legal variables are court-based. While 
judge-level data would have been preferred, the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database does 
not code how each judge answers these legal questions. As an acceptable alternative, I 
hypothesized that individual judges‘ decisions to support agencies in final cases decisions 
are influenced by how the review panel answered these legal questions, irrespective of 
how the individual judge would have answered the questions. As hypothesized, if the 
review panel answers legal questions in support of agencies, individual judges are more 
likely to support agencies in final case dispositions. Therefore, it is appropriate to include 
the court-level legal variables in a model predicting individual judge decisionmaking. 
The two sets of judge-level models are identical except for the ideology variables. 
The first model examines the impact of judge ideological agreement with the 
agency as an informant of individual judges‘ votes to support agencies in final case 
decisions. This model is expressed as follows. 
Judge Support for Agency = β0 + β1 (legal variable) + β2 (judge ideological 
agreement) + β3 (D.C. Circuit dummy) + β4 (D.C. Circuit dummy x legal 
variable) + β5 (D.C. Circuit dummy x judge ideological agreement) + e, 
where, β0 is the constant, and e is the error term. 
The second judge-level model is the same as above, except it includes the 
influence of  the ideological composition of the review panel as an informant of 
individual judge decisionmaking, rather than a judge‘s own ideology. In this model, I test 
Hypothesis 11 (H11), which states that an individual judge votes to support agencies are 
influenced by the ideology of other judges on the reviewing panel. If the ideology of the 
review panel is in agreement with the agency position, individual judges are more likely 
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to support agencies in final case decisions. Thus, it is appropriate to include this court-
level independent variable in models predicting individual judge decisionmaking. This 
model is expressed as: 
Judge Support for Agency = β0 + β1 (legal variable) + β2 (panel ideological 
agreement) + β3 (D.C. Circuit dummy) + β4 (D.C. Circuit dummy x legal 
variable) + β5 (D.C. Circuit dummy x panel ideological agreement) + e, 
where, β0 is the constant, and e is the error term. 
 
TESTING HYPOTHESES 
To test my hypotheses, I used the Stata statistical package and data from the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals Database to run and analyze logistic regression models. The next 
chapter presents these models and the results of hypotheses testing. 
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TABLES REFERENCED IN CHAPTER FOUR 
Table 4.1 Sources of Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1982–2002 
 
Source No. of Cases % of Docket 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
District Court 6,515 86.19  
 
Administrative Agency/ALJ 583 7.72 
 
Bankruptcy 22 0.29 
 
Federal Magistrate 75 0.99 
 
Court of Customs & Patent Appeals 33 0.44 
 
Court of Claims 1 0.01 
 
Court of Military Appeals 1 0.01 
 
Tax Court or Tax Board 84 1.11 
 
U.S. Supreme Court (remand) 61 0.81 
 
Special D.C. Court (not Dist. Ct. for D.C.) 1 0.01 
 
State Court 26 0.34 
 
Earlier Appeals Court Panel 118 1.56 
 
Other 21 0.28 
 
Not Ascertained 18 0.24 
 
Total 7,559 100.00 
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Table 4.2 Percent of U.S. Courts of Appeals Caseload from Administrative 
Agencies, 1982–2002 
 
Year  % of Docket   Year  % of Docket 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1982  12.5    1993  6.11 
 
1983  5.84    1994  8.61 
 
1984  8.62    1995  7.23 
 
1985  7.78    1996  6.39 
 
1986  6.95    1997  7.77 
 
1987  8.89    1998  8.05 
 
1988  8.06    1999  8.34 
 
1989  7.50    2000  5.84 
 
1990  8.61    2001  8.61 
 
1991  6.94    2002  5.57 
 
1992  7.78 
 
Mean 7.70 
S.E. 0.33 
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Table 4.3 Number and Percent of Agency Cases by Circuit, 1982–2002 (Database 
Sample) 
 
Circuit No. of Cases Percent 
__________________________________________________ 
 
D.C. 229 39.3 
 
1 33 5.7 
 
2 35 6.0 
 
3 39 6.7 
 
4 48 8.2 
 
5 28 4.8 
 
6 46 7.9 
 
7 30 5.2 
 
8 17 2.9 
 
9 48 8.2 
 
10 21 3.6 
 
11 9 1.5 
 
Total 583 100.0 
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Table 4.4 Frequency and Percent of Values for the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
Database‘s Treat Variable, 1982–2002 
 
Value Description Frequency % 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
0 stay, petition, or motion granted 81 14.57  
 
1 affirmed; or affirmed and petition denied 111 19.96 
 
2 reversed (includes reversed and vacated) 22 3.96 
 
3  reversed and remanded (or just remanded) 76 13.67 
 
4 vacated and remanded (also set aside and remanded; 36 6.47 
modified and remanded) 
 
5 affirmed in part and reversed in part 15 2.70 
(or modified or affirmed and modified) 
 
6 affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; 22 3.96 
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded 
 
7 vacated 7 1.26 
 
8 petition denied or appeal dismissed 182 32.73 
 
9 certified to another court 0 0.00 
 
10 not ascertained 1 0.18 
 
11 affirmed, vacated (with no mention of reverse), 3 0.54 
and remanded 
 
Total  556 100.0 
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Table 4.4.5 Cross Values for Appfed and R_fed when Treat = 8 
 
 Appfed 
R_fed (No. of federal agencies as appellants) 
(No. of federal _____________________________________________________ 
agencies as  
respondents) 0 1 2 99 Total 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
0 4 10 0 1 15 
 
1 121  2 1 0 124  
 
2 37 0 0 0 37 
 
3 2 0 0 0 2 
 
4 1 0 0 0 1 
 
99 3 0 0 0 3 
 
Total 168 12 1 1 182 
 
 
Table 4.4.6 Mixed-Decision Cases and Dissent Cases, All Circuits, 1982–2002 
 Dissent in Case? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Mixed-Decision in Case? No Yes Total % Dissent 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 394 43 437 9.8% 
 (390.9)  (46.1) 
 
Yes 30 7 37 18.9% 
 (33.1)  (3.9) 
 
Total 424 50 474 10.5% 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 2.98 
Chi
2
 p < 0.084 
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Table 4.4.7 Mixed-Decision Cases and Multiple Docket Cases, All Circuits, 1989–
2002 
 Multiple Dockets in Case? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Mixed-Decision in Case? No Yes Total % Mult. Dockets 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 259 28 287 9.8% 
 (252.9)  (34.1) 
 
Yes 15 9 24 37.5% 
 (33.1)  (3.9) 
 
Total 274 37 311 11.9% 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 16.26 
Chi
2
 p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 4.5 Coding for Dependent Variable: Court Support 
 
Value Based On Interpretation N 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
0 Treat = 2, 3, 4, 7, 18 Court does not support agency 154 
 
1 Treat = 1, 8, 11 Court supports agency 283 
 
. Treat = 0, 5, 6, 9, 10 Support not determinable 119 
  (recoded as missing data) 
 
Total   556 
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Table 4.6 Circuit Court Support for Agencies, 1982–2002 
 
Circuit Total No. of Cases Agency Support (N) Agency Support (%) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
D.C. Circuit 186 123 66.1 
 
Circuits 1-11 251 160 63.8 
 
All Circuits 437 283 64.8 
 
 
 
Table 4.7 Mixed-Answer Standard-of-Review Cases Omitted from Analysis 
 
 No. of Cases No. of Mixed-Answer 
Standard of Review in Sample Cases Omitted 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Arbitrary and Capricious 68 2 
 
Substantial Evidence 127 3 
 
De Novo 9 0 
 
Clearly Erroneous 36 0 
 
Abuse of Discretion 86 4 
 
Chevron 135 3 
 
Total 461 12 
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Table 4.8 Court Support if Arbitrary-and-Capricious Question Raised, Circuits 1–11 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Arbitrary & Capricious in case? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 82 142 224 63.4 
 (80.4)  (143.6)  
 
Yes 7 17 24 70.8 
 (8.6)  (15.4)  
 
Total 89 159 248 64.1 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 0.52 
Chi
2
 p < 0.470 
 
 
Table 4.9 Court Support if Arbitrary-and-Capricious Question Raised, D.C. Circuit 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Arbitrary & Capricious in case? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 46 96 142 67.6 
 (47.1) (94.9) 
 
Yes 15 27 42 64.3 
 (13.9) (28.1) 
 
Total 61 123 184 66.8 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 0.16 
Chi
2
 p < 0.688 
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Table 4.10 Court Support if Arbitrary-and-Capricious Test Supports Agency, Circuits 
1–11 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Arbitrary & capricious test supports agency? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 5 2 7 28.6 
 (2.0) (5.0) 
 
Yes 2 15 17 88.2 
 (5.0) (12.0) 
 
Total 7 17 24 70.8 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 8.54 
Chi
2
 p < 0.003 
 
 
Table 4.11 Court Support if Arbitrary-and-Capricious Test Supports Agency, D.C. 
Circuit 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Arbitrary & capricious test supports agency? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 15 1 16 6.3 
 (5.7) (10.3)  
 
Yes 0 26 26 100.0 
 (9.3) (16.7) 
 
Total 15 27 42 64.3 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 37.92 
Chi
2
 p < 0.001 
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Table 4.12 Court Support if Abuse-of-Discretion Question Raised, Circuits 1–11 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Abuse of Discretion in case? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 80 128 208 61.5 
 (75.4) (132.6) 
 
Yes 11 32 43 74.4 
 (15.6) (27.4)  
 
Total 91 160 251 63.7 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 5.56 
Chi
2
 p < 0.110 
 
 
Table 4.13 Court Support if Abuse-of-Discretion Question Raised, D.C. Circuit 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Abuse of Discretion in case? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
No 50 93 143 65.0 
 (47.1) (95.9)  
 
Yes 10 29 39 74.4 
 (12.9) (26.1)  
 
Total 60 122 182 67.0 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 1.21 
Chi
2
 p < 0.272 
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Table 4.14 Court Support if Abuse-of-Discretion Test Supports Agency, Circuits 1–
11 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Abuse of disc. test supports agency? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 9 2 11 18.2 
 (2.8) (8.2)  
 
Yes 2 30 32 93.8 
 (8.2) (23.8)  
 
Total 11 32 43 74.4 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 24.56 
Chi
2
 p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 4.15 Court Support if Abuse-of-Discretion Test Supports Agency, D.C. Circuit 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Abuse of disc. test supports agency? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 10 2 12 16.7 
 (3.1) (8.9)  
 
Yes 0 27 27 100.0 
 (6.9) (20.1)  
 
Total 10 29 39 74.4 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 30.26 
Chi
2
 p < 0.001 
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Table 4.16 Court Support if Substantial-Evidence Question Raised, Circuits 1–11 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Substantial Evidence in case? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 56 103 159 64.8 
 (56.8) (102.2) 
 
Yes 33 57 90 63.3 
 (32.2) (57.8) 
 
Total 89 160 249 64.3 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 0.05 
Chi
2
 p < 0.819 
 
 
Table 4.17 Court Support if Substantial-Evidence Question Raised, D.C. Circuit 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Substantial Evidence in case? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 55 97 152 63.8 
 (51.8) (100.2) 
 
Yes 8 25 33 75.8 
 (11.2) (21.8)  
 
Total 63 122 185 65.9 
 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 1.72 
Chi
2
 p < 0.189 
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Table 4.18 Court Support if Substantial-Evidence Test Supports Agency, Circuits 1–
11 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Substantial evidence test supports agency? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 30 3 33 9.1 
 (12.1) (20.9)  
 
Yes 3 54 57 94.7 
 (20.9) (36.1)  
 
Total 33 57 90 63.3 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 66.02 
Chi
2
 p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 4.19 Court Support if Substantial-Evidence Test Supports Agency, D.C. Circuit 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Substantial evidence test supports agency? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 8 1 9 11.1 
 (2.2) (6.8) 
  
Yes 0 24 24 100.0 
 (5.8) (18.2)  
 
Total 8 25 33 75.8 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 28.16 
Chi
2
 p < 0.001 
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Table 4.20 Court Support if Clearly-Erroneous Question Raised, Circuits 1–11 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Clearly Erroneous in case? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 90 153 243 63.0 
 (88.1) (154.9)  
 
Yes 1 7 8 87.5 
 (2.9) (5.1)  
 
Total 91 160 251 63.7 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 2.02 
Chi
2
 p < 0.155 
 
 
Table 4.21 Court Support if Clearly-Erroneous Question Raised, D.C. Circuit 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Clearly Erroneous in case? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 52 106 158 67.1 
 (53.5) (104.5)  
 
Yes 11 17 28 60.7 
 (9.5) (18.5)  
 
Total 63 123 194 63.4 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 0.4943 
Chi
2
 p < 0.511 
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Table 4.22 Court Support if Clearly-Erroneous Test Supports Agency, Circuits 1–11 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Clearly erroneous test supports agency? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 1 1 2 50.0 
 (0.3) (1.8)  
 
Yes 0 6 6 100.0 
 (0.8) (5.3)  
 
Total 1 7 8 87.5 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 3.42 
Chi
2
 p < 0.064 
 
 
Table 4.23 Court Support if Clearly-Erroneous Test Supports Agency, D.C. Circuit 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Clearly erroneous test supports agency? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 9 0 9 0.0 
 (3.5) (5.5)  
          
Yes 2 17 19 89.5 
 (7.5) (11.5)  
 
Total 11 17 28 60.7 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 20.50 
Chi
2
 p < 0.001 
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Table 4.24 Court Support if De Novo Question Raised, All Circuits 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
De novo in case? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 152 276 428 64.5 
 (150.8) (277.2)  
 
Yes 2 7 9 77.8 
 (3.2) (5.8)  
 
Total 154 283 437 64.8 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 0.68 
Chi
2
 p < 0.409 
 
 
Table 4.25 Court Support if De Novo Test Supports Agency, All Circuits 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
De novo test supports agency? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 2 0 2 0.0 
 (0.4) (1.6)  
 
Yes 0 7 7 100.0 
 (1.6) (5.4)  
 
Total 2 7 9 77.8 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 9.00 
Chi
2
 p < 0.003 
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Table 4.26 Court Support if Chevron Review Used, Circuits 1–11 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Chevron Review in case? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 66 123 189 65.1 
 (68.0) (121.0)  
 
Yes 24 37 61 60.7 
 (22.0) (39.0)  
 
Total 90 160 250 64.0 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 0.39 
Chi
2
 p < 0.531 
 
 
Table 4.27 Court Support if Chevron Review Used, D.C. Circuit 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Chevron Review in case? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 39 74 113 65.5 
 (37.5) (75.5)  
 
Yes 22 49 71 69.0 
 (23.5) (47.5)  
 
Total 61 123 184 66.8 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 0.24 
Chi
2
 p < 0.621 
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Table 4.28 Court Support if Chevron Test Supports Agency, Circuits 1–11 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Chevron test supports agency? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 22 3 25 12.0 
 (9.8) (15.2)  
          
Yes 2 34 36 94.4 
 (14.2) (21.8)  
 
Total 24 37 61 60.7 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 42.02 
Chi
2
 p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 4.29 Court Support if Chevron Test Supports Agency, D.C. Circuit 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Chevron test supports agency? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 21 0 21 0.0 
 (6.5) (14.5)  
 
Yes 1 49 50 98.0 
 (15.5) (34.5)  
 
Total 22 49 71 69.0 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 66.42 
Chi
2
 p < 0.001 
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Table 4.30 Percent Court Support when Standard-of-Review Tests Support Agencies 
 Court Support 
 Percent (N) 
 ______________________________________ 
 
Standard of Review Circuits 1-11 D.C. Circuit 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Arbitrary & Capricious 88.2 100.0 
 (15)  (26) 
 
Abuse of Discretion 93.8 100.0 
 (30)  (27) 
 
Substantial Evidence 94.7 100.0 
 (54)  (24) 
 
Clearly Erroneous 100.0 89.5 
 (6)  (17) 
 
Chevron 94.4 98.0 
 (34)  (49) 
 
 
Table 4.31 Standards of Review Raised in a Case, Circuits 1–11 
 
No. of Standards Frequency % of Cases 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
0 96 30.2 
 
1 154 48.4 
 
2 54 17.0 
 
3 10 3.1 
 
4 4 1.2 
 
Total 318 99.9*  
 
*Total percent does not equal 100 due to rounding. 
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Table 4.32 Standards of Review Raised in a Case, D.C. Circuit 
 
No. of Standards Frequency % of Cases
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
0 59 28.6 
 
1 84 40.8 
 
2 44 21.4 
 
3 14 6.8 
 
4 4 1.9 
 
5 1 0.5 
 
Total 206 100.0 
 
Table 4.33 Correlation Matrix of Support and Standard-of-Review Variables, Circuits 
1–11 
 
 Court Substantial Arbitrary Abuse of Chevron 
Variable Support Evidence & Capric Discretion Deference 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court Support 1.00 
 
Substantial Evidence 0.86*** 1.00 
 (0.001) 
 
Arbitrary & Capricious 0.60** 1.00*** 1.00 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
 
Abuse of Discretion 0.76*** 0.79*** 1.00*** 1.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Chevron Deference 0.83*** 0.75*** 0.60 0.87*** 1.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.089) (0.001) 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Numbers in parentheses are significance levels. 
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Table 4.34 Correlation Matrix of Support and Standard-of-Review Variables, D.C. 
Circuit 
 
 Court Substantial Arbitrary Abuse of Chevron 
Variable Support Evidence & Capric Discretion Deference 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court Support 1.00 
 
Substantial Evidence 0.92*** 1.00 
 (0.001) 
 
Arbitrary & Capricious 0.95*** 0.84*** 1.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Abuse of Discretion 0.88*** 1.00*** 0.66 1.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.052) 
 
Chevron Deference 0.97*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 0.89*** 1.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Numbers in parentheses are significance levels. 
 
 
Table 4.35 Type and Frequency of Procedural Questions Raised in Cases 
 
 Circuits 1-11 D.C. Circuit 
 __________________________ __________________________ 
  
Procedure Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Info Acquired 1 0.3 1 0.5 
 
Info Provided 2 0.6 6 2.7 
 
Notice 11 3.3 15 6.8 
 
Comment 7 2.1 7 3.2 
 
Record 7 2.1 15 6.8 
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Table 4.36 Frequency of Procedural Questions Raised in a Case 
 
 Circuits 1-11 D.C. Circuit 
 __________________________ __________________________ 
  
No. of Procedures Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
0 311 93.4 181 82.3 
 
1 18 5.4 36 16.4 
 
2 3 0.9 1 0.5 
 
3 1 0.3 2 0.9 
 
Total 333 100.0 220 100.1* 
 
*Total does not equal 100 due to rounding. 
 
 
Table 4.37 Court Support if Procedural Questions Support Agency, Circuits 1–11 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Procedural Question supports agency? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 4 1 5 20.0 
 (1.5) (3.5)  
 
Yes 1 11 12 91.7 
 (3.5) (8.5)  
 
Total 5 12 17 70.6 
 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 8.73 
Chi
2
 p < 0.003 
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Table 4.38 Court Support if Procedural Questions Support Agency, D.C. Circuit 
 Did court support agency? 
 N (expected N) 
 ______________________ 
 
Procedural Question supports agency? No Yes Total % Support 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No 13 1 14 7.1 
 (5.7) (8.3)  
 
Yes 2 21 23 91.3 
 (9.3) (13.7)  
 
Total 15 22 37 59.5 
 
 
Pearson Chi
2
 = 25.57 
Chi
2
 p < 0.001 
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Table 4.39 Frequency of Judge Votes in Sample by Circuit 
 
Circuit No. of Judge Votes % of Judge Votes 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
D.C. 570 44.0 
 
1 75 5.8 
 
2 57 4.4 
 
3 77 5.9 
 
4 92 7.1 
 
5 63 4.9 
 
6 75 5.8 
 
7 65 5.0 
 
8 37 2.9 
 
9 110 8.5 
 
10 51 3.9 
 
11 24 1.9 
 
Total 1,296 100.1* 
 
Circuit Mean (without D.C.) 66 5.1 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
* Total does not equal 100 due to rounding. 
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Table 4.40 Frequency of Judge Support for Agencies, All Circuits 
 
 Total Votes Supportive Votes Non-Supportive Votes 
  ________________ _____________________ 
 
Circuit  No. Percent No. Percent 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
D.C. 570 368 64.5 202 35.4 
 
Circuits 1-11 726 476 65.6 250 34.4 
 
Total 1,296 844 65.1 452 34.9 
 
 
 
Table 4.41 Ideological Composition of Judges in Sample, 1982–2002 
 
Circuit N Mean SD Min Max 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
D.C. 33 –0.012 0.491 –0.623 0.567 
 
1-11 255 0.024 0.348 –0.684 0.581 
 
All Circuits 283 0.024 0.367 –0.684 0.581 
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Table 4.42 Frequency of Judges in Each Ideology Range 
 
 D.C. Circuit Circuits 1–11 All Circuits 
 ______________ ______________ ______________ 
  
Ideology Range N % N % N % 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Liberal Range 
 
–1.0 to –0.75 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
      
–0.75 to –0.5 8 24.2 10 3.9 18 6.4 
 
–0.5 to –0.25 8 24.2 63 24.7 69 24.4 
 
–0.25 to 0.0 1 3.0 46 18.0 46 16.3 
 
Total in Liberal Range 17 51.4 119 46.6 133* 47.1 
 
 
Conservative Range 
 
0.0 to 0.25 2 6.1 55 21.6 55 19.4 
 
0.25 to 0.50 3 9.1 51 20.0 54 19.1 
 
0.50 to 0.75 11 33.3 30 11.8 41 14.5 
 
0.75 to 1.00 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0  
 
Total in Conservative Range 16 48.5 136 53.4 150 53.0 
 
 
Grand Total 33 99.9* 255 100.0 283 100.1** 
 
* The total number of unique judges in all circuits does not equal the total of unique judges in the D.C. 
circuit plus the total in the remaining circuits because of judges hearing cases in more than one 
circuit. 
** Totals do not equal 100.0 due to rounding. 
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Table 4.43 Coding Values for Ideological Direction of Case Decision 
 
 Value for Value for 
Description Direct1 Ideological Direction of Case Decision 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Liberal 3 0 
 
Conservative 1 1 
 
 
Table 4.44 Derived Values for Ideological Direction of Agency Position 
 
 Ideological Direction of Case Decision 
 __________________________________ 
 
Court Support Liberal (0) Conservative (1) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Supports agency (0) 0 1 
 
Does not support agency (1) 1 0 
 
 
Table 4.45 Judge Ideological Agreement and Judge Support for Agencies—Model 
Summaries 
 Judge 
 Ideological 
 Agreement Coef.  Model Model 
Model (Circuit) Coefficient SE p Pseudo R
2 
N 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
D.C. 0.25 0.17 0.130 0.003 570 
 
1-11 0.73 0.22 0.001 0.012 721 
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Table 4.46 Panel Ideological Agreement Predicting Judge Support, Circuits 1–11 
 
 Regression 
 Model Coef.  Model 
Model Coefficient SE P Pseudo R
2 
N 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel Median Ideology 1.27 0.29 0.001 0.022 726 
 
Panel Mean Ideology 1.83 0.37 0.001 0.028 726 
 
 
 
Table 4.47 Panel Ideological Agreement Predicting Judge Support, D.C. Circuit 
 
 Regression 
 Model Coef.  Model 
Model Coefficient SE P Pseudo R
2 
N 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel Median Ideology 0.33 0.17 0.055 0.005 570 
 
Panel Mean Ideology 0.78 0.30 0.009 0.010 570 
 
 
 
143 
 
Table 4.48 Panel Ideological Agreement Predicting Court Support, Circuits 1–11 
 Logistic 
 Regression 
 Model Coef 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel Ideology Agree 1.09 0.059 
 (0.58) 
 
Constant 0.57*** 0.001  
 (0.13) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –162.56 
N 251 
LR Chi2 3.63 
Prob > Chi2 0.057 
Pseudo R2 0.01 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
Table 4.49 Panel Ideological Agreement Predicting Court Support, DC Circuit 
 Logistic 
 Regression 
 Model Coef 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel Ideology Agree 0.64 0.211 
 (0.51) 
 
Constant 0.69*** 0.001  
 (0.16) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –118.28 
N 186 
LR Chi2 1.59 
Prob > Chi2 0.207 
Pseudo R2 0.01 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Copyright © Jerry D. Thomas 2010 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
 
In the preceding chapter, I conceptualized, described, and operationalized 
variables related to the attitudinal and legal models of judicial behavior. In this chapter, I 
use these variables, along with data from the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database, to test 
attitudinal and legal hypotheses in logistic regression models. I first address court-level 
behavior, followed by individual judge behavior. 
IS COURT BEHAVIOR DEFERENTIAL? 
As previously discussed in the data and methods section, there is a positive 
correlation between how courts answer legal questions with respect to agencies and 
whether courts support agencies in final decisions. There is also a positive correlation 
between a panel‘s ideological agreement with agency positions and whether a court 
supports an agency. The following sections report the results of logistic regression 
models predicting court support for agencies when both legal and attitudinal variables are 
included in the same model. These models include the panel-ideological-agreement 
variable, a legal variable, and variables for the D.C. Circuit. The equation for this model 
is as follows: 
Court Support for Agency = β0 + β1 (legal variable) + β2 (panel ideological 
agreement) + β3 (D.C. Circuit dummy) + β4 (D.C. Circuit dummy x legal 
variable) + β5 (D.C. Circuit dummy x panel ideological agreement) + e, 
where, β0 is the constant and e is the error term. 
 
Models are named for the unique legal variable used in each—procedural 
adherence, substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, abuse of discretion, and 
Chevron deference. The results of these models are presented in Tables 5.1 through 5.5. 
Subsequent sections address whether these results support the court-level hypotheses. 
Courts Support Agencies that Follow Procedures 
The probability that a review panel will support an agency in final case decisions 
increases substantially if agencies follow prescribed procedures. Hypothesis 1 states, 
―Agency adherence to procedural standards, such as those outlined in the Administrative 
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Procedures Act and other related statutes, increases the likelihood that a review panel will 
defer to the agency. Agency non-adherence to procedural standards decreases the 
likelihood that a review panel will defer to the agency.‖ Results of the logistic regression 
of the procedural-adherence model reported in Table 5.1 support this hypothesis. Courts‘ 
views of agency adherence to procedures are significantly associated with agency success 
in the courts. If a court panel determines an agency adhered to procedures, the probability 
the court will support the agency in the final case decision is 0.75 higher than if agencies 
do not adhere to procedures. 
Review panels in the D.C. Circuit appear no more and no less prone than panels 
in other circuits to support agencies based on an agency‘s adherence to procedures. 
Notice that the DC dummy variable is not statistically significant in Table 5.1 Hypothesis 
2 states, ―D.C. Circuit panels are less likely than other circuit panels to defer to agencies 
based on agency adherence to procedures.‖ The results of the logistic regression of the 
procedural-adherence model (Table 5.1) do not support this hypothesis, since the 
interactive variable, DC x procedural-adherence, is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. This may have ramifications for scholars‘ assertions that the D.C. 
Circuit is less likely to defer to agencies because of the greater administrative law 
expertise that judges in the D.C. Circuit develop as a result of reviewing a greater number 
of agency decisions (Pierce 1988). I revisit this point in the discussion chapter, but note 
here that court decisionmaking in the D.C. Circuit is not statistically different from court 
decisionmaking in the remaining circuits. 
Courts Support Agencies that Pass Standard-of-Review Muster 
Review panels tend to support agencies in final case decisions where courts also 
determine that agencies meet minimum thresholds for each standard of review. This 
support suggests that courts defer to agencies as legally prescribed by these standards of 
review. Hypothesis 3 states, ―If a court panel answers standard-of-review questions 
favorably toward an agency, the review panel is more likely to defer to the agency, 
resulting in support for the agency in the final case decision.‖ To test this hypothesis, I 
examine four standards of review in logistic regression models that predict court support 
for agencies in final case decisions. Tables 5.2 through 5.5 report the results of the four 
standard-of-review models, all of which support this hypothesis. 
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Based on the results in the substantial-evidence model (Table 5.2), if an agency 
provides substantial evidence to support its decision, the probability of a court supporting 
the agency in the final case decision increases by 0.87 compared to when agencies do not 
provide substantial evidence. The arbitrary-and-capricious model (Table 5.3) shows that 
when an agency does not act arbitrarily or capriciously, the probability of a court 
supporting the agency increases by 0.83. Similarly, when court panels determine agencies 
do not abuse discretion, the probability of court support increases by 0.81 (see abuse-of-
discretion model in Table 5.4). Finally, the Chevron-deference model (Table 5.5) 
indicates that when an agency articulates a reasonable interpretation of a statute, the 
probability of courts supporting the agency in final case decisions increases by 0.91. 
Based on these results, if an agency passes the minimum threshold of deference 
requirements established in each standard of review, courts are more likely to support 
agencies in final case decisions. Furthermore, the results of these models do not support 
the attitudinalists‘ idea that courts substitute their ideological preferences in place of 
agency‘s preferences. The panel ideology variable is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels in any of the four models. Thus, it appears that courts defer to 
agencies where agencies pass muster on these standards of review. 
Review panels in the D.C. Circuit also support agencies when agencies pass 
standard-of-review muster. Since the DC control variable is not statistically significant in 
any of these models, we can reject any hypothesis suggesting that courts in the DC 
Circuit behave differently from courts in other circuits. Further, notice that in all four of 
the standard-of-review models, the interactive variable, DC x Legal, is not shown. This is 
because values of 1 for this variable predict success perfectly; therefore, these 
observations were dropped from the models. Substantively, this means that there were no 
instances in the D.C. Circuit where a review panel answered standard-of-review 
questions favorably toward the agency but chose not to support the agency in the final 
case decision.
22
 That is, if D.C. Circuit review panels determined that agencies provided 
substantial evidence to support their decisions, agencies were not arbitrary or capricious, 
agencies did not abuse discretion, or agencies reasonably interpreted statutes, the review 
                                                 
22
 There is one exception to this proposition. There is one case in the Chevron deference model where the 
review panel supported the agency in the review question, but not in the final case decision. However, one 
observation is insufficient variation to keep Stata from dropping this variable for want of perfect prediction. 
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panel always supported the agency‘s decisions. While I did not hypothesize D.C. Circuit 
court decisionmaking based on standard-of-review questions, I would have been inclined 
to hypothesize behavior opposite to these results based on scholarly assertions that the 
D.C. Circuit is less deferential to agencies because of its hard-look approaches to judicial 
review of agency decisions (Edwards 1998; Revesz 1997, 1999; Wald 1996). On the 
other hand, the lack of observable variation in these standards is noted in Chapter Four, 
where I examined correlations between these legal variables and the court-support 
variable in the D.C. Circuit apart from the other circuits. Nonetheless, it appears from 
these results that review panels in the D.C. Circuit, are at a minimum, just as deferential 
to agencies as review panels in other circuits, and, at a maximum, D.C. review panels 
may be more deferential. 
Ideological Composition of Panels 
The ideological composition of a review panel does not appear to affect decisions 
of the entire court. Hypothesis 4 states, ―Court panels decide cases consistently with 
panel ideology. Liberal panels tend to support liberal agency decisions, and conservative 
panels tend to support conservative agency decisions.‖ To test this hypothesis, I used the 
panel-ideological-agreement variable in a regression model to predict support for 
agencies in final case decisions.  If this hypothesis is true, the panel-ideological-
agreement variable coefficient will be positive, indicating that as panel ideological 
agreement increases so does the probability of court support for agencies. Results 
reported in Tables 5.1 through 5.5 do not support this hypothesis. In all models, panel 
ideology is never statistically significant. This suggests that the ideological composition 
of a review panel has little import in judicial decisionmaking when legal variables are 
also considered. 
Review panels in the D.C. Circuit do not appear to be any more or less ideological 
in their decisionmaking than panels in other circuits. Hypothesis 5 states, ―D.C. Circuit 
review panels tend to decide cases more consistently with panel ideologies than review 
panels in other circuits.‖ To test this hypothesis, I examine the DC x panel ideology 
variable in all five of the models reported in Tables 5.1 through 5.5. Since these variables 
are not statistically significant in any of the models, this hypothesis is not supported. 
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These results reiterate the bivariate regression results, where there is nto a 
statistically significant association between panel ideological agreement with agency 
positions and court support for agencies (see Tables 4.48 and 4.49 in Chapter 4). Even 
when all circuits are combined into the same model, once a legal variable is introduced 
into the model, the panel-ideological-agreement variable is not significant. But as 
attitudinalists assert, this may indicate that these legal variables are masks for ideology. 
This contrast merits further investigation. 
Case Opinions as Masks for Ideology 
Attitudinalists argue that opinions are window dressing for judges‘ policy 
preferences (Segal and Spaeth 2002). This suggests that courts decide cases based on 
ideological preferences and then craft opinions to support those ideological decisions. 
This argument is reasonable for two reasons. First, as noted in the data and methods 
chapter, all standard-of-review variables are highly and positively correlated with each 
other, many of them perfectly so. When two standards-of-review questions are raised in a 
case, if a court answers one of those questions favorably toward the agency, the court 
generally answers the second question favorably toward the agency as well. One might 
conclude that standard-of-review questions are answered in the same manner because 
they are all window dressing for ideology. If courts have an ideological predisposition or 
preference to support an agency, it is reasonable to expect their answers to legal questions 
in their opinions to also support the agency. 
Second, in bivariate regression models, panel ideological agreement approaches 
statistical significance when predicting court support for agencies. This stands in contrast 
to panel ideological agreement not being statistically significant in models with standard-
of-review variables, ceteris paribus (see Tables 5.2 through 5.5). Attitudinalists might 
reason that these standard-of-review variables mask the effects of the panel-ideological-
agreement variable because they themselves are proxies for ideology. This claim is, 
prima facie, reasonable and feasible. To test it, I use another set of logistic regression 
models. 
If standard-of review variables are proxies for ideology, then panel ideological 
agreement with agency positions should predict how courts answer standard-of-review 
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questions with respect to agencies. Tables 5.6 through 5.10 report the results of logistic 
regression in these models, which also include variables for the D.C. Circuit. 
The panel-ideological-agreement variable is not statistically significant in any of 
the models, nor is the interactive variable, DC x panel ideology. Therefore, attitudinalist 
assertions that legal reasoning in opinions is window dressing for ideological preferences 
do not appear to be supported when agency decisions are under review in the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals. 
Summary of Court Decisionmaking 
Court decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals when agency decisions are 
under review appears to be driven by procedural and institutional deference. Where 
agencies follow prescribed legal procedures in carrying out and documenting their 
decisions, courts support agencies‘ decisions, even if agency decisions do not mirror the 
ideological preferences of review panels. Similarly, courts tend to defer to agency 
decisions so long as agencies provide substantial evidence to support their decisions, do 
not act arbitrarily or capriciously, or do not abuse their discretion. Further, as the 
Chevron doctrine prescribes, the results suggest that courts may defer to agencies‘ 
interpretations of statutes, so long as these interpretations are reasonable. There is little 
evidence suggesting that courts substitute their policy preference in place of agency 
decisions based on the court‘s ideological composition and its concomitant ideological 
agreement with the agency. 
The results presented in Tables 5.6 through 5.10 strengthen the tests and findings 
for the court-level hypotheses. These findings generally support the legal model, and 
there is little evidence to support the attitudinal model. These results show that courts‘ 
answers to standard-of-review questions and procedural-adherence questions are not 
statistically associated with judges‘ ideological preferences. I, therefore, argue that 
answers to these legal questions are not proxies for judges‘ ideologies. Instead, these 
variables appear to be independent legal questions that courts answer according to criteria 
other than ideology. 
The results presented in Tables 5.6–5.10 provide insights into the direction of the 
causal arrows in the models presented in Tables 5.1–5.5. Attitudinalists would argue that 
the decision to support an agency comes first, and opinions that support those decisions 
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follow. Legal model proponents would argue that legal reasoning dictates case decisions. 
Since panel ideology does not predict answers to legal questions used in this study, the 
attitudinalist argument is not supported. Therefore, these results suggest that courts‘ 
decisions to support (or not support) an agency are guided more by legal doctrine, and 
less by judges‘ attitudes. If agencies follow procedures—broadly speaking, this includes 
providing substantial evidence to justify actions, not acting arbitrarily or capriciously, not 
abusing discretion, and reasonably interpreting statutes—then there is a high tendency for 
courts to defer to agencies. Where agencies do not follow procedures, courts are less 
likely to do so. However, these results do not suggest that the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
rubber stamp agency decisions. As discussed in the data and methods chapter, the 
presence of a particular legal question in a case is not sufficient to predict court support 
for an agency. Remember, that agencies receive support in the circuit courts in about 65% 
of cases, but these courts also render non-supportive decisions in 35% of cases. 
Finally, I note that most attitudinalist research is based on the behavior of 
individual judges. That is, attitudinalists suggest that an individual judge will vote 
consistently with his or her ideology. Where scholars extend attitudinalists‘ findings to 
entire courts, as I do here, there is an assumption that courts behaving ideologically is the 
cumulative result of judges behaving ideologically. In past research, this assumption is 
implicit, rather than explicit (e.g., Humphries and Songer 1999). I am careful, however, 
not to extend the court-level results to individual judge behavior. Hence, I posited 
separate hypotheses for individual judge behavior. The next section discusses the results 
of the tests for hypotheses related to individual judge decisionmaking. 
IS JUDGE DECISIONMAKING DEFERENTIAL OR IDEOLOGICAL? 
Since individual judge decisions are the basic components of court decisions, the 
following sections examine individual judge decisionmaking when agency decisions are 
under review. The dependent variable, judge support, in the following logistic 
regression models measures whether a judge voted to support an agency in the final case 
decision. All models include one legal variable, an ideology variable and controls for the 
D.C. Circuit. The names of the models indicate the legal variable being tested in each. 
The equations for the models being tested are as follows. Note that all the equations are 
the same except for the specific legal variable being tested.  
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Procedural Adherence Model 
Judge Support for Agency = β0 + β1 (procedural adherence) + β2 (judge 
ideological agreement) + β3 (D.C. Circuit dummy) + β4 (D.C. Circuit 
dummy x legal variable) + β5 (D.C. Circuit dummy x judge ideological 
agreement) + e, where, β0 is the constant, and e is the error term. 
 
Substantial Evidence Model 
Judge Support for Agency = β0 + β1 (substantial evidence) + β2 (judge 
ideological agreement) + β3 (D.C. Circuit dummy) + β4 (D.C. Circuit 
dummy x legal variable) + β5 (D.C. Circuit dummy x judge ideological 
agreement) + e, where, β0 is the constant, and e is the error term. 
 
Arbitrary & Capricious Model 
Judge Support for Agency = β0 + β1 (arbitrary & capricious) + β2 (judge 
ideological agreement) + β3 (D.C. Circuit dummy) + β4 (D.C. Circuit 
dummy x legal variable) + β5 (D.C. Circuit dummy x judge ideological 
agreement) + e, where, β0 is the constant, and e is the error term. 
 
Abuse of Discretion Model 
Judge Support for Agency = β0 + β1 (abuse discretion) + β2 (judge 
ideological agreement) + β3 (D.C. Circuit dummy) + β4 (D.C. Circuit 
dummy x legal variable) + β5 (D.C. Circuit dummy x judge ideological 
agreement) + e, where, β0 is the constant, and e is the error term. 
 
Chevron Deference Model 
Judge Support for Agency = β0 + β1 (Chevron deference) + β2 (judge 
ideological agreement) + β3 (D.C. Circuit dummy) + β4 (D.C. Circuit 
dummy x legal variable) + β5 (D.C. Circuit dummy x judge ideological 
agreement) + e, where, β0 is the constant, and e is the error term. 
 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals Database does not include data for how individual 
judges answered standard-of-review and procedural questions. However, since the court-
level analyses show that answers to standard-of-review questions and procedural-
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adherence questions are probably not significantly associated with ideology, and likely 
occur before final case decisions are made, I use these court-level answers as predictors 
of how judges will vote in final case decisions. For example, in the procedural-adherence 
model, I examine whether a court‘s determination that an agency adhered to procedures 
has a statistically significant relationship with whether individual judges‘ votes for the 
agency in final case decisions. As I note in the chapter describing these variables, it 
would have been better to have individual judge-level data for the legal variables. 
However, as I note in the final chapter, it is unlikely that the results would be markedly 
different with more specific data since 90% of cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals are 
unanimous. This means that in 90% of cases, how an individual judge answers a legal 
question will be the same as how a court answers a legal question. It would not be correct 
to assume that this congruence is always true. Therefore, I note that the answers to legal 
questions are based on court answers, not individual judge answers. Tables 5.11 through 
5.15 report the results when the ideology variable in each model is individual judge 
ideological agreement with the agency. 
Judges Support Agencies that Adhere to Procedures 
Individual judge support for agencies is statistically associated with whether 
agencies adhere to procedures. Hypothesis 6 states, ―Agency adherence to procedural 
standards, such as those outlined in the Administrative Procedures Act and other related 
statutes, increases the likelihood that a judge will defer to the agency. Agency non-
adherence to procedural standards decreases the likelihood that a judge will defer to the 
agency.‖ The procedural-adherence model (Table 5.11) supports this hypothesis. Agency 
adherence to procedures, as determined by the review panel, has a statistically significant 
association with judge support. The probability of a judge supporting an agency in final 
case decisions increases by 0.75 when the agency follows procedures. 
Concerning adherence to procedures, judges in the D.C. Circuit do not appear to 
behave differently from judges in other circuits. Hypothesis 7 states, ―D.C. Circuit judges 
are less likely than judges in other circuits to defer to agencies based on agency 
adherence to procedures.‖ To test this hypothesis, I included two variables in the 
procedural adherence model—the dummy variable, DC, and the interactive variable, DC 
x procedural adherence (Table 5.11). The results of this test do not support this 
153 
 
hypothesis, since neither variable is statistically significant at conventional levels. This 
may suggest that if judges in the D.C. Circuit retain greater administrative law expertise 
than their counterparts in other circuits, this expertise does not manifest in diminished 
levels of agency support because of greater scrutiny of agency procedures. 
Judges Defer to Agencies as Prescribed by Standards of Review 
Regardless of the standard of review addressed in a case, the probability of 
individual judges supporting agencies in final case decisions increases when the review 
panel determines the agency met the minimum requirements for deference defined by the 
standard. Hypothesis 8 states, ―If a court panel answers standard-of-review questions 
favorably toward an agency, a judge is more likely to defer to the agency and vote to 
support the agency in the final case decision.‖ I test this hypothesis with four logistic 
regression models—substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, abuse of discretion 
and Chevron deference (Tables 5.13 through 5.16). Logistic regression results for these 
four models all support this hypothesis, since the standard-of-review variable in each 
model is statistically significant.  
In all models, the probability of individual judge support increases if review 
panels answer standard-of-review questions favorably toward agencies. When agencies 
do not act arbitrarily or capriciously, the probability of judge support increases 0.44. 
When agencies do not abuse discretion, the probability of judge support increases 0.49. 
When an agency provides substantial evidence to support its position, the probability of a 
judge supporting the agency increases 0.63, compared to instances when the agency does 
not provide substantial evidence. Similarly, under the Chevron-deference model, the 
probability of judges supporting agencies increases 0.70 if agencies articulate a 
reasonable interpretation of a statute. 
Judges in the D.C. Circuit generally appears to be as deferential to agencies as 
judges in other circuits. The interactive DC variable (DC x Standard of Review) was 
statistically significant in only the substantial-evidence model. In this model, if review 
panels determine agencies provided substantial evidence, the probability of support from 
individual judges increases 0.30 in the D.C. Circuit. I consider these results more fully 
with the results of other models in the section titled, Judicial Decisionmaking in the D.C. 
Circuit, later in this chapter. 
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Individual Judge Ideology is of Little Consequence 
Whether an individual judge is in ideological agreement with an agency has no 
statistically significant impact on whether the judge votes to support the agency in the 
final case decision. Hypothesis 9 states, ―A judge‘s vote will be consistent with his/her 
ideology in a case. Judges will vote to support agencies if their ideology agrees with the 
agency position. Conservative judges will vote to support conservative agency decisions. 
Liberal judges will vote to support liberal agency decisions.‖ I tested this hypothesis by 
including the judge-ideological-agreement variable in the regression models reported in 
Tables 5.11 through 5.15. In all models, the judge-ideological-agreement variable is not 
statistically significant at p<0.05, so there is no evidence to support this hypothesis. 
Similarly, individual judge votes to support an agency do not appear to be 
affected by an individual judge‘s ideological agreement with the agency. Hypothesis 10 
states, ―D.C. Circuit judges tend to decide cases more consistently with their ideologies 
than judges in other circuits.‖ The results reported in Tables 5.11 through 5.15 include 
the interactive variable, DC x judge ideological agreement. This variable is not 
statistically significant in any of the models, so hypothesis 10 is not supported. 
Panel Ideology May Influence Individual Judge Decisionmaking 
The ideological composition of a review panel may, in some instances, influence 
whether individual judges support agencies in final case decisions. Hypothesis 11 states, 
―Individual judge votes to support agencies are influenced by the ideology of other 
judges on the reviewing panel. If the mean ideology of the review panel is in ideological 
agreement with the agency position, individual judges are more likely to support agencies 
in final case decisions.‖ To test the influence of the ideological composition of a review 
panel on an individual judge‘s decisionmaking, I ran all of the above judge-level models, 
replacing the judge-ideological agreement variable with panel ideological agreement. As 
with the other models, the dependent variable is judge support, which measures whether 
a judge voted to support an agency in the final case decision. All models include one 
legal variable, an ideology variable and variables for the D.C. Circuit. The names of the 
models indicate the legal variable being tested in each. The equations for the models 
being tested are as follows. Note that all the equations are the same except for the specific 
legal variable being tested, and that the only difference between these models and the 
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ones presented earlier in this section is that the judge ideological agreement variable is 
replaced with the panel ideological agreement variable. 
Procedural Adherence Model 
Judge Support for Agency = β0 + β1 (procedural adherence) + β2 (panel 
ideological agreement) + β3 (D.C. Circuit dummy) + β4 (D.C. Circuit 
dummy x legal variable) + β5 (D.C. Circuit dummy x judge ideological 
agreement) + e, where, β0 is the constant, and e is the error term. 
 
Substantial Evidence Model 
Judge Support for Agency = β0 + β1 (substantial evidence) + β2 (panel 
ideological agreement) + β3 (D.C. Circuit dummy) + β4 (D.C. Circuit 
dummy x legal variable) + β5 (D.C. Circuit dummy x judge ideological 
agreement) + e, where, β0 is the constant, and e is the error term. 
 
Arbitrary & Capricious Model 
Judge Support for Agency = β0 + β1 (arbitrary & capricious) + β2 (panel 
ideological agreement) + β3 (D.C. Circuit dummy) + β4 (D.C. Circuit 
dummy x legal variable) + β5 (D.C. Circuit dummy x judge ideological 
agreement) + e, where, β0 is the constant, and e is the error term. 
 
Abuse of Discretion Model 
Judge Support for Agency = β0 + β1 (abuse discretion) + β2 (panel 
ideological agreement) + β3 (D.C. Circuit dummy) + β4 (D.C. Circuit 
dummy x legal variable) + β5 (D.C. Circuit dummy x judge ideological 
agreement) + e, where, β0 is the constant, and e is the error term. 
 
Chevron Deference Model 
Judge Support for Agency = β0 + β1 (Chevron deference) + β2 (panel 
ideological agreement) + β3 (D.C. Circuit dummy) + β4 (D.C. Circuit 
dummy x legal variable) + β5 (D.C. Circuit dummy x judge ideological 
agreement) + e, where, β0 is the constant, and e is the error term. 
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Tables 5.16 through 5.20 report these results. Support for Hypothesis 11 is mixed. 
In the procedural-adherence model (Table 5.16), substantial-evidence model (Table 5.17) 
and arbitrary-and-capricious model (Table 5.18), the panel-ideological-agreement 
variable is not statistically significant at p<0.05. However, panel composition appears to 
have an impact on individual judges‘ votes in the abuse-of-discretion model and 
Chevron-deference model (Tables 5.19 and 5.20). In the latter two models, the 
probability of judge support increases 0.50 and 0.49, respectively, as panel ideological 
agreement moves from its minimum to maximum. Remember that the panel ideological 
agreement variable is a continuous variable, so minimum ideological agreement is the 
observed values closest to negative one, and maximum ideological agreement is the 
observed value closest to positive one. 
It appears that support for Hypothesis 11 depends on the nature of the legal 
questions courts address. As noted in Chapter Four, abuse of discretion and Chevron 
deference are not ―standards of review‖ in the strictest sense of the term. Although they 
function as such, these two ―standards‖ examine more substantive interpretations of 
agency actions, especially Chevron deference. Unlike the substantial-evidence test and 
the arbitrary-and-capricious test, in Chevron-type cases judges first evaluate whether 
agencies provided a reasonable interpretation of statutes based on Congress‘ intent. 
Where statutes are ambiguous, judges then evaluate whether agencies provided a 
reasonable interpretation of statutes. While the levels of deference due to agencies is not 
always clear from one standard to the next, it is at least plausible that more substantive 
reviews of agency actions, such as evaluating whether agencies exceeded their 
Congressionally-granted discretion or whether agencies reasonably interpreted statutes, 
these judgments may leave more room for ideological interpretations. 
Curiously, however, the probability of individual judge support in the D.C. 
Circuit decreases by 0.69 as panel ideological agreement moves from minimum to 
maximum in the Chevron-deference model. This finding is not in the expected direction. 
In substantive terms it means that, in the D.C. Circuit, as panels become more 
ideologically unaligned with agency positions, individual judges are more likely to 
support agencies in final case decisions. I consider these points later in the next chapter. 
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Procedural-Adherence and Standard-of-Review Hypotheses Revisited 
How judges answer legal questions with respect to agencies has a statistically 
significant impact on whether individual judges vote to support agencies. In all models, 
the probability of a judge voting to support an agency increases significantly if the review 
panel answers procedural-adherence and standard-of-review questions favorably toward 
the agency. This is true in all models irrespective of the ideology measures used in the 
model. In the models testing the influence of panel ideological agreement on individual 
judge decisionmaking, the legal variables were all statistically significant. 
These results lend further support to Hypotheses 6 and 8. Hypothesis 6 states, 
―Agency adherence to procedural standards, such as those outlined in the Administrative 
Procedures Act and other related statutes, increases the likelihood that a judge will defer 
to the agency. Agency non-adherence to procedural standards decreases the likelihood 
that a judge will defer to the agency.‖ As shown in the procedural-adherence model 
(Table 5.16), the probability of judge support for agencies in final case decisions 
increases by 0.72 when agencies adhere to procedures. Hypothesis 8 states, ―If a court 
panel answers standard-of-review questions favorably toward an agency, a judge is more 
likely to defer to the agency and vote to support the agency in the final case decision.‖ 
All four of the standard-of-review models support this hypothesis. Where panels answer 
standard-of-review questions favorably toward agencies, the probability of judge support 
in final case decisions increases as little as 0.43 to as much as 0.72. 
In sum, the results reported here suggest that individual judges, like entire review 
panels, appear to be deferential toward agencies based on law and legal doctrine. Unlike 
courts, however, individual judges appear to be influenced by the ideological 
composition of review panels when making these decisions. Remember, the court-level 
results suggest that court decisions to support an agency may not be influenced by the 
ideological composition of the review panel. A judge‘s individual ideological agreement 
with an agency, on the other hand, has no statistically significant impact on whether a 
particular judge votes to support agencies. In the next section, I analyze the results to see 
if these generalizations may also exist in the D.C. Circuit. 
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DO JUDGES BEHAVE DIFFERENTLY IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT? 
Scholars disagree on whether judges and review panels in the D.C. Circuit are 
more political or more deferent than their counterparts in other circuits (Banks 1999; 
Caruson and Bitzer 2004; Edwards 1998; Pierce 1988; Revesz 1999; Willison 1986). 
Court-level analyses suggest that review panels in the D.C. Circuit do not behave 
differently than panels in other circuits. That is, review panels are not any more or less 
political in the D.C. Circuit, nor are they any more or less deferent to agencies. Judge-
level analyses suggest that individual judges in the D.C. Circuit are less likely to support 
agencies in final case decisions. In some instances, these judges appear to be influenced 
by the ideological composition of the review panel and, perhaps other factors, such as 
greater administrative law expertise. 
D.C. Circuit Review Panels Not More Ideological, Maybe More Deferential 
In the present study, sample data show that agencies receive support in the D.C. 
Circuit in about 66% of cases, compared to 64% in the remaining circuits (see Table 4.6 
in Chapter Four). I included a dummy variable for the D.C. Circuit in all of the logistic 
regression models predicting support for agencies. In all of the court-level models, the 
DC variable was never statistically significant. This suggests that review panels in the 
D.C. Circuit are not any more or less inclined to support agencies in final case decisions 
than are review panels in other circuits. 
Hypothesis 5 stated that D.C. Circuit review panels tend to decide cases more 
consistently with panel ideology than review panels in other circuits. To test this 
hypothesis, I included an interactive variable, DC x Panel Ideology, in all the models. 
This variable was never statistically significant in any model. Therefore, I conclude that 
panels in the D.C. Circuit are no more and no less ideological in their outcomes than 
panels in other circuits. 
The variables that measure the interactive effects of the D.C. Circuit and standard-
of-review variables were dropped from each model because they predicted agency 
support perfectly. Recall that there were no observations in the dataset when review 
panels in the D.C. Circuit answered standard-of-review questions favorably toward 
agencies and did not support agencies in final case decisions. While I am unable to 
evaluate whether this behavior is statistically different from review panels in other 
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circuits, it does suggest that D.C. Circuit panels may be more deferential to agencies so 
long as agencies meet the minimum thresholds of deference prescribed by law. 
In the procedural-adherence model, the interactive term, DC x Procedural 
adherence, is not statistically significant. This suggests that review panels in the D.C. 
Circuit are no more and no less inclined to support agencies in final case decisions 
compared to panels in other circuits based on whether an agency followed procedures. 
Again, this suggests that the D.C. Circuit is no more deferential to agencies than other 
circuits. 
Agencies Receive Less Support from Individual Judges in the D.C. Circuit 
I included a dummy variable for the D.C. Circuit in all of the judge-level models. 
Here, the results are surprising. First, in all of the models, coefficients for the D.C. 
variable are always negative. This suggests that D.C. Circuit judges are less inclined to 
support agencies in final case decisions than their counterparts in other circuits. Further, 
the D.C. dummy variable is statistically significant in two of the four standard-of-review 
models—abuse of discretion (p<0.036) and Chevron deference (p<0.027). In the abuse-
of-discretion model, the probability of judge support decreases 0.23. For the Chevron-
deference model, this probability decreases 0.16. The D.C. dummy variable was not 
statistically significant in the substantial-evidence and arbitrary-and-capricious models, 
and neither was it significant in the procedural-adherence model. 
It is unlikely that this decreased probability is due to either ideology or deference, 
since neither of the DC-interactive variables in these models is statistically significant. 
This alternative influence on individual judge decisionmaking may be due to judges in 
the D.C. Circuit developing and retaining greater administrative law expertise, which 
could lead to increased scrutiny of agency actions and less support in final case decisions, 
as some scholars suggest (Banks 1999; Revesz 1997, 1999). 
Are D.C. Circuit judges more ideological? 
Judges in the D.C. Circuit do not appear to be more ideological than judges in 
other circuits. Hypothesis 10 states that D.C. Circuit judges tend to decide cases more 
consistently with their ideologies than judges in other circuits. To test this hypothesis, I 
included in all models an interaction term, DC x judge ideology. This variable was never 
statistically significant in these models. Thus, I conclude that individual judges are no 
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more or less prone to vote according to their ideological preferences than judges in other 
circuits. 
I further tested this hypothesis by including an interactive variable, DC x panel 
ideology, which indicates if individual judge decisionmaking is influenced by the 
ideological composition of the review panel. This interactive term was statistically 
significant in only one model—Chevron deference. Counter-intuitively, however, the 
coefficient for this interactive term is negative. This means that as the panel ideological 
agreement with the agency position increases, the probability of a judge supporting the 
agency decreases. More specifically, as panel ideological agreement moves from its 
minimum (least agreement) to its maximum (most agreement), the probability of a judge 
in the D.C. Circuit voting to support the agency in the final case decision decreases by 
0.69. 
Is the D.C. Circuit less deferential to agencies? 
Scholars suggest that judges in the D.C. Circuit are less deferential to agencies 
because these judges have more administrative law expertise and, therefore, take hard 
looks at these cases (Banks 1999; Revesz 1997, 1999). This study provides limited 
support for such a conclusion. 
First, there is no support for Hypothesis 7, which states that D.C. Circuit judges 
are less likely than judges in other circuits to defer to agencies based on agency 
adherence to procedures. The DC variable is not statistically significant in the 
procedural-adherence model. Therefore, it does not appear that judges in the D.C. Circuit 
are any more or less inclined than other circuits to defer to agencies based on agency 
adherence to procedures. Second, the dummy variable, DC, is negative in all of the 
standard-of-review models. This suggests an overall disinclination for judges in the D.C. 
Circuit to support agencies, which further suggests that these judges may be less 
deferential to agencies than judges in other circuits.  
D.C. Circuit Decisionmaking—Summary 
D.C. Circuit review panels behave essentially the same as review panels in other 
circuits. That is, support for agencies in the D.C. Circuit is a function of deference to 
agencies based on prescribed law. The ideological composition of a review panel appears 
to have no influence on whether agencies receive support. 
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Individual judge behavior in the D.C. Circuit is less clear than panel behavior. 
Overall, D.C. Circuit judges are less inclined to support agencies in final case decisions 
than judges in other circuits in cases where an agency‘s abuse of discretion and 
interpretation of statutes are in question. 
An individual judge‘s decision to support an agency in the D.C. Circuit does not 
depend on whether the judge agrees ideologically with the agency. However, individual 
judges are influenced by the ideological composition of review panels in Chevron-type 
questions, but the relationship is not as expected. In the Chevron-deference model, as the 
panel‘s collective ideological agreement with the agency position increases, the 
probability that an individual judge will vote to support an agency in final case decisions 
decreases. This means that liberal judges tend to support conservative agency decisions, 
and conservative judges tend to support liberal agency decisions. This is counter-
intuitive, and may suggest that the measure actually captures a judge‘s inclination to join 
in unanimous opinions more than it suggests that judges are swayed by ideology. 
Finally, D.C. Circuit judges are no more or less likely to support agencies whether 
or not agencies follow procedures. Agencies that follow procedures can expect support 
from judges in the D.C. Circuit as much as they can expect support from judges in other 
circuits. Likewise, agencies that do not follow procedures are just as likely to receive 
votes of non-support from judges in the D.C. Circuit as they are in other circuits. 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND HYPOTHESES TESTS 
The central research question in the present study asks, ―When agency decisions 
are under review in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, what are the effects of law and ideology 
on judicial decisionmaking?‖ Based on this question, I developed hypotheses aimed at 
testing the extent to which decisionmaking is the U.S. Courts of Appeals is a function of 
law, political ideology, or both. The results of these tests suggest that law matters, to the 
exclusion of judge‘s ideological preferences. In limited circumstances, the ideological 
composition of a panel may also influence case decisions, but never to the exclusion of 
law. 
 Agency Adherence to Procedures is Paramount to Court Support 
As hypothesized, agency adherence to procedural standards increases the 
likelihood that individual judges and review panels will support the agency in final case 
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decisions, and agency non-adherence to procedural standards decreases that likelihood 
(see Hypotheses 1 and 6). If a review panel determines that an agency adhered to 
procedures, the probability of the panel supporting the agency in the final case decision 
increases by 0.75 over instances in which the agency did not follow procedures (see 
Table 5.1). Similarly, the probability of an individual judge voting to support an agency 
in final case decisions increases by 0.75 when agencies adhere to procedures (see Table 
5.11). 
In the procedural adherence models, the ideological composition of the review 
panel does not affect the final outcome of the case. Neither does individual judge 
ideology affect how judges vote in final case decisions. Procedural adherence, then, 
approximates a litmus test for whether individual judges and courts support agencies in 
final case decisions.  
Judges and Courts Defer to Agencies—Standards of Review 
The legal model presupposes certain levels of deference to agencies, depending 
on the standard of review the court uses. As hypothesized, if a court panel answers 
standard-of-review questions favorably toward an agency, individual judges and the 
review panel as a whole are more likely to support the agency in the final case decision 
(see Hypotheses 3 and 8). In all models testing these hypotheses, how courts answered 
standard-of-review questions has a statistically significant association with whether court 
panels support agencies in final case decisions. Where agencies pass standard-of-review 
tests, the probability of courts supporting agencies in final case decisions increases as 
much as 0.81–0.88, depending on the standard of review. For individual judges, this 
probability of support increases as much as 0.44–0.63 when agencies pass standard-of-
review muster. 
Table 5.21 summarizes the probabilities of increased support for agencies for each 
standard of review I examined.
23
 These figures show the change in probability of support 
when a judge (or review panel) answers standard-of-review questions favorably toward 
an agency compared to when a judge (or review panel) answers questions unfavorably. 
If agencies provide substantial evidence to support their decisions, the probability 
of court support increases 0.87. The probability of courts supporting agencies increases 
                                                 
23
 Data for Table 5.21 compiled from Tables 5.2–5.5, 5.12–5.15, and 5.17–5.20. 
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0.88 if agencies are not arbitrary and capricious in their actions and 0.81 if agencies do 
not abuse discretion. When agencies provide reasonable interpretations of statutes, the 
probability of court support increases 0.91. 
For individual judges, the probability of support for agencies in final case 
decisions also increases when agencies pass these standard-of-review tests. The 
probability of judge support increases as little as 0.63 and as much as 0.72 if agencies 
provide substantial evidence to support their actions. When agencies do not act arbitrarily 
or capriciously, the probability of judge support increases about 0.44. This probability of 
support increases about 0.49 if agencies do not abuse discretion and 0.70 if agencies 
interpret statutes reasonably. 
Ideology Yields to Law 
Unlike studies of the Supreme Court showing that support for agencies is a 
function of a justice‘s ideological agreement with agency positions, the present study 
suggests that judge ideology in the circuit courts is not a significant determinant of 
agency support. There is no support for the hypothesis that judges‘ votes will be 
consistent with their own ideologies (see Hypothesis 9). There is little evidence to 
suggest that conservative judges support conservative agency positions and liberal judges 
support liberal agency decisions. While the judge-ideological-agreement variable is 
always statistically significant in bivariate logistic regression models predicting judge 
support for agencies, this ideology variable is never statistically significant in 
multivariate models that contain a legal variable. 
The same is true for courts as a whole. I hypothesized that court panels decide 
cases consistently with the mean ideology of the panel (see Hypothesis 4). However, this 
study does not support that hypothesis. The panel-ideological-agreement variable is never 
statistically significant in logistic regression models when one of the legal variables is 
also present (see Tables 5.1–5.5). Thus, it appears not to be true that liberal panels tend to 
support liberal agency decisions and conservative panels tend to support conservative 
agency decisions. 
In sum, an individual judge‘s ideological agreement with an agency does not 
predict whether the judge will support the agency in final case decisions. Similarly, a 
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panel‘s ideological agreement with an agency does not predict whether a panel will 
support an agency in final case decisions. 
This is not to say, however, that ideology never has any effect on individual judge 
decisionmaking. In two regression models, abuse of discretion and Chevron deference, 
the ideological composition of the review panel affected whether individual judges voted 
to support agencies in final case decisions. In the next chapter, I further examine the 
influence of panel composition on individual judge decisionmaking. 
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TABLES REFERENCED IN CHAPTER FIVE 
Table 5.1 Court Support for Agencies: Procedural-Adherence Model 
 
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p ∆ Pr 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Procedural Adherence 3.89* 0.015 0.75 
 (1.60) 
 
Panel Ideology Agree –1.58 0.639 – 
 (3.36) 
 
DC –1.06 0.506 – 
 (1.59) 
 
DC x Procedural Adherence 0.99 0.629 – 
 (2.05) 
 
DC x Panel Ideology 1.87 0.639 – 
 (3.98) 
 
Constant –1.45 0.207 
 (1.15) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –16.22 
N 54 
LR Chi
2
 38.75 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.001 
Pseudo R
2
 0.54 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
∆Pr Change in probability that a court will support an agency when the independent variable moves from 
its minimum to maximum, with all other variables held constant at their means. 
– ∆Pr not calculated since variable is not statistically significant at p<0.05. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.2 Court Support for Agencies: Substantial-Evidence Model 
 
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p ∆ Pr 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Substantial Evidence 5.59*** 0.001 0.87 
 (0.83) 
 
Panel Ideology Agree 1.17 0.402 – 
 (2.08) 
 
DC 0.86 0.379 – 
 (0.98) 
 
DC x Panel Ideology –2.11 0.593 – 
 (3.94) 
 
Constant –2.55*** 0.001 
 (0.63) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –25.24 
N 123 
LR Chi
2
 106.10 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.001 
Pseudo R
2
 0.68 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
∆Pr Change in probability that a court will support an agency when the independent variable moves from 
its minimum to maximum, with all other variables held constant at their means. 
– ∆Pr not calculated since variable is not statistically significant at p<0.05. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.3 Court Support for Agencies: Arbitrary-and-Capricious Model 
 
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p ∆ Pr 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Arbitrary & Capricious 5.78*** 0.001 0.88 
 (1.29) 
 
Panel Ideology Agree 7.78 0.079 – 
 (4.43) 
 
DC 0.12 0.907 – 
 (1.01) 
 
DC x Panel Ideology –8.31 0.117 – 
 (5.30) 
 
Constant –2.30* 0.016 
 (0.96) 
 
 
Log Likelihood  –15.47 
N 66 
LR Chi
2
 53.09 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.001 
Pseudo R
2
 0.63 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
∆Pr Change in probability that a court will support an agency when the independent variable moves from 
its minimum to maximum, with all other variables held constant at their means. 
– ∆Pr not calculated since variable is not statistically significant at p<0.05. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.4 Court Support for Agencies: Abuse-of-Discretion Model 
 
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p ∆ Pr 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Abuse Discretion 5.23*** 0.001 0.81 
 (1.06) 
 
Panel Ideology Agree 4.32 0.170 – 
 (3.15) 
 
DC 0.69 0.467 – 
 (0.94) 
 
DC x Panel Ideology –4.24 0.276 – 
 (3.89) 
 
Constant –2.01* 0.014   
 (0.82) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –18.12 
N 82 
LR Chi
2
 57.06 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.001 
Pseudo R
2
 0.61 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
∆Pr Change in probability that a court will support an agency when the independent variable moves from 
its minimum to maximum, with all other variables held constant at their means. 
– ∆Pr not calculated since variable is not statistically significant at p<0.05. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.5 Court Support for Agencies: Chevron-Deference Model 
 
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p ∆ Pr 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Chevron Deference 6.12*** 0.001 0.91 
 (0.91) 
 
Panel Ideology Agree 2.18 0.410 – 
 (2.65) 
 
DC –0.51 0.571 – 
 (0.90) 
 
DC x Panel Ideology –1.92 0.547 – 
 (3.20) 
 
Constant –2.44*** 0.001   
 (0.68) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –23.60 
N 132 
LR Chi
2
 123.48 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.001 
Pseudo R
2
 0.72 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
∆Pr Change in probability that a court will support an agency when the independent variable moves from 
its minimum to maximum, with all other variables held constant at their means. 
– ∆Pr not calculated since variable is not statistically significant at p<0.05. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.6 Court Support for Agencies in Procedural-Adherence Questions 
  
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel Ideology Agree 0.32 0.868 
 (1.95) 
 
DC –0.02 0.978 
 (0.60) 
 
DC x Panel Ideology 1.15 0.620 
 (2.31) 
 
Constant 0.75 0.105   
 (0.46) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –38.02 
N 60 
LR Chi
2
 1.65 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.648 
Pseudo R
2
 0.02 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.7 Court Support for Agencies in Substantial-Evidence Questions 
  
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel Ideology Agree 0.24 0.778 
 (0.86) 
 
DC –0.20 0.586 
 (0.37) 
 
DC x Panel Ideology –1.62 0.248 
 (1.41) 
 
Constant 0.69*** 0.001   
 (0.19) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –109.18 
N 171 
LR Chi
2
 2.00 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.573 
Pseudo R
2
 0.01 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
  
172 
 
Table 5.8 Court Support for Agencies in Arbitrary-and-Capricious Questions 
  
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel Ideology Agree –1.94 0.460 
 (2.62) 
 
DC –0.64 0.235 
 (0.54) 
 
DC x Panel Ideology 2.61 0.351 
 (2.80) 
 
Constant 1.02* 0.022   
 (0.44) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –46.64 
N 74 
LR Chi
2
 2.67 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.446 
Pseudo R
2
 0.03 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.9 Court Support for Agencies in Abuse-of-Discretion Questions 
 
  Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel Ideology Agree 1.45 0.298 
 (1.40) 
 
DC –0.29 0.528 
 (0.46) 
 
DC x Panel Ideology –1.55 0.416 
 (1.91) 
 
Constant 1.06*** 0.001   
 (0.32) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –55.96 
N 95 
LR Chi
2
 1.49 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.685 
Pseudo R
2
 0.01 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
  
174 
 
Table 5.10 Court Support for Agencies in Chevron-Deference Questions 
 
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel Ideology Agree 1.16 0.191 
 (0.88) 
 
DC 0.16 0.624 
 (0.33) 
 
DC x Panel Ideology –2.04 0.088 
 (1.19) 
 
Constant 0.47* 0.038   
 (0.23) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –102.67 
N 159 
LR Chi
2
 3.30 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.348 
Pseudo R
2
 0.02 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.11 Judge Support for Agencies: Procedural-Adherence Model 
 
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p ∆ Pr 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Procedural Adherence 4.07*** 0.001 0.75 
 (0.99) 
 
Judge Ideology Agree –0.60 0.658 – 
 (1.35) 
 
DC –0.22 0.807 – 
 (0.91) 
 
DC x Procedural Adherence –1.26 0.263 – 
 (1.13) 
 
DC x Judge Ideology Agree 0.83 0.556 – 
 (1.42) 
 
Constant –1.71* 0.027 
 (0.77) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –77.63 
N 165 
LR Chi
2
 71.29 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.001 
Pseudo R
2
 0.31 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
∆Pr Change in probability that a court will support an agency when the independent variable moves from 
its minimum to maximum, with all other variables held constant at their means. 
– ∆Pr not calculated since variable is not statistically significant at p<0.05. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.12 Judge Support for Agencies: Substantial-Evidence Model 
 
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p ∆ Pr 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Substantial Evidence 3.14*** 0.001 0.63 
 (0.35) 
 
Judge Ideology Agree –0.56 0.250 – 
 (0.49) 
 
DC –0.76 0.263 – 
 (0.67) 
 
DC x Substantial Evidence 2.16* 0.025 0.30 
 (0.97) 
 
DC x Judge Ideology Agree 0.38 0.706 – 
 (1.00) 
 
Constant –1.29*** 0.001 
 (0.26) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –130.97 
N 349 
LR Chi
2
 184.62 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.001 
Pseudo R
2
 0.41 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
∆Pr Change in probability that a court will support an agency when the independent variable moves from 
its minimum to maximum, with all other variables held constant at their means. 
– ∆Pr not calculated since variable is not statistically significant at p<0.05. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.13 Judge Support for Agencies: Arbitrary-and-Capricious Model 
 
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p ∆ Pr 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Arbitrary & Capricious 1.92** 0.002 0.44 
 (0.61) 
 
Judge Ideology Agree –0.12 0.881 – 
 (0.83) 
 
DC –1.26 0.059 – 
 (0.67) 
 
DC x Arbitrary & Capricious 1.02 0.199 – 
 (0.79) 
 
DC x Judge Ideology Agree 0.21 0.821 – 
 (0.92) 
 
Constant –0.69* 0.172 
 (0.50) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –105.23 
N 200 
LR Chi
2
 63.91 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.001 
Pseudo R
2
 0.23 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
∆Pr Change in probability that a court will support an agency when the independent variable moves from 
its minimum to maximum, with all other variables held constant at their means. 
– ∆Pr not calculated since variable is not statistically significant at p<0.05. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.14 Judge Support for Agencies: Abuse-of-Discretion Model 
 
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p ∆ Pr 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Abuse of Discretion 2.32*** 0.001 0.49 
 (0.47) 
 
Judge Ideology Agree 0.90 0.208 – 
 (0.72) 
 
DC –1.19* 0.036 –0.23 
 (0.57) 
 
DC x Abuse of Discretion 1.17 0.108 – 
 (0.73) 
 
DC x Judge Ideology Agree –0.70 0.425 – 
 (0.88) 
 
Constant –0.43 0.214 
 (0.35) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –104.75 
N 241 
LR Chi
2
 87.76 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.001 
Pseudo R
2
 0.30 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
∆Pr Change in probability that a court will support an agency when the independent variable moves from 
its minimum to maximum, with all other variables held constant at their means. 
– ∆Pr not calculated since variable is not statistically significant at p<0.05. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.15 Judge Support for Agencies: Chevron-Deference Model 
 
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p ∆ Pr 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Chevron Deference 3.84*** 0.001 0.70 
 (0.54) 
 
Judge Ideology Agree 1.09 0.111 – 
 (0.69) 
 
DC –1.04* 0.027 –0.16 
 (0.47) 
 
DC x Chevron Deference 0.86 0.248 – 
 (0.75) 
 
DC x Judge Ideology Agree –1.52 0.071 – 
 (0.84) 
 
Constant –0.92*** 0.001 
 (0.27) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –116.28 
N 376 
LR Chi
2
 236.84 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.001 
Pseudo R
2
 0.50 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
∆Pr Change in probability that a court will support an agency when the independent variable moves from 
its minimum to maximum, with all other variables held constant at their means. 
– ∆Pr not calculated since variable is not statistically significant at p<0.05. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.16 Judge Support for Agencies: Procedural-Adherence Model (Panel 
Ideology) 
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p ∆ Pr 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Procedural Adherence 3.72*** 0.001 0.72 
 (0.91) 
 
Panel Ideology Agree –1.38 0.490 – 
 (2.00) 
 
DC –0.52 0.530 – 
 (0.82) 
 
DC x Procedural Adherence –0.96 0.363 – 
 (1.06) 
 
DC x Panel Ideology Agree 2.24 0.301 – 
 (2.16) 
 
Constant –1.31* 0.047 
 (0.66) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –78.86 
N 167 
LR Chi
2
 71.14 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.001 
Pseudo R
2
 0.31 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
∆Pr Change in probability that a court will support an agency when the independent variable moves from 
its minimum to maximum, with all other variables held constant at their means. 
– ∆Pr not calculated since variable is not statistically significant at p<0.05. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.17 Judge Support for Agencies: Substantial-Evidence Model (Panel Ideology) 
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p ∆ Pr 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Substantial Evidence 3.15*** 0.001 0.72 
 (0.35) 
 
Panel Ideology Agree 1.41 0.072 – 
 (0.78) 
 
DC –0.50 0.472 – 
 (0.69) 
 
DC x Substantial Evidence 2.75* 0.022 0.32 
 (1.20) 
 
DC x Panel Ideology Agree 3.91 0.111 – 
 (2.45) 
 
Constant –1.31*** 0.001 
 (0.26) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –127.51 
N 350 
LR Chi
2
 192.36 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.001 
Pseudo R
2
 0.43 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
∆Pr Change in probability that a court will support an agency when the independent variable moves from 
its minimum to maximum, with all other variables held constant at their means. 
– ∆Pr not calculated since variable is not statistically significant at p<0.05. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.18 Judge Support for Agencies: Arbitrary-and-Capricious Model (Panel 
Ideology) 
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p ∆ Pr 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Arbitrary & Capricious 1.86** 0.004 0.43 
 (0.65) 
 
Panel Ideology Agree –0.80 0.682 – 
 (1.96) 
 
DC –1.28 0.057 – 
 (0.67) 
 
DC x Arbitrary & Capricious 1.06 0.193 – 
 (0.82) 
 
DC x Panel Ideology Agree 1.12 0.596 – 
 (2.10) 
 
Constant –0.65 0.204 
 (0.51) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –105.35 
N 201 
LR Chi
2
 64.83 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.001 
Pseudo R
2
 0.24 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
∆Pr Change in probability that a court will support an agency when the independent variable moves from 
its minimum to maximum, with all other variables held constant at their means. 
– ∆Pr not calculated since variable is not statistically significant at p<0.05. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.19 Judge Support for Agencies: Abuse-of-Discretion Model (Panel Ideology) 
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p ∆ Pr 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Abuse of Discretion 2.30*** 0.001 0.48 
 (0.48) 
 
Panel Ideology Agree 2.40* 0.045 0.50 
 (1.20) 
 
DC –1.25* 0.029 –0.24 
 (0.57) 
 
DC x Abuse of Discretion 1.23 0.095 – 
 (0.74) 
 
DC x Panel Ideology Agree –1.54 0.333 – 
 (1.59) 
 
Constant –0.39 0.263 
 (0.35) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –103.62 
N 244 
LR Chi
2
 92.21 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.001 
Pseudo R
2
 0.31 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
∆Pr Change in probability that a court will support an agency when the independent variable moves from 
its minimum to maximum, with all other variables held constant at their means. 
– ∆Pr not calculated since variable is not statistically significant at p<0.05. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.20 Judge Support for Agencies: Chevron-Deference Model (Panel Ideology) 
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p ∆ Pr 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Chevron Deference 3.90*** 0.001 0.70 
 (0.56) 
 
Panel Ideology Agree 2.78* 0.015 0.49 
 (1.14) 
 
DC –1.12* 0.019 –0.17 
 (0.48) 
 
DC x Chevron Deference 0.82 0.283 – 
 (0.77) 
 
DC x Panel Ideology Agree –3.96** 0.005 –0.69 
 (1.40) 
 
Constant –0.88** 0.002 
 (0.28) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –113.75 
N 378 
LR Chi
2
 243.42 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.001 
Pseudo R
2
 0.52 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
∆Pr Change in probability that a court will support an agency when the independent variable moves from 
its minimum to maximum, with all other variables held constant at their means. 
– ∆Pr not calculated since variable is not statistically significant at p<0.05. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5.21 Change in Probability of Agency Support if Court Panels Answer 
Standard-of-Review Questions Favorably toward Agencies 
 
 Individual Judge* Court (Panel) 
 __________________________ __________________________ 
   
Standard ∆ Pr ∆ Pr 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
      
Substantial Evidence 0.63 – 0.72 0.87 
 
Arbitrary & Capricious 0.43 – 0.44 0.88 
 
Abuse of Discretion 0.48 – 0.49 0.81 
 
Chevron Deference 0.70 – 0.70 0.91 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
∆Pr Change in probability that a judge/court will support an agency when standard-of-review questions 
are answered favorably toward the agency compared to the probability of support when these 
questions are not answered favorably, while all other variables are held constant at their means. 
* Values are presented as a range based on the results in two sets of models using different ideology 
measures—judge ideological agreement and panel ideological agreement. 
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CHAPTER 6: WHERE IDEOLOGY MANIFESTS 
 
 
The results of this study provide support for the legal model, and there is little 
support for judges and courts voting consistently with their ideologies.  It is not accurate, 
however, to dismiss ideology entirely as an informant of judge decisionmaking. In the 
last chapter, I noted instances where ideology may impact judicial decisionmaking when 
agency decisions are under review in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Specifically, two 
models show that the ideological composition of a review panel may influence individual 
judge decisionmaking. In this chapter, I examine further the influence of ideology on 
individual judge decisionmaking in the models where panel ideology influences 
individual judge decisionmaking. 
I also consider one additional instance where ideology might manifest—in dissent 
behavior. Although I did not originally hypothesize a relationship between dissent 
behavior and ideology, the results of this research suggested that judges‘ decisions to 
dissent may be ideological decisions. I conclude with two additional hypotheses about the 
relationship between judges‘ political ideologies and their decisions to support (or not 
support agencies) through dissent. These results suggest a statistically significant 
relationship between judges‘ ideologies and judges‘ decisions to dissent. 
PANEL COMPOSITION MAY INFLUENCE INDIVIDUAL JUDGE VOTES, BUT WITHIN LEGAL 
CONSTRAINTS 
The ideological composition of a review panel may affect individual judges‘ 
votes, but it appears that these effects are constrained by law. I hypothesized that 
individual judges are more likely to support agencies in final case decisions where the 
mean ideology of the review panel is in agreement with the agency position. Results for 
this hypothesis are mixed. 
Panel composition does not affect individual judge votes in three models—
procedural adherence, arbitrary and capricious, and substantial evidence.  However, panel 
composition appears to affect individual judge votes in the abuse-of-discretion and 
Chevron-deference models. As noted in Chapter Four, abuse of discretion and Chevron 
deference are not ―standards of review‖ in the strictest sense of the term. Although they 
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function as such, these two ―standards‖ examine more substantive interpretations of 
agency actions, especially Chevron deference. Unlike the substantial-evidence test and 
the arbitrary-and-capricious test, in Chevron-type cases judges first evaluate whether 
agencies provided a reasonable interpretation of statutes based on Congress‘ intent. 
Where statutes are ambiguous, judges then evaluate whether agencies provided a 
reasonable interpretation of statutes. While the levels of deference due to agencies is not 
always clear from one standard to the next, it is at least plausible that more substantive 
reviews of agency actions, such as evaluating whether agencies exceeded their 
Congressionally-granted discretion or whether agencies reasonably interpreted statutes, 
these judgments may leave more room for ideological interpretations. The next sections 
further illustrate the extent to which the ideological composition of a panel influences 
individual judge votes in the abuse-of-discretion and Chevron-deference models. 
Panel Ideology in the Abuse-of-Discretion Model 
In the abuse-of-discretion model predicting individual judge support for agencies, 
both the abuse-of-discretion variable and the panel-ideological-agreement variables are 
statistically significant in the logistic regression model (see Table 5.19 in Chapter Five). 
This suggests that the ideological composition of the review panel may influence how an 
individual judge votes. It also suggests that judges are likely to support agencies that do 
not abuse discretion and the converse—judges are not likely to support agencies that 
abuse discretion. This underscores that ―abuse of discretion‖ is a term of art, rather than a 
rigid test, such that there is space within the standard for ideology to manifest. 
Figure 6.1 shows the impact of an agency abusing discretion and the ideological 
composition of the review panel on the probability of a judge supporting the agency in 
final case decisions. The y-axis indicates the probability of a judge supporting the 
agency, so the scale is zero to one. The x-axis shows the level of agreement between the 
panel and the agency position. Recall that the variable, panel ideological agreement, is a 
continuous variable ranging from negative one (least agreement) to the positive one (most 
agreement). However, the scale for the x-axis is based on observed values, not potential 
values. Therefore, negative one and positive one do not actually appear on x-axis. 
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The top line of the graph shows the probability of judge support when agencies do 
not abuse discretion. The bottom line shows the probability of judge support when 
agencies abuse discretion. 
When the review panel is in least ideological agreement with the agency position, 
the probability that an individual judge will support the agency if it abused discretion is 
0.12, compared to 0.59 when the agency did not abuse discretion. When a panel is in 
greatest ideological agreement with the agency position, the probability of a judge 
supporting an agency is 0.68 or 0.96, depending on whether the agency abused its 
discretion. 
The bottom line in Figure 6.1 also shows that when agencies abuse discretion, 
judges may still support agencies in final case decisions. This could mean, for example, 
that although an agency abused discretion, the judge reached the same conclusion as the 
agency. In instances where agencies abused discretion, the probability of individual 
judges ranges from 0.12 to 0.68, depending on the ideological composition of the panel. 
That is, as panel ideological agreement moves from its minimum to its maximum, the 
probability of an individual judge supporting an agency increases by as much 0.56. 
The top line in Figure 6.4 shows that the probability of judge support can also 
vary when agencies do not abuse discretion. When agencies do not abuse discretion, the 
probability of an individual judge supporting an agency when the review panel is in least 
ideological agreement with the agency position is 0.59. When the review panel is in most 
ideological agreement with the agency, this probability is 0.96. Stated differently, as 
ideological agreement of the panel moves from minimum to maximum, the probability of 
an individual judge supporting the agency increases as much as 0.37. 
The most influence that panel ideology can have on an individual vote is 0.37, 
when agencies do not abuse discretion, compared to 0.59 when agencies abuse discretion. 
This suggests that when agencies do not abuse discretion, there is less space available for 
the ideological composition of the review panel to influence individual judge votes. That 
is, the ideological composition of a review panel may have greater potential to influence 
individual judge decisionmaking when an agency abuses discretion than when an agency 
does not abuse discretion. 
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In sum, panel ideology as an informant of individual judge decisionmaking 
appears to be constrained by the abuse-of-discretion test. If agencies abuse discretion, the 
ideological composition of the panel can potentially have more influence over individual 
judges‘ final votes. The potential for this influence is less when agencies do not abuse 
discretion. 
Panel Ideology in the Chevron-Deference Model 
Similar to the abuse-of-discretion model, the panel-ideological-agreement 
variable is statistically significant in the Chevron-deference model. Recall that the 
Chevron-deference variable captures several legal elements related to how agencies 
interpret statutes.  This includes whether agencies applied correct versions of statutes to a 
case or whether agencies interpreted these statutes correctly, according to the text or plain 
meaning of the statute. While the Administrative Procedure Act and the Chevron decision 
require U.S. Courts of Appeals to extend deference to agencies depending on the 
reasonableness of agency interpretations, there is room for disagreement in interpretation. 
How panels answer these questions with respect to agencies has a statistically significant 
association with individual judges‘ support for agencies, as does the ideological 
composition of the panel (see Table 5.20 for results of the Chevron-deference model). 
Figure 6.2 illustrates the impact of law and panel ideology on the probability of 
individual judges supporting agencies in the Chevron-deference model. Again, the x-axis 
shows the probability of an individual judge supporting an agency, with values ranging 
from zero to one. The y-axis shows the degree of agreement between the mean ideology 
of the review panel and the ideological direction of the agency position. Possible values 
range from negative one to positive one, but the scale of the x-axis represents observed 
values. Negative values indicate less agreement, and positive values indicate more 
agreement. The top line of Figure 6.2 shows the probability of individual judge support 
when review panels answer Chevron-type questions favorably toward agencies. The 
bottom line shows the probability of support when panels answer these questions 
unfavorably toward agencies. 
The top line in Figure 6.2 shows that in cases when courts answer Chevron-type 
questions favorably toward agencies, the probability of an individual judge supporting an 
agency is between 0.77 and 0.99, depending on whether the review panel is in ideological 
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agreement with the agency position. The difference between these two numbers suggests 
that the ideological composition of a review panel can affect the probability of an 
individual judge supporting an agency by as much as 0.22. 
The bottom line in Figure 6.2 also shows that when review panels answer 
Chevron-type questions favorably toward agencies, the probability of individual judge 
support for agencies varies depending on how much ideological agreement there is 
between the review panel and the agency decision. Where panels are in least ideological 
agreement, the probability of judge support is 0.06, compared to 0.62 when panels are in 
most ideological agreement. Stated differently, when agencies do not pass Chevron 
muster, the probability of an individual judge supporting an agency increases as much as 
0.56 if review panel are more ideologically aligned with agency positions. 
Where review panels are in least ideological agreement with agencies, the 
probability of judge support when agencies do not pass Chevron tests is 0.06 compared to 
0.77 when agencies do pass Chevron tests. Similarly, when review panels are in greatest 
ideological agreement with agencies‘ positions, the probability of judge support when 
agencies pass Chevron muster is 0.62 compared to 0.99, otherwise. 
In sum, the Chevron model suggests that there is more room for ideology to 
manifest when agencies do not meet this standard of review. The ideological composition 
of a review panel can influence an individual judge‘s decision as much as 0.56 when 
agencies do not meet Chevron muster, compared to 0.22 when agencies do.  This 
suggests that law constrains ideology. 
The Effects of Panel Ideology—Summary 
The effects of panel ideology on individual judge decisionmaking are 
inconsistent. The panel ideology variable is statistically significant in two models, but not 
in three of them. In the two models where this variable is statistically significant—abuse 
of discretion and Chevron deference—the relationship between panel ideological 
agreement with an agency and the probability of a judge supporting the agency in final 
case decisions is a positive one. That is, as a review panel‘s mean ideology becomes 
more aligned with the ideological direction of the agency position, individual judges are 
more likely to support the agency in final case decisions. This is consistent with past 
research showing that the more ideologically conservative a review panel is, the more 
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likely an individual judge will render a conservative decision; and liberal panels tend to 
foster liberal decisions from individual judges (Sunstein et al. 2004). 
Unlike past research, however, these results suggest that where ideology does 
manifest, it is constrained by law. In the abuse of discretion and Chevron-deference 
models depicted in Figures 6.1 and 6.2, the ideological composition of the review panel 
can influence individual judge votes more when agencies do not pass standard-of-review 
tests. The converse relationship is more revealing: it appears that panel ideology is less 
able to influence judges when agencies pass Chevron-type tests. Ideology appears to 
yield to law and manifests only when there is sufficient space within the law for it to do 
so. 
Remember, however, the ideological composition of a review panel does not 
appear to influence individual judge decisionmaking in three models, including the 
procedural-adherence model. In all models, an agency‘s adherence to procedures and 
meeting minimum thresholds of deference, as prescribed in standards of review, have 
statistically significant associations with individual judges voting to support agencies in 
final case decisions. These finding provide further support for the legal model of judicial 
behavior. 
Consider these findings with the broader perspective of other findings in the 
present research. Panel ideology does not appear to affect court decisions to support an 
agency. Too, an individual judge‘s ideology does not appear to affect his/her decision to 
support an agency. However, in some circumstances, the collective ideology of a review 
panel may influence whether an individual judge supports an agency. 
DOES IDEOLOGY PREDICT DISSENT BEHAVIOR? 
In the data and methods chapter, I noted several descriptive behavioral patterns in 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals when agency decisions are under review. Ninety percent of 
court decisions are unanimous. Also, 53% of the judges in the sample are conservative 
and 47% are liberal. It is not feasible for judges to vote consistently with their ideologies 
and to achieve unanimity in 90% of cases. This suggests that ideology yields to other 
factors in individual judges‘ decision-making calculi. Results of the analysis support this 
conclusion and suggest that these other factors are legal factors—legally prescribed 
procedural adherence and standards of review. 
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It is feasible, however that ideology could manifest in the 10% of non-unanimous 
cases. To provide context for this proposition, consider the results discussed in the 
previous sections of this chapter. The ideological composition of a review panel has no 
statistically significant relationship to whether the review panel decides to support an 
agency in final case decisions. Similarly, a judge‘s own ideological agreement with an 
agency is not a statistically significant predictor of whether that judge supports the 
agency in final case decisions. In some circumstances, however, the ideological 
composition of a review panel may influence individual judge decisionmaking. The latter 
point may suggest that in addition to ideology, there may be norms of collegiality in the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals that fuel consensus and unanimity in decisionmaking. In the ten 
percent of cases where a judge deviates from these norms, it may be because of a judge‘s 
ideological disagreement. 
Although ideology does not appear to account for a substantial portion of judicial 
decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, there may be a relationship between 
ideology and judges‘ decisions to dissent. That is, if judges have an overall inclination to 
support agencies based on legally prescribed deference, it could still be that a decision to 
dissent from the majority is an ideological decision. 
Rather than leaving this to speculation, I posit two additional hypotheses, 
notwithstanding their ad hoc nature. These hypotheses are based on a judge‘s decision to 
dissent with respect to supporting agencies. I argue that a judge‘s dissent from the 
majority suggests one of the following: the judge prefers to support the agency when the 
majority does not support the agency, or the judge prefers not to support the agency when 
the majority prefers otherwise. This leads to the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 12: A judge is more likely to dissent from majority support for 
agencies when he/she is in ideological disagreement with the agency 
position. (H12) 
Hypothesis 13: A judge is more likely to dissent from majority non-
support for agencies when he/she is in ideological agreement with the 
agency position. (H12) 
At the risk of stating the obvious, dissent, by its nature, is an individual judge 
behavior. Therefore, the unit of analysis for testing these hypotheses is individual judge. 
Using variables already coded in the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database, I constructed a 
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dichotomous dependent variable, judge dissent, which is coded as one if the judge 
dissented and zero, otherwise.
24
  
To test Hypotheses 12 and 13, I developed a simple regression model with two 
independent variables that predict dissent. The first variable, judge ideology agree, is the 
same variable I used in the previous chapters. It is a continuous variable, ranging from 
negative one to positive one. Negative values indicate the least amount of agreement 
between the judge and the ideological position of the agency; positive values indicate the 
most agreement. Second, I include a dummy variable for the D.C. Circuit, since other 
scholars have suggested that judges in the D.C. Circuit may be more political than judges 
in other circuits. The dissent model is as follows. 
Judge Dissent = β0 + β1 (judge ideological agreement) + β2 (D.C. Circuit 
dummy) + e, where, β0 is the constant and e is the error term. 
  
Depending on whether the majority supports the agency‘s position, a judge‘s 
dissent can mean one of two things. Either it means that the judge is in ideological 
disagreement with the agency if the majority supports the agency, or it means that the 
judge is in ideological agreement with the agency if the majority does not support the 
agency. Since dissent can mean these two different things, I examine cases when the 
majority supported the agency separately from cases when the majority did not support 
the agency. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, logistic regression is an 
appropriate tool to estimate the models. Again, I use data from the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals Database from 1982–2002. Table 6.1 reports the results of the regression model 
in cases where the majority supported the agency. This model corresponds to and tests 
Hypothesis 12. Table 6.2 reports the result of the logistic regression model in cases where 
the majority did not support the agency. This corresponds to and tests Hypothesis 13. 
As hypothesized, it appears that ideology affects a judge‘s decision to dissent. In 
both of the models reported in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, the judge ideological agreement 
variable is statistically significant at conventional levels. The D.C. Circuit variable is not 
statistically significant in either model. 
                                                 
24
 I coded this variable based on the jXmaj1 variables in the in the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database, where 
X indicates whether the judge was number 2, 3, … ,16 on the review panel. A value of ―2‖ for these 
variables indicates that a judge dissented from the majority.  
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Hypothesis 12 states, ―A judge is more likely to dissent from majority support for 
agencies when he/she is in ideological disagreement with the agency position.‖ Results in 
Table 6.1 support this hypothesis since the judge ideological agreement variable is 
statistically significant at 0.003 and since the coefficient for this variable is negative. A 
negative coefficient means that the probability of a judge dissenting decreases as his or 
her ideological agreement with the agency increases. Stated differently, the negative 
coefficient means that in cases where the majority supported the agency, the probability 
of a judge dissenting increases when the judge is in least ideological agreement with the 
agency position. This relationship is expected. If the attitudinal model is correct, we 
would expect judges to vote with the majority when the majority supports the agency and 
when the judge is in ideological agreement with the agency. We would expect a judge to 
dissent in these cases only if the judge were in ideological disagreement with the agency. 
As ideological agreement moves from its minimum (least agreement) to its maximum 
(most agreement), the probability of a judge dissenting decreases by 0.06 (Pr∆ = –0.06). 
Hypothesis 13 is also supported. Where the majority does not support the agency 
(Table 6.2), the judge ideological agreement variable is positive and significant at 
p<0.001. As judge ideological agreement moves from its minimum (least agreement) to 
its maximum (most agreement), the change in the probability that a judge will dissent is 
0.13. That is, the probability of dissent increases as much as 0.13 when the judge is in 
ideological agreement with the agency. This supports Hypothesis 13. 
Influence of Ideology on Dissent Behavior is Minimal 
Results of testing Hypotheses 12 and 13 suggest that ideology may influence 
judges‘ decisions to support or not support agencies through dissent. These results, 
however, appear to have minimal influence on a judge‘s decisionmaking. The maximum 
influence in the probability of dissent is only 0.06 in cases where the majority supports 
agencies and 0.13 in cases where the majority does not support agencies. 
These results may also be limited, since the specified regression model does not 
include a legal variable. The above hypotheses suggest that the reason for a judge‘s 
dissent is because of ideological (dis)agreement with the agency, or lack thereof. If the 
legal model is true, a judge‘s reason for dissenting might also be based on disagreement 
with the majority on an interpretation of law. Given the nature of the data in the U.S. 
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Courts of Appeals Database, I am unable to test the effects of law on a judge‘s decision to 
dissent. The legal variables used in this study, procedural adherence and standards of 
review, are coded only at the court level. The abuse-of-discretion variable, for example, 
indicates only how the court answered the question of agency abuse of discretion. There 
is no variable in the database indicating how individual judges answered these legal 
questions. Therefore, I am unable to test the legal implications that may inform an 
individual judge‘s decision to dissent. This means that the influence of ideology on 
dissent behavior may be overstated, since there are no legal variables in the models. 
WHERE DOES IDEOLOGY MANIFEST? 
Results of this study show that judicial decisionmaking in administrative law 
questions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals is largely informed by law and legal standards. In 
limited circumstances, ideology may affect individual judge decisionmaking. 
Specifically, a judge may be swayed by the ideologies of his/her fellow judges on a 
review panel. This occurs in only two types of cases—Chevron deference and abuse of 
discretion, both of which are standards of review that may leave more room for 
reasonable judges to disagree. This reasonable disagreement may be based on judges‘ 
political ideologies. Thus, two ideologically like-minded judges on the same panel may 
be able to persuade the third judge to put aside his/her ideology in order to form a 
unanimous decision. In this regard, the ideology of two judges influences the behavior of 
a third judge. 
An individual judge‘s ideological agreement with an agency‘s position may 
influences whether a judge will dissent in a case. Where the majority on a review panel 
supports an agency, judges in most ideological disagreement with the agency are 0.05 
more likely to dissent. Where the majority does not support an agency, the probability of 
a judge dissenting (i.e., supporting the agency) increases by 0.12. These changes in 
probability are statistically significant, but substantively small. 
While it may be intuitive that a judge in ideological disagreement with other 
judges on the review panel is more likely to dissent, the results of this study suggest that 
the ideological composition of a review panel sometimes may influence individual judges 
to depart from their own ideological preferences. The models testing judge dissent do not 
include legal variables to test whether a judge disagreed with fellow judges because of a 
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point of law. Therefore, I am cautious not to overstate the influence of ideology on 
dissent behavior. 
Finally, in all models predicting individual judge support for agencies, the legal 
variables are always statistically significant. Even in the two models where the ideology 
variables are statistically significant, the legal variables are also significant. Further, the 
magnitudes of the legal variable coefficients are much greater than the ideology variable 
coefficients. In sum, it appears that ideology manifests minimally in judicial 
decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals when agency decisions are under review. 
This minimal manifestation may be due to legal constraints and, perhaps, collegial norms 
of consensus, both of which appear to contribute to the large number of unanimously 
decided cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. 
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TABLES REFERENCED IN CHAPTER SIX 
 
Table 6.1 Judge Dissent from Majority Support for Agencies 
 
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p ∆ Pr 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Judge Ideology Agree –1.33** 0.003 –0.06 
 (0.45) 
 
DC 0.07 0.853 – 
 (0.37) 
 
Constant –3.40 0.001 
 (0.26) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –130.76 
N 838 
LR Chi
2
 10.21 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.006 
Pseudo R
2
 0.04 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
∆Pr Change in probability that a court will support an agency when the independent variable moves from 
its minimum to maximum, with all other variables held constant at their means. 
– ∆Pr not calculated since variable is not statistically significant at p<0.05. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 6.2 Judge Dissent from Majority Non-Support for Agencies 
 
 Coef. 
Independent Variable (S.E.) p ∆ Pr 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Judge Ideology Agree 2.06*** 0.001 0.13 
 (0.63) 
 
DC –0.26 0.574 – 
 (0.46) 
 
Constant –2.96 0.001 
 (0.31) 
 
 
Log Likelihood –82.13 
N 417 
LR Chi
2
 13.73 
Prob > Chi
2
 0.001 
Pseudo R
2
 0.07 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
∆Pr Change in probability that a court will support an agency when the independent variable moves from 
its minimum to maximum, with all other variables held constant at their means. 
– ∆Pr not calculated since variable is not statistically significant at p<0.05. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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FIGURES REFERENCED IN CHAPTER SIX 
Figure 6.1 Effects of Panel Ideology on Judge Vote: Abuse-of-Discretion Model 
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Figure 6.2 Effects of Panel Ideology on Judge Vote: Chevron-Deference Model 
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CHAPTER 7: TOWARD A MORE COMPLETE MODEL OF JUDICIAL 
DECISIONMAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 
 
 
The aim of this research is to determine the extent to which support for federal 
agencies in the U.S. Courts of Appeals is a function of deference, as prescribed by law, 
and a function of judges‘ ideological agreement with agency positions. As a study of 
judicial decisionmaking, the primary research question asks, ―When agency decisions are 
under review in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, what are the effects of law and ideology on 
judicial decisionmaking?‖ Beyond the research question, this study is concerned with 
constructing a more accurate model of judicial decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals. 
CONSTRUCTING A MODEL OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 
Any accurate model of judicial decisionmaking should assess the effects of both 
law and politics in judges‘ decision-making calculi. A model of judicial decisionmaking 
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals must also account for the high number of unanimously 
decided cases and the high success rates of agencies. In the present study, the Courts of 
Appeals support federal agencies about 65% of the time. Also, courts decide about 90% 
of these cases unanimously; only 10% contain dissents. The latter statistic necessarily 
limits quantitative analyses because of the concomitant need for observable variation in 
statistical models. Constructing a model that accounts for unanimity 90% of the time is 
simple, but testing these models becomes difficult without considerable observational 
variation. 
Legal Model Prescribes and Explains Judicial Decisionmaking 
A legal model requires particular specification. That is, there is no single legal 
model; rather, there are many legal models, which should be specified according to 
different elements of law. For some researchers, the elements of law could be, for 
example, stare decisis (see Segal and Spaeth 2002). In the present study, I specify a legal 
model of the U.S. Courts of Appeals‘ reviews of federal agency decisions, which focuses 
on legally prescribed agency procedures and legally prescribed deference through various 
standards of review. As a normative model, this legal model prescribes that judges and 
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courts defer to agencies under certain circumstances. As an empirical model, this legal 
model also explains why agencies receive high levels of support in the courts of appeals 
and also why the vast majority of cases are decided unanimously. Further, this legal 
model may predict case outcomes since over two-thirds of cases result in support for 
agencies‘ decisions. 
As the results of this study suggest, agency adherence to procedures appears to be 
a litmus test for agency support. The probability of circuit courts and judges rendering 
agency-favorable decisions increases by 0.75 where agencies adhere to procedures, such 
as notice and comment requirements, acquiring information, providing information, and 
adequately developing a record upon which the agency‘s decision is based. Where 
agencies adhere to procedures, courts support agencies in 91% of final case decisions, 
and judges vote to support agencies 83% of the time. 
In addition to agency procedural adherence, legally prescribed standards of 
review also appear to serve as a mechanism for U.S. Courts of Appeals to defer to 
agencies. Depending on the standard of review used in a case, agencies that successfully 
pass the court‘s tests for these standards can expect to receive support in final case 
decisions from 88%–100% of the time. In this regard, the U.S. Courts of Appeals are akin 
to the U.S. Supreme Court. As Canon and Giles found in their Supreme Court study, 
―agencies which meet certain criteria more or less traditionally associated with the 
concept of due process of law (e.g., proper notice, impartial hearing, decisions made in 
accordance with ascertainable evidentiary rules or standards, etc.) are supported by the 
Court and those which often fail to meet such standards are not supported‖ (1972). 
Attitudinal Model Predicts Decisionmaking Only Minimally 
It is not apparent from this study that the attitudinal model predicts court 
decisionmaking very well, but judges‘ attitudes, namely their political ideologies, may 
influence individual judge decisionmaking, especially judges‘ decisions to dissent in a 
case. Unlike the results in Supreme Court studies, it does not appear that judges‘ 
ideological agreement with agency positions is a precursor to agency support in final case 
decisions on questions of substance (cf. Crowley 1987; Sheehan 1992). 
While some scholars argue that court answers to legal questions (i.e., the language 
in their opinions) rationales for the courts‘ policy preferences, and, subsequently, that 
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courts answer legal questions according to the review panel‘s ideological preferences 
(Cross 2007; Humphries and Songer 1999), the results of this study suggest otherwise. 
The mean ideology of a review panel is statistically related to how courts answer these 
procedural and standard-of-review tests. It does not appear that passing these legal tests is 
a function of judge‘s ideological preferences. Similarly, where courts examine more 
substantive legal questions—for example, if agencies applied an appropriate 
interpretation of a statute, as in Chevron‘s step two—these court decisions appear to turn 
on questions of law and not on judges‘ ideological predilections. 
Similarly, in judge-level analyses, whether a judge votes to support an agency in 
legal questions does not appear to depend on whether the judge is in ideological 
agreement with the agency. However, an individual judge may be swayed, in limited 
circumstances, by the ideological preferences of fellow judges on a review panel. There 
is limited support in the present study and I argue that this sway may represent the 
collegial nature of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, where judges set aside their own 
ideological preferences in favor of norms of professional harmony and clarity of law. 
Alternatively, judges may set aside ideology in compromise; a judge who may prefer a 
different outcome may choose to join the majority in exchange for a more narrowed 
scope in the opinion. Although the results of this study cannot conclusively explain why 
an individual judge is sometimes swayed by other judges‘ ideologies, this research does 
suggest, in nearly all empirical tests, where individual judges may be influenced by 
fellow panel members, the influence is appears to constrained by law—agency adherence 
to procedures, legal standards requiring judicial deference, and agencies correctly 
applying and interpreting law. In short, the instances of ideology influencing individual 
judge decisionmaking are minimal when agency decisions are under review, and these 
instances are tempered by what the law allows. 
Panel Effects and Role Theory 
The results of this study suggest that individual judge decisionmaking may be 
influenced by fellow judges on the review panel. The ideological composition of a review 
panel sometimes influences the direction of an individual judge‘s vote; however, whether 
this influence is a function of ideology or other panel influences is not borne out in the 
present study. Future studies should examine not only the ideological influence of panel 
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composition, but also professional norms and role perceptions, such as the desire for 
unanimity, that inform judicial decisionmaking. 
Results in the present study suggest that agreement by two judges on a review 
panel compels agreement by the third judge, en banc cases notwithstanding. Also, judges 
dissent in only 10% of cases. This study did not explore whether the high levels of 
unanimity are a function of clear law or other reasons. It is plausible that where two 
judges agree, the third judge‘s decision to join the majority may not be for ideological 
reasons. Three of the five judge level models suggest that this may be true. The third 
judge 1) may defer to his/her cohorts on the panel out of professional courtesy or 2) may 
desire to join his/her cohorts to form a unanimous decision in order to promote greater 
court legitimacy. These notions are not tested in the present study, but these ideas suggest 
that the roles individual judges adopt for themselves may influence their decisions. This 
is role theory. 
Role theory has fallen out of vogue in the judicial behavior literature, and this is 
likely because of the difficulty in empirically measuring judge‘s role perceptions. J. 
Woodford Howard suspected that the attitudinal model is oversimplified because it does 
not account for intuitional constraints and judges‘ own role perceptions (Howard Jr. 
1973, 1977, 1981). For similar reasons, the legal model in the present study may also be 
oversimplified. The assumption in the present study is that judges defer to agencies 
according to prescribed legal doctrine; however, this deference may be overstated, 
depending on how judges view their judicial roles. Future scholars should explore new 
ways to measure elements of role theory in an effort to understand more fully the effects 
of judges‘ role perceptions, including collegiality in three-judge review panels. 
Deference as Part of the Legal Model 
Deference is an inherent part of the legal model, since both statutes and common 
law prescribe deference. Prescribed law comes from statutes that conditionally require 
courts to defer to agencies, such as in the Administrative Procedure Act. Prescribed 
deference also comes from the Supreme Court, such as in Chevron, which essentially 
requires courts to defer to agencies so long as agency actions are reasonable. These legal 
prescriptions suggest that the U.S. Courts of Appeals should defer to the policy 
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preferences of other institutions, including Congress, the Supreme Court, and federal 
agencies. This is institutional deference. 
Institutional deference not only accounts for the high levels of success agencies 
have in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, it also accounts for the high levels of unanimous 
decisions in these courts. Thus, models of judicial decisionmaking should account for 
institutional deference. The present study does not precisely distinguish the specific 
institutions to which the U.S. Courts of Appeals defer. In the Chevron-deference models, 
one might argue that support for agencies is a function of judges deferring to the Supreme 
Court, as measured by courts observing the principle of stare decisis. One might also 
argue that support for agencies in these cases is a manifestation of courts deferring to 
Congress, where courts preserve Congressional intent based on evaluations of the plain 
meaning of statutory text. Further, in these same sets of cases, agency support could be 
deference to agencies if agency actions are reasonable ones. Future scholarly inquiry into 
institutional deference should examine case opinions more closely and code more 
specifically the institutions to which courts do or do not defer. 
This study measures only institutional deference, but further inquiry into other 
dimensions of deference should be explored. For example, not only do courts defer to 
agencies‘ reasonable interpretations of vague statutes, as prescribed by Chevron, but 
courts might also defer to agencies based on agencies‘ technical expertise. While the 
distinction between institutional deference and expertise deference is subtle, the former 
requires deference based on agency authority, and the latter persuades deference based 
on agency expertise. Future inquiry may also want to further conceptualize and measure 
other types of deference. 
Balancing Obsequious Deference and Intense Scrutiny 
Judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals comment on the balance that judges must 
find between adhering to legally prescribed deference to agencies and making their 
reviews of agency actions meaningful and substantive ones (Bazelon 1976; Edwards 
1998, 2003; Scalia 1978, 1989; Wald 1996). In her assessment of judicial review of 
agency actions under the first fifty years of the Administrative Procedure Act, Patricia 
Wald, Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit from 1986-1991, acknowledged the courts‘ 
struggles to meaningfully scrutinize agency actions without encroaching into the 
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policymaking functions of the two political branches of government (1996). Regardless 
of the standard of review that courts use, Wald suggests that judges should provide 
meaningful scrutiny without acting like bulls in the agency china shop (1996). The results 
of this study suggest that judicial decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals may be a 
manifestation of judges balancing obsequious deference and overreaching into executive 
administration.  
Regardless of the standard of review used in a case—substantial evidence, 
arbitrary and capricious, abuse of discretion, or Chevron deference—there is little 
evidence to suggest that courts‘ decisions are driven by judges‘ ideological preferences. 
Rather, it appears that judges and courts review agencies‘ actions based on prescribed law 
and legal doctrine. While scholars, judges and other players in the administrative process 
may continue to debate whether the appropriate scope of review is extreme deference or 
intense scrutiny, it appears that judges find this balance without interjecting their personal 
policy preferences into the equation, at least as much as personal policy preferences are 
represented by judges‘ ideologies. 
JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT 
As the circuit that reviews about 40% of federal agency actions, the D.C. Circuit 
does not appear to be any more or less deferential or ideological than other circuits. This 
is not to say, however, that judges in the D.C. Circuit do not defer to agencies and are not 
political. Instead, the results of this study underscore Banks‘ conclusion: 
[T]he decisions of the D.C. Circuit are not solely the product of judicial 
politics. Empirical analysis of the court‘s access decisions and its 
approach to judicial deference to agencies‘ cases … indicate that judicial 
behavior is more complex than that and is accordingly affected by a 
variety of nonideological factors. Social scientists studying courts 
sometimes fall into the trap of believing that political considerations 
exclusively drive court outcomes. This may not be true. Political ideology 
is an important, but not an omnipotent, element in affecting D.C. Circuit 
policymaking. Quite simply, the law counts, too (Banks 1999,  p. 86). 
The results of this study differ from Banks‘ conclusion only in the emphasis 
placed on the role of ideology and the role of law in judicial decisionmaking. Banks 
suggests that political ideology is important but not omnipotent. The results of the present 
study support this conclusion, but go further: political ideology may be important, but not 
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as important as law in certain kinds of cases. The results from this study may merit an 
alternate conclusion: law is important but not omnipotent. Political ideology manifests 
only where there is sufficient room in the law for it to do so. Contrarily, law is 
statistically significant in all regression models, and none of the analyses in this study 
suggest that law yields to ideology. 
Even in cases where ideology does manifest, law is the predominant predictor of 
whether courts and judges support agencies in final case decisions. In the D.C. Circuit, as 
in other circuits, the probability of agency support increases substantially when judges 
perceive that agencies adhere to procedures and prescribed law. Comparatively, agency 
support is substantially less based on a judges‘ ideological agreement with agencies. This 
suggests that law plays a more prominent role in judicial decisionmaking than past 
scholars, including Banks, suggest. 
Hard-Look Approaches to Judicial Review in the D.C. Circuit 
The results of the present study cannot rule out the existence of hard-look 
approaches to judicial review in the D.C. Circuit; however, the data suggest that if hard-
look review occurs, judges‘ final outcomes are not markedly different from agencies‘ 
outcomes. There are no instances in which a D.C. Circuit panel answered standard-of-
review questions favorably toward an agency but did not support the agency in final case 
decisions. This suggests that if hard-look criteria exist in the D.C. Circuit, as scholars 
suggest is true in certain periods (Wald 1996), these hard-looks may not result in 
decreased support for agencies in final case decisions. 
The hard-look approach to judicial review and institutional deference are at odds. 
The hard-look approach suggests that if courts arrive at the same outcome as agencies, it 
is because of independent scrutiny that compels such a result. Institutional deference, on 
the other hand, suggests that courts should arrive at the same outcome as agencies 
because prescribed standards of review, such as Chevron deference, compel judges to 
leave agency decisions intact so long as the agency is acting reasonably. 
D.C. Circuit review panels did not support agencies 33% of the time. But, when 
review panels determined agencies did not meet procedural or standard-of-review muster, 
support for agencies in final case decisions still occurred in as much as 16% of cases, 
depending on the standard of review used. Where D.C. Circuit panels determined 
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agencies did not follow procedures, support for agencies in final case decisions still 
occurred in 7% of cases. 
These results suggest that if deference exists in the D.C. Circuit, it may not be 
obsequiously extended. However, these results cannot fully disentangle hard-look 
approaches from institutional deference. Future scholars may want to consider more fully 
whether hard-look approaches exists in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, especially the D.C. 
Circuit, and if so, whether these approaches results in reversals of agency decisions. 
TOWARD A MORE COMPLETE MODEL OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS 
OF APPEALS 
At the beginning of this chapter, I noted that any model of judicial 
decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals must account for the great percentage of 
unanimous cases and the relatively high rates of agency success in these courts. The legal 
model satisfies these requirements. The law explicitly calls for deference to agencies. In 
limited circumstances, such as the decision to dissent, the attitudinal model may also help 
predict judicial decisionmaking. The present study focuses on two models of judicial 
behavior—attitudinal and legal—but there are other models that contribute to the judicial 
behavior literature. 
Future studies of judicial decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals will 
benefit from continued examination of other models. Nancy Maveety summarizes the 
importance of historical-institutionalist approaches by suggesting ―institutionally 
constituted norms, powers and preferences matter because they inform behavior, but they 
also reconstitute the institutional context in which actors act,‖ (2003 285). Further, she 
suggests: 
Informed by the ways in which past actions and institutions constitute the 
powers and preferences of agents in contemporary politics, this approach 
seeks to discern patterns of historical evolution and political development 
that demonstrate that conscious, jurisprudential decisions of judicial actors 
matter, that they can reshape structural contexts and thus shape future 
decisions (2003 285). 
The strategic model, as an extension of the attitudinal model, suggests that judges 
act strategically to achieve their policy preferences. The most prominent strategic studies 
examine the Supreme Court and suggest that justices‘ decisions to grant or deny certiorari 
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are made strategically based on justices preferred policy positions (Epstein and Knight 
1998). For example, a justice may vote to deny certiorari for a particular case if he/she 
believes a majority of justices may decide the case on the merits in a way not preferable 
to him/her. 
Neither legal theorists nor political theorists entirely abandon historical-
institutional factors or strategic ones as important to judicial research. Instead, many 
political science scholars couch their research in these perspectives (Dahl 1957; Epstein 
and Knight 1998; Pritchett 1948; Shapiro 1964, 1968, 1988). It may be true, however, 
that legal scholars do a somewhat better job than political scientists at capturing the 
nuances of court norms and the impact of other branches of government in the judicial 
process (see, for example, Molot 2000). Therefore, not only should future judicial 
behavior studies consider these competing models, but they should also continue to look 
to legal scholarship to conceptualize elements of these models more fully. 
The Breadth and Depth of Court Actions—Beyond Yes and No 
As Martin Shapiro warned, ―The persistent tendency of American political 
analysis to either view the courts as a great dictator or dismiss them as powerless, or do 
both at once, is partly due to a failure to appreciate that the courts are not confined to a 
simple yes or no,‖ (Shapiro 1968). At best, the present study may inch the discipline 
beyond considering only the dichotomous yes-no outcomes of court decisions, but it still 
falls short of considering the full extent of court power and authority. Courts can exercise 
considerable or little influence over agencies simply through the timing, breadth, and 
ambiguity of their actions (Shapiro 1968, pp. 269-70). If we are to understand fully the 
nature of the relationship between courts and agencies, future scholars will benefit from 
examining the range of tools that courts and agencies have at their disposal to wield 
authority. 
Shapiro and earlier court scholars moved the study of courts further out of the 
realm of public law and into politics, and concomitantly toward quantitative 
measurement. The attitudinalists systematically developed methods to measure political 
influence. In the debate over the best approach to scientific inquiry, Shapiro suggested 
the legal community would embrace any useful information about its profession 
regardless of whether the method of inquiry were qualitative or quantitative, or whether 
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this information were informed by political scientists or other social science professionals 
(Shapiro 1964, p. 7). The present study quantifies some of the content of court opinions 
as an indicator of the influences on judicial decisionmaking, but these efforts still lack the 
breadth of consideration that Shapiro suggested is needed. Moving beyond 
dichotomously coded variables, such as support and nonsupport for agencies, is still 
needed. This may mean further embracing mixed methods to court inquiry, which should 
include developing new methods of measuring the impact of court opinions. 
Court-Agency Partnerships 
The legal model suggests that courts defer to agencies. The attitudinal model 
suggests courts do not consider agency preferences in their reviews. Extant judicial 
behavior scholarship, including the present study, has not considered fully, however, the 
degree to which courts may be interacting with agencies in a collaborative sense, as 
Horowitz (1994) suggests. Political science scholars as early as Pritchett framed the 
relationship between courts and agencies as a partnership (Pritchett 1948). He notes, ―A 
controlling philosophy which sees ‗court and agency‘ as coworkers for the attainment of 
a common aim requires that the courts limit themselves to those functions which they are 
better fitted than the agencies to perform‖ (p. 172).  Pritchett goes on to underscore the 
Roosevelt Court‘s acknowledgement of agency expertise and competence that the Court 
does not have. (p. 172). One opinion authored by Justice Harlan Stone particularly 
summarizes Pritchett‘s assessment of this court-agency relationship: 
In construing a statute setting up an administrative agency and providing 
for judicial review of its action, court and agency are not to be regarded as 
wholly independent and unrelated instrumentalities of justice, each acting 
in the performance of its prescribed statutory duty without regard to the 
appropriate function of the other in securing the plainly indicated objects 
of the statute. Court and agency are the means adopted to attain the 
prescribed end … neither can rightly be regarded as an alien intruder, to be 
tolerated if must be, but never to be encouraged or aided by the other in 
the attainment of the common aim (Justice Harlan Fiske Stone quoted in 
Pritchett 1948, p. 172). 
Further, Pritchett concludes: 
In comparison to its predecessors, then, the Roosevelt Court has been 
responsible for markedly a different attitude toward administrative 
agencies, which are no longer treated as ―alien intruders‖ in the courts. … 
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The Court appears conscientiously to have attempted to follow its 
announced polity of serving as ―co-worker‖ with the administration in the 
attainment of legislative goals. It may have swerved now to this side and 
now to the other side of that line. There may have been on occasions 
immoderate exaltation of the administrative agency and undue deprecation 
of judicial authority. But on other occasions, the worm has turned, 
producing decisions which have expanded judicial authority in entirely 
new directions. In a recent decision the Court thought it well to give notice 
that it does not intend to become a mere junior partner with the 
bureaucracy, reminding that ―Courts no less than administrative bodies are 
agencies of government. Both are instruments for realizing public 
purposes.‖
25
 Left and right may disagree as to the public purposes in 
behalf of which the courts should intervene, but both agree that judicial 
powers must be maintained adequate to protect their respective values 
against administrative attack (pp. 196-97). 
The relationship that Pritchett describes between the Roosevelt Court and federal 
agencies may also exist between modern U.S. Courts of Appeals and federal agencies. 
Circuit court judges also speak in the language of partnership.  Judge Bazelon, in 
reference to a ―new partnership,‖ called for agencies and the courts to work 
collaboratively in their joint endeavor to provide fair implementation of public policies 
(1976). Judge Wald comments that the D.C. Circuit is sensitive to the impact of its 
decisions on administrative issues and, in particular, budget issues (1996). 
Other scholars—in particular, public administration scholars—note the tendency 
of courts to be sensitive to the flexibility that is required by agencies to make their routine 
complex decisions (Cooper 1985; Melnick 1985; O'Leary and Wise 1991; Yarbrough 
1985). One view, in light of the present study, could be to view this sensitivity to 
flexibility as a form of deference. Deference may be a part of partnership, but it is not the 
entire story. Some scholars view this partnership in a positive light, suggesting that 
although a natural tension exists between courts and agencies, it is unfair to assume that 
judges are not concerned about the negative impact of their decisions on agencies 
(Cooper 1985). Other scholars view the courts in a less positive light in the partnership, 
suggesting that courts may overstep their boundaries into administration and legislation 
(O'Leary and Wise 1991; Yarbrough 1985). 
                                                 
25
 Quoting Scripps-Howard Radio v. Federal Communications Commission (1942). 
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However much or little the attitudinal and legal models predict judicial behavior, 
a model of judicial decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals cannot be a 
comprehensive one unless it accounts for courts‘ roles in the administrative law 
partnership with agencies. The dynamics of this relationship may be too complex to 
capture in a quantitative study such as the present one. Future studies of judicial 
decisionmaking should examine further the notions of court-agency partnerships to which 
political scientists, public administration scholars, and judges allude. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS 
Judicial Decisionmaking beyond Administrative Agencies—External Validity 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals‘ reviews of agency decisions is a particularly good 
place to examine the often competing legal and attitudinal models of judicial behavior, 
since explicit law exists requiring judges and courts to defer to agencies. Extant law, such 
as the Chevron decision and the Administrative Procedures Act, explicitly directs judges 
not to substitute their personal policy preferences in place of agency preferences. In the 
face of such prescribed law, it is counterintuitive to suggest that politics is as prolific in 
all areas of judicial decisionmaking as political scientists suggest. Arguably, the results of 
this study may not be generalizable to decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
outside of courts‘ reviews of agency actions. Future inquiry is merited to determine if the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals similarly defer to other entities, such as the U.S. District Courts, 
where legal standards of deference are not the same as with agencies. Further, the results 
of the present study focus on civil law; the results may not be the same for criminal law. 
Which comes first—the decision or the reasoning? 
Attitudinalists argue that judges make decisions based on their policy preferences, 
and then craft legal reasoning to support those decisions. That is, legal reasoning for 
decisions serves as window dressing for ideological decisionmaking. This research 
suggests this may not be true in the U.S. Courts of Appeals when agency decisions are 
under review. If it were true, then the ideologies of judges would not only predict final 
case decisions, but these ideologies would also predict how courts answer legal questions 
in their opinions. Results of this study show that a court‘s ideological agreement with an 
agency does not predict how courts answer standard-of-review and procedural questions. 
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Therefore, it does not follow, as attitudinalists argue, that ideologically based decisions 
are formed before the ideologically formed opinions. 
Although this study shows that neither the decisions nor the opinions of courts are 
based on a court‘s ideological agreement with the agency, it remains unclear whether 
courts and judges form their decisions in advance of their reasoning. The results of the 
present study do not show unequivocally that legal reasoning occurs in advance of final 
case decisions. How courts answer legal questions about deference is highly and 
positively correlated with whether courts support agencies in final case decisions. Based 
on the results and analyses of numerous logistic regressions, it appears that legal 
reasoning in opinions occurs before final case decisions. However, these results and are 
not borne out fully. As a test, I ran all court-level regressions again, using the legal 
variables (how courts answer standard-of-review and procedural-adherence questions 
with respect to agencies) as the dependent variable. I used the court-support variable as 
an explanatory variable, and retained all other control variables as described. In every 
model, the court-support variable predicted how courts answered legal questions and was 
statistically significant at p<0.001. The panel-ideological-agreement variables are not 
statistically significant in any of the models, nor are the DC control variables. This 
suggests that the direction of the causal arrow in these models is not definitive. Inferring 
causality should continue to be a concern for judicial behavior scholars. 
It may be a common practice in American judging to look toward a preferred case 
outcome and then to craft legal reasoning to support those preferences (Burton 1992; 
Warner 1989). This may be true in a number of areas of law, such as contract law, where 
outcomes based on fairness may drive the legal remedy that judges choose to apply to a 
particular set of facts. For example, judges and courts acting in equity may decide the 
outcome before crafting law around their opinions, where the only law supporting their 
decisions is equitable estoppel. Again, it is not uncommon for preferred outcomes to 
precede legal reasoning. 
That the present study does not show definitive causality between legal opinions 
and legal decisions, however, does not undermine the central purpose of this study. 
Whether legal decisions or legal opinions come first is a question separate from whether 
either of these two is determined based on ideology. Future studies of judicial behavior 
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may benefit from considering and testing whether decisions or opinions occur first in 
judges‘ decision-making calculi or whether they occur simultaneously. 
Published and Non-published Cases 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals Database is a sample of published cases with 
opinions—full, memoranda, or per curium. Unpublished cases are not represented in the 
sample. Unpublished cases may have particular importance for studies examining court-
agency relations, especially if these cases are unanimously decided. It is plausible that 
unpublished cases, compared to published ones, are easy or trivial cases, which could 
further suggest that decisions in unpublished cases are made through routine processing 
based on clear-cut legal doctrines devoid of ideological disagreement. There may be a 
greater number of unanimous cases among unpublished cases, but future scholars may 
want to include unpublished cases in their analysis to check this and other assumptions 
(for a comparison of published and unpublished cases in the U.S. District Courts, see 
Songer 1988).  Further, the notion of published cases and unpublished cases continues to 
diminish in some circuits because of the electronic accessibility of ―unpublished‖ cases in 
searchable databases such as LexisNexis and Westlaw. One of the rationales for 
excluding unpublished cases from early quantitative studies may have been the 
inaccessibility of these cases. Modern technology may be changing the way we should 
view unpublished cases. Nonetheless, the present study uses the data from the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals Database, which is a sample of only published cases. Caution should 
be exercised in extending this study‘s findings to unpublished cases. 
Data Limitations 
The results of this study should also be considered in light of other 
methodological and data limitations. Specifically, I omitted ―mixed‖ cases from analysis. 
These are either cases where the ideological direction of case outcomes was mixed or 
cases where court support for agencies was mixed (i.e., affirmed in part and reversed in 
part). There were no obvious differences between these cases and other cases, but 
systematically excluding mixed cases may bias the data. One possible bias is that mixed 
cases may reflect compromise positions among judges on a review panel, or they may 
reflect a compromise position between courts and agencies. Future scholars may want to 
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consider alternative coding structures for databases, so these cases can more easily be 
included in quantitative analyses. 
There is no individual, judge-level data in the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database 
for how judges answered legal questions. In all of the judge-level models presented in 
this study, the legal variables are based on how the court answered legal questions. 
Judge-level data would have been preferable, but was not available. While judge-level 
data would have been preferable, it is not apparent that the results of the present study 
would be substantively different if these data were available. First, there is a high level of 
unanimity in the U.S. Courts of Appeals—90% of cases are unanimous. This means that 
90% of the time an individual judge‘s answers to a legal question will be the same as the 
court‘s answer. 
Second, if a judge disagrees with his or her panel cohorts about how a legal 
question is answered and if this disagreement is substantial, the judge‘s disagreement 
would likely appear in the dissent. As the results in the present study suggest, decisions to 
dissent may be ideological. However, the magnitudes of the ideology coefficients are 
small in the dissent models, which suggest that the influence of ideology may not be 
substantive. If data were available for individual judges‘ answers to legal questions, it is 
unlikely that these answers would strengthen the effects of ideology. However, judge-
level data for the legal variables could show that a judge‘s decision to dissent is based on 
disagreement over a legal issue. Judge-level data for these legal variables may strengthen 
the results of the legal model. For models predicting dissent, this level of coding 
specificity may afford future scholars leverage in analyzing judicial decisionmaking. 
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
The data in the U.S. Courts of Appeals database do not represent cases heard by 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which was created by the Federal 
Courts Improvement Act (1982). The Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit merged 
the former Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and a portion of the U.S. Court of 
Claims. This accounts for the relatively low number of custom and patent appeals cases, 
claims cases, and military appeals heard in the remaining circuit courts. Since a large 
portion of the Federal Circuit‘s docket deals with administrative law cases, future 
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research may benefit from examining the relationship between this court and federal 
administrative agencies. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The results of this dissertation provide insights into judicial decisionmaking and 
court-agency relations in several important ways. First, judicial behavior literature in 
political science is replete with studies of the U.S. Supreme Court. This study adds to the 
limited, but growing, body of literature on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. 
Second, this study also contributes to the even more limited body of empirical 
administrative law literature in the disciplines of political science, public administration, 
and law. As an empirical study of administrative law concepts, I hope that this study 
helps readers understand the relationships between federal courts and federal 
administrative agencies. At a minimum, it underscores the complexity of a system of 
government where the judicial branch is charged with reviewing decisions of 
administrative agencies, which often engage in quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial 
activities. Judicial review of such actions is not simple to characterize and measure. 
Judges juggle myriad considerations, including different standards of review, agency 
adherence to procedures, agency expertise, statutes and precedents prescribing deference, 
their own policy preferences, collegiality, and numerous other variables that are not the 
focus of the present study—namely a unique set of facts for each case they review. I hope 
this study provides students of the courts and administrative law a more informed view of 
the juggling act that judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals must perform. 
Although court-agency relations may be complex, I hope that this study helps 
dispel Justice Antonin Scalia‘s decree that ―[a]dministrative law is not for sissies‖(Scalia 
1989, p. 511). Studying administrative law need not be as daunting as Justice Scalia 
suggests. Perhaps this study will help de-mystify a few administrative law concepts or 
serve as springboard for future administrative law studies. 
This dissertation also contributes to the study of judicial behavior. I spent 
considerable time throughout the study framing research questions, hypotheses, and 
empirical tests in terms of two models of judicial behavior—the legal model and the 
attitudinal model. The results suggest that we should give law its due—perhaps a 
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renewed place in studies of judicial behavior. Renewing law‘s place in judicial behavior 
studies includes continuing to find better ways to conceptualize and measure elements of 
a legal model. We should also continue looking for better ways to measure non-legal 
concepts, including political ideology and judges‘ role perceptions. 
This study illuminates the continued need to bridge epistemological and 
interdisciplinary approaches to studying judicial decisionmaking, law, and the courts. As 
Frank Cross concluded in his study of decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: 
Existing legal research has too often ignored the results, and the methods, 
of the very valuable social scientific examination of judicial decision 
making. Social scientists, though, have too often used cramped and 
inaccurate models of how the law is meant to work and consequently 
demeaned its role. Joint efforts can overcome these shortcomings and 
provide a much truer picture of judicial decision making (Cross 2007, p. 
231). 
I could not agree more. Cross also concludes his study of judicial decisionmaking by 
calling for deeper analyses for the role of law, smaller samples, interaction variables, and 
more rigorous and detailed theoretical examples (pp. 230-31). This dissertation attempts 
to do these things. 
 Finally, this dissertation likely raises more questions about judicial 
decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals than it actually answers. Nonetheless, I 
will view this study as a successful one if it encourages others (including me) to build on 
its shortcomings—to conceptualize, construct, measure and test better, more complete 
models of judicial behavior. 
  
 
 
Copyright © Jerry D. Thomas 2010  
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APPENDIX A: DEPENDENT VARIABLE (SUPPORT) CODING EXCEPTIONS 
BASED ON TREAT VALUES EQUAL TO EIGHT (8) 
 
 
Coding for the dependent variable, support, is based on the treat variable in the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals Database. As discussed in Chapter Four, court support for an 
agency when a court denies a petition or dismisses an appeal (treat = 8). Where treat=8, I 
must distinguish whether the agency is the appellant or the respondent, in order to 
determine whether the court action is supportive or non-supportive to the agency. 
Generally, agencies are the respondent in these cases, so where the database‘s appfed 
variable (indicating the number of appellants that are federal agencies) is greater than 
zero, I coded the agency as the appellant. I checked this coding convention using the 
database‘s r_fed variable, which indicates the number of respondents that are federal 
agencies. Table 4.4.5 in Chapter Four shows a cross-tabulation of appfed and r_fed, and 
also identifies eleven anomalies. I examined these cases individually. This appendix 
documents the anomalies and how I coded them for the dependent variable, support. 
 
Cases Coded with Number of Agencies as Respondents Undeterminable (N=3) 
I examined these three cases to make sure that there is at least one agency as a 
respondent. The exact number of agencies as respondents is unimportant for purposes of 
coding the support variable. All three cases have at least one agency as a respondent. 
 
Casenum Case Name (Citation) Support Code 
17450 Action on Smoking v. Dept. of Labor, et al. (28 F.3d 162)
 26
  1 
357 Center for Auto Safety v. Thomas (EPA administrator) (856 F.2d 1557)
27
 1 
1438 Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. E.P.A. (759 F.2d 922)
28
 1 
 
  
                                                 
26
 The U.S. Department of Labor is a respondent. 
27
 The Environmental Protection Agency is a respondent. 
28
 The Environmental Protection Agency is a respondent. 
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Cases Coded with Number of Agencies as Appellants Undeterminable (N=1) 
I examined this case to make sure there is at least one agency as an appellant. The 
exact number of agencies among appellants is unimportant for purposes of coding the 
support variable. This case is incorrectly coded in the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database as 
noted. 
 
Casenum Case Name (Citation) Support Code 
15646 Telestar, Inc. v. FCC and the United States of America (888 F.3d 132)
 29
  1 
 
 
 
Cases Coded with Agencies as both Appellant and Respondent (N=3) 
All three cases deal with federal agencies appealing decisions of the Federal 
Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). In all three cases, the court reviews FLRA actions 
and FLRA is the respondent. I retained all three cases and coded the support variable with 
respect to FLRA. 
 
Casenum Case Name (Citation) Support Code 
20116 U.S. Dept. of Interior v. Fed. Labor Rel. Authority (132 F.3d 157)
 30
  0 
17028 U.S. Dept. of Interior v. Fed. Labor Rel. Authority (1 F.3d 1059)
31
 0* 
17107 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric  
 Admin., National Weather Svc. V. Fed. Labor Rel. Authority (838 F.2d 93)
32
 0* 
 
* These observations are coded incorrectly in the present study. The support variable should have been 
coded as zero for these cases, but instead was coded as one. These two incorrectly coded observations do 
not affect the findings in this dissertation. 
 
                                                 
29
 This case is incorrectly coded as appfed = 99 (should be 0) and r_fed = 0 (should be 1). In a per curiam 
opinion the D.C. Circuit dismissed the case because the petition as pre-maturely filed (before the vase was 
ripe). I, therefore, coded the support variable in accordance with the FCC‘s decision remaining intact. 
30
 Case involved an FLRA action and whether the court should extend Chevron deference. The judgment 
states, ―We grant the petition for review and deny enforcement of the Authority‘s decision.‖ This case is 
probably miscoded as treat = 8, but since I am able to discern whether the court did or did not support the 
agency, I retain it and code the support variable consistent with the judgment. 
31
 The FLRA action under review was deemed ―unreviewable‖ by the court for lack of jurisdiction. The 
court‘s action has the effect of leaving the FLRA action in place, and the support variable should be coded 
as 0 (non-support). 
32
 Case coded incorrectly for r_fed. The Environmental Protection Agency is obviously the respondent. 
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Cases Coded with Agencies as neither Appellant nor Respondent (N=4) 
 In three of these cases, the r_fed variable was incorrectly coded in the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals database, since federal agencies were clearly respondents in the case. The 
remaining case did not cite a federal agency as a party, but the nature of the case was 
whether the court would honor the agency‘s request not to interfere in the case. All four 
cases are coded 1 for the support variable. 
 
Casenum Case Name (Citation) Support Code 
489 In re Willy (831 F.2d 545)
 33
  1 
16405 Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. et al. (978 F.2d 750)
34
 1 
76 Ausimont USA, Inc. v. E.P.A. (838 F.2d 93)
35
 1 
1878 Burroughs of Ellwood … v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Com. (701 F.2d 266)
36
 1 
 
 
  
                                                 
33
 A specific agency is not named as a party in the case, but the case is a petition for mandamus asking the 
court of appeal to make a final ruling on whether evidence was discoverable based on attorney-client 
privilege. An Administrative Law Judge for the Department of Labor ordered the evidence discoverable, 
and the Secretary of the Department of Labor asked the court to stay its hand. The Court denied the petition 
for mandamus, citing the parties‘ failure to exhaust administrative remedies and not wanting to interfere 
with the administrative process. This case is likely miscoded as treat = 8, since it is interlocutory in nature. 
However, since the court‘s decision showed deference to agency processes, I retained the case and coded 
the support variable as 1 (support). 
34
 Case coded incorrectly for r_fed. Benefits Review Board is part of the ―et al.‖ The judgment states, ―The 
petition to review is dismissed and the [Benefits Review] Board‘s decision is affirmed.‖ 
35
 Case coded incorrectly for r_fed. The Environmental Protection Agency is obviously the respondent. 
36
 Case coded incorrectly for r_fed. FERC is obviously the respondent. 
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APPENDIX B: DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES USED 
 
Variable Type How used Description Values 
 
abuse of 
discretion 
dichotomous independent 
variable 
Did the court conclude that it 
should defer to agency 
discretion? 
 
0=no 
1=yes 
arbitrary & 
capricious 
dichotomous independent 
variable 
Did the court's use or 
interpretation of the 
arbitrary-and-capricious 
standard support the 
government? 
 
0=no 
1=yes 
Chevron 
deference 
dichotomous independent 
variable 
Did the court conclude that 
the agency provided a 
reasonable interpretation to 
statutes? 
 
0=no 
1=yes 
court support dichotomous dependent 
variable 
Did the court support the 
agency? 
 
0=no 
1=yes 
DC dichotomous independent 
variable 
Dummy variable indicating 
the DC circuit 
0=all 
other 
circuits 
1=DC 
Circuit 
 
Dissent dichotomous dependent 
variable 
Did an individual judge 
dissent in the case? 
 
0=no 
1=yes 
judge ideological 
agreement 
continuous independent 
variable 
Judge ideological agreement 
with agency position 
-1=least 
agreement 
1=most 
agreement 
 
judge support dichotomous dependent 
variable 
Did the judge vote to support 
the agency? 
 
0=no 
1=yes 
panel ideological 
agreement 
continuous independent 
variable 
Ideological agreement with 
agency position based on 
mean panel ideology 
-1=least 
agreement 
1=most 
agreement 
 
procedures dichotomous independent 
variable 
Did courts determine 
agencies followed 
procedures (notice, 
comment, record, etc.)? 
 
0=no 
1=yes 
substantial 
evidence 
dichotomous independent 
variable 
Did the court's interpretation 
of the substantial evidence 
rule support the government? 
0=no 
1=yes 
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APPENDIX C: VARIABLE CORRELATION MATRICES 
 
 
Tables B.1 and B.2 show correlations between all dependent and independent 
variables used in logistic regression models. Statistical significance levels are in 
parentheses below each correlation. 
Table C.1 Variable Correlation Matrix: Judge Support 
 
       Judge Panel 
 Judge Subst. Arbitrary Abuse Chevron  Ideology Ideology 
Variable Support Evidence & Capric of Discr Deference Proced. Agree Agree 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Judge 1.00 
Support (DV) 
 
Substantial 0.70 1.00 
Evidence (0.001) 
 
Arbitrary & 0.54 0.86 1.00 
Capricious (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Abuse of 0.59 0.88 0.79 1.00 
Discretion (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Chevron 0.76 0.85 0.88 0.88 1.00 
Deference (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Procedures 0.59 0.87 0.73 0.40 1.00 1.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
 
Judge 0.09 –0.03 –0.01 0.05 0.00 0.08 1.00 
Ideology Agree (0.002) (0.518) (0.998) (0.404) (0.955) (0.261) 
 
Panel 0.15 –0.05 –0.01 0.09 0.01 0.14 0.60 1.00 
Ideology Agree (0.001) (0.279) (0.967) (0.134) (0.893) (0.056) (0.001) 
 
 
224 
 
Table C.2 Variable Correlation Matrix: Court Support 
 
       Panel 
 Court Subst. Arbitrary Abuse Chevron  Ideology 
Variable Support Evidence & Capric of Discr Deference Proced. Agree 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court 1.00 
Support (DV) 
 
Substantial 0.87 1.00 
Evidence (0.001) 
 
Arbitrary & 0.83 0.87 1.00 
Capricious (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Abuse of 0.82 0.88 0.79 1.00 
Discretion (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Chevron 0.90 0.82 0.83 0.88 1.00 
Deference (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Procedures 0.80 0.87 0.72 0.37 1.00 1.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.123) (0.001) 
 
Panel 0.10 –0.04 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.15 1.00 
Ideology Agree (0.030) (0.593) (0.797) (0.500) (0.971) (0.246) 
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